Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the appellant, Brendan Linton, was riding his bicycle on a heavily trafficked state highway in Butler Township, Pennsylvania. The highway had one lane of travel in each direction, with a speed limit varying from 45 to 55 mph. Pennsylvania State Trooper Joshua Osche observed Linton riding his bicycle at speeds significantly lower than the posted speed limits, causing a buildup of traffic behind him. Despite multiple vehicles successfully passing Linton, Trooper Osche eventually initiated a traffic stop, citing Linton for impeding the normal and reasonable movement of traffic under Section 3364(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code.The Court of Common Pleas of Butler County found Linton guilty of violating Section 3364(b)(2), concluding that he should have moved to the berm area to allow faster-moving traffic to pass. The court imposed a $25 fine. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment, agreeing that Linton's failure to use the berm constituted a violation of the statute.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether Section 3364(b)(2) requires pedalcyclists to leave the roadway whenever faster-moving traffic approaches. The Court concluded that the statute calls for a fact-bound assessment of reasonableness, taking all relevant considerations into account. The Court held that there may be circumstances under which a factfinder could determine that the "reasonable efforts" a pedalcycle operator must exert include temporarily leaving the roadway. However, the Court rejected the rigid interpretations of both the appellant and the lower courts, emphasizing that the statute does not mandate pedalcyclists to always vacate the roadway for faster-moving traffic.The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the lower court to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence using the proper legal standard. View "Commonwealth v. Linton" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Gabriel Porter was cited for a traffic infraction under California Vehicle Code section 23123.5(a) for holding and viewing a mapping application on his wireless phone while driving. Section 23123.5(a) prohibits drivers from holding and operating a handheld wireless telephone unless it is used in a voice-operated and hands-free manner. Porter contested the citation, arguing that viewing a mapping application did not constitute "operating" the phone as defined by the statute. The traffic commissioner found Porter guilty and imposed a $158 fine.Porter appealed to the appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which reversed his conviction. The appellate division concluded that "operating" a wireless telephone required active use or manipulation, such as talking, listening, emailing, or browsing the internet, and that merely observing GPS directions did not meet this threshold. The court suggested that the Legislature might need to amend the statute to address evolving technology and distracted driving concerns.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case to ensure uniformity in legal interpretation. The court examined the statutory language, legislative history, and public policy considerations. It concluded that "operating" under section 23123.5(a) includes all uses of a handheld phone's functions while driving, including viewing a mapping application. The court determined that the Legislature intended to prohibit all handheld phone use while driving to mitigate distracted driving risks. Consequently, the appellate division's judgment was reversed, and Porter's traffic conviction was reinstated. View "P. v. Porter" on Justia Law

A group of seven Utah counties, known as the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, applied to the U.S. Surface Transportation Board for approval to construct an 88-mile railroad line in Utah's Uinta Basin. This project aimed to connect the oil-rich region to the national freight rail network, facilitating crude oil transportation to Gulf Coast refineries. The Board prepared a 3,600-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the project's significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives. However, the EIS did not fully analyze the potential environmental impacts of increased upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case after petitions were filed by a Colorado county and several environmental organizations. The D.C. Circuit found numerous violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the EIS, specifically criticizing the Board for not sufficiently analyzing the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit vacated both the EIS and the Board's final approval order for the railroad line.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. The Court held that the D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases. The Supreme Court clarified that NEPA requires agencies to focus on the environmental effects of the proposed project itself, not on separate projects that are distinct in time or place. The Court concluded that the Board's EIS complied with NEPA's procedural requirements by addressing the environmental effects of the 88-mile railroad line, without needing to evaluate the impacts of upstream oil drilling or downstream oil refining. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) increased the rental fees for hangar space at state-owned airports. Five tenants, who own hangar facilities at the Northeast Kingdom International Airport and the Stowe-Morrisville State Airport, appealed the rate increases to the Transportation Board. They argued that the rent increase did not comply with the terms of their leases and was arbitrary. The leases allowed AOT to adjust rent based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), current market value for the land, and maintenance costs for the airport. The tenants contended that AOT improperly considered changes outside the previous lease term.The Transportation Board consolidated the tenants' appeals and reviewed the administrative records and memoranda submitted by both parties. The Board found that AOT had invested significantly in airport improvements and conducted a market-value analysis for leased space. However, the Board noted that details of the analysis were not included in the administrative record. The Board concluded that AOT was permitted to consider changes to market value and maintenance costs outside of the prior lease term but admonished AOT to provide a clearer analysis in the future.The tenants appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the rent increases were arbitrary and capricious due to a lack of transparent methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's conclusion that AOT could consider changes outside the prior lease term but reversed and remanded the decision concerning the fairness of the rent increases. The Court held that the Board should have sought a complete record from AOT to determine whether the rent levels were fair and conducted a new adjudication consistent with this opinion. View "In re State Airport Hangar Lease Disputes" on Justia Law

Javier Hernandez, a farm laborer employed by Ceja Reyes, Inc., was injured in a vanpool accident while commuting home from work. Hernandez did not have a driver's license or own a car, and he used a vanpool arranged by another employee, paying $10 per day for the service. The vanpool was not provided by Ceja Reyes, and the driver at the time of the accident did not have a valid California driver's license. Hernandez sustained catastrophic injuries, including a right leg amputation, and filed a workers' compensation claim.A workers' compensation judge initially heard the case and concluded that Hernandez's claim was not barred by the going and coming rule, applying the special risk and dual purpose exceptions. Zenith Insurance Company, Ceja Reyes's workers' compensation insurer, denied the claim and filed a petition for reconsideration. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) denied the petition and adopted the judge's report, leading Zenith to file a petition for writ of review with the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and determined that the Board's application of the special risk and dual purpose exceptions was erroneous. The court found that the special risk exception did not apply because the injury did not occur just outside the employer's premises and there was no relationship between the risk and the location of the premises or conditions over which the employer had control. Additionally, the dual purpose exception was deemed inapplicable as the commute did not provide an incidental benefit to the employer beyond the normal need for the employee's presence at work. Consequently, the court annulled the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Zenith Insurance Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court's decision.CMI then sought attorney's fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court's ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs' ability to assess the offer's value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling CMI's unapportioned offer invalid. View "Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Charles and Grant Adler, through their business entity CM Adler LLC, distributed tortillas and other food products of Defendant Gruma Corporation to grocery stores in central New Jersey under a "Store Door Distributor Agreement" (SDDA). When Defendant terminated the relationship, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging retaliatory termination due to their organizing efforts with other distributors. Plaintiffs claimed violations of state and federal labor laws, including failure to pay minimum wages and unlawful deductions, and argued that the SDDA was a franchise agreement subject to New Jersey's Franchise Practices Act, which forbids termination without cause.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the case, concluding that Texas law governed under the SDDA and the case should proceed to arbitration. The District Court did not address the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or Plaintiffs' exemption argument under 9 U.S.C. § 1. It found the parties had contracted for Texas law, under which the arbitration agreement was enforceable, and rejected Plaintiffs' bid to apply New Jersey law instead. The District Court also decided that Charles and Grant Adler, who did not sign the contract, were estopped from challenging its arbitration provision because they acted as parties to the contract when they performed the LLC’s work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the FAA does not apply to the SDDA because Plaintiffs are transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals found that the District Court erred in its choice-of-law analysis by failing to consider the impact of New Jersey public policies on its arbitrability ruling. The Court of Appeals vacated the order compelling arbitration and remanded for the District Court to complete the choice-of-law analysis under the correct framework and to reevaluate whether the individual Plaintiffs, who did not sign the arbitration agreement, are bound by its terms. View "Adler v. Gruma Corporation" on Justia Law

A business owner and his company, which provides non-emergency medical transportation, challenged the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute requiring a showing of "public convenience and necessity" to obtain a certificate to operate such services. They argued that the statute violated the Nebraska Constitution's due process, special legislation, and special privileges and immunities clauses. They claimed the requirement protected existing providers from competition and harmed the public by reducing service quality.The district court for Lancaster County rejected their constitutional challenges and dismissed their complaint. The court applied a rational basis test to the due process claim, finding the statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest in preventing destructive competition and ensuring reliable transportation services. The court also found the statute did not create an arbitrary or unreasonable classification or a closed class, thus rejecting the special legislation claim. Finally, the court determined the statute did not grant irrevocable special privileges or immunities, dismissing the special privileges and immunities claim.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rejection of the facial constitutional challenges, agreeing that the statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and did not violate the special legislation or special privileges and immunities clauses. However, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's order to the extent it ruled on as-applied challenges, determining that such challenges should be raised in an application for certification and an appeal from any denial by the Public Service Commission. View "N'Da v. Golden" on Justia Law

Christopher Ray was observed by a Cumberland Police Department officer riding his bicycle slightly to the left of the white fog line on Tuttle Road. The officer, traveling behind Ray and another cyclist, instructed them to ride single file. Ray responded with an expletive, prompting the officer to stop them and issue Ray a violation summons for failing to keep to the right of the road, as required by 29-A M.R.S. § 2063(2).Ray contested the violation, and a bench trial was held in the District Court (Portland). The court found Ray had committed the traffic infraction of not operating his bicycle on the right portion of the way as far as practicable and imposed a fine of $151. Ray appealed the decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the interpretation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2063(2). The Court found the statute ambiguous regarding where cyclists must operate when the command to ride to the right applies. The Court noted that the terms "roadway" and "way" were not clearly defined, and the statute's language left it up to the cyclist to determine what was safe, making enforcement difficult. The Court concluded that the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of Ray, vacated the adjudication, and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Ray. View "State of Maine v. Ray" on Justia Law

Timothy Hoffstead, a canine handler for Metra, was suspended after testing positive for amphetamines and opioids during a random drug test. Hoffstead attributed the positive result to his prescribed medications for ADD, migraines, and a wrist injury. The medical review officer (MRO) attempted to contact Hoffstead for an explanation but was unsuccessful. Consequently, Hoffstead was suspended and later not considered for an open canine handler position. Despite providing proof of his prescriptions and having his test results revised to negative, Metra required him to complete a rehabilitation program. Hoffstead eventually returned to work but left Metra for other employment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The court found that Hoffstead failed to demonstrate that Metra's actions were due to his disability. The court also ruled that it could not consider Hoffstead's claim regarding the exercise of seniority under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) due to the Railway Labor Act (RLA), which prohibits courts from interpreting CBAs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Hoffstead did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Metra's actions were motivated by his disability. The court noted that Hoffstead's failure to respond to the MRO and his decision to waive an investigation in favor of the rehabilitation program were the primary reasons for Metra's actions. The court also found that the RLA did not preclude adjudicating Hoffstead's claim regarding the seniority rules but concluded that Hoffstead failed to demonstrate a link between his disability and Metra's actions. View "Hoffstead v Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp" on Justia Law