Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

A man traveling with his family, including his thirteen-year-old daughter, on Delta Air Lines was reported by a flight attendant for suspected human trafficking or sexual abuse after comforting his distressed daughter during turbulence. The flight attendant relayed her suspicions to the flight captain, who then involved the airport station manager, resulting in a call to law enforcement. Upon landing, police detained and questioned the man and his daughter but found no probable cause for arrest. The incident caused the man significant emotional distress and exacerbated his pre-existing PTSD.He subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News against the flight attendant, Delta, and Endeavor Air, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and moved to dismiss, claiming immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. The district court agreed, holding that the defendants were immune because the report, even if made only to law enforcement and not to social services, was made in good faith and without malicious intent. The man appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was uncertain whether the immunity statute applied in this context and certified the legal question to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia, upon review of the certified question, held that Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 does not provide immunity to a nonmandatory reporter who, in good faith, reports suspected child abuse to law enforcement without also contacting a Department of Social Services employee or the designated hotline. The Court reasoned that the statutory language is clear and limits immunity to specific categories, which do not include complaints made solely to law enforcement by nonmandatory reporters. The answer to the certified question was “no.” View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Following two fatal airplane crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which resulted in significant loss of life, the Department of Justice investigated Boeing for misleading the Federal Aviation Administration about changes to flight control systems. The Department initially entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing, requiring the company to pay a substantial fine and undertake remedial measures. After Boeing was alleged to have breached the DPA, the Department negotiated a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again requiring compliance and penalties. Family members of crash victims challenged both the DPA and NPA, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).The families first moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to set aside the DPA, arguing they were denied timely notice and the right to confer as crime victims. The district court found the Department had not acted in bad faith but had committed a legal error in initially failing to recognize the families as crime victims. The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to review or alter the terms of the DPA. When the Department later moved to dismiss the charges based on the NPA, the families objected, but the district court granted the motion, finding the Department had provided sufficient reasons and had not acted with bad faith.The families petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for writs of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenge to the DPA was moot because it was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. As to the NPA, the court found the Department had satisfied the CVRA’s requirements to confer with and treat the families fairly. The court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to conduct a substantive review of the district court’s dismissal of charges. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. View "In re Ryan" on Justia Law

A professional pilot was asked to operate a Cessna Citation 550 aircraft whose tail number had recently been changed by its owner from N550ME to N550MK. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved the new registration and issued new documents, but denied a new airworthiness certificate because the aircraft required further inspection. Believing the registration had reverted to the old number due to the denial, the owner had the physical tail number altered back to N550ME using tape, while the aircraft carried documents for both the old and new registrations. The pilot, after being told about “paperwork issues” and noticing the taped number, proceeded to fly the aircraft on two flights without confirming the correct registration and without a valid airworthiness certificate for the current registered tail number. After the first flight, FAA inspectors issued a written notice warning that further operation would violate federal regulations; the pilot disregarded this and completed the return flight.The FAA suspended the pilot’s license for 150 days, citing violations of various regulations requiring proper display of the registered tail number and possession of a valid airworthiness certificate. The pilot appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), where an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the FAA’s order after a hearing. The full NTSB then affirmed the ALJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s findings and sanction. The court held that the NTSB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the pilot’s reliance on the owner’s explanation was unreasonable and that the penalty was not excessive, even if the violations were administrative. The court also found no improper disparity in sanctioning compared to another pilot. The petition for review was denied, and the suspension was upheld. View "Hardwick v. FAA" on Justia Law

Several individuals died in a 2015 small aircraft accident in Georgia, including the pilot and three passengers. The plaintiffs, representing the victims and their estates, brought claims in 2017 against Avco Corporation and its division, Lycoming Engines, which manufactured the aircraft’s engine, as well as against companies that performed maintenance on the engine. The claims included strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranties, and other theories. Over time, all defendants except Avco were voluntarily dismissed from the suit.The Superior Court in Buncombe County was assigned the case as exceptional. In 2022, the court granted Avco summary judgment on all claims except negligent failure to warn, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Avco had misrepresented or withheld information from the Federal Aviation Administration, which could trigger an exception to the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). Avco moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in 2024, reaffirming that the question of whether Avco knowingly concealed required information should go to the jury.Avco appealed this interlocutory order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, presumably for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order. Avco then sought review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that an interlocutory order denying a statute of repose defense, such as GARA, affects a substantial right because it grants immunity from suit—not merely from liability—and thus is immediately appealable. The Court overruled contrary Court of Appeals precedent and reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the merits of Avco’s claim to statutory immunity. View "Byrd v. Avco Corp" on Justia Law

The case concerns injuries suffered by two individuals, one in New York and one in Pennsylvania, each struck by buses operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit), a public transportation entity created by the New Jersey Legislature. NJ Transit operates as a “body corporate and politic” with significant powers such as suing and being sued, entering contracts, and raising funds. Its founding statute specifies that debts or liabilities of NJ Transit are not debts of the State of New Jersey, and all expenses must be paid from NJ Transit’s own funds. The State retains substantial control over NJ Transit through board appointments and removal powers, veto authority, and some legislative oversight, but the statute also stresses NJ Transit’s operational independence.After the incidents, the injured parties filed negligence lawsuits against NJ Transit in their home state courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both suits, arguing it was an arm of New Jersey and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey, allowing the New York suit to proceed. Conversely, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that NJ Transit is an arm of New Jersey and dismissed the Pennsylvania suit.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed both cases to resolve the conflict. It held that NJ Transit is not an arm of the State of New Jersey and therefore does not share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. The Court emphasized that NJ Transit’s status as a legally separate corporation, responsible for its own debts and judgments, and the absence of formal state liability for its obligations, are decisive. The Court affirmed the New York decision, reversed the Pennsylvania decision, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law

Two former residents of Libby, Montana developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos. The exposure was linked to asbestos-containing vermiculite transported by BNSF Railway Company from a nearby mine. Between 1922 and 1990, BNSF was required by federal law to ship this vermiculite to and from its Libby railyard. Evidence showed that asbestos dust escaped from sealed railcars during transit and switching operations, eventually accumulating in and around the railyard. Both plaintiffs resided or spent considerable time near the railyard during the relevant period.This litigation began when the personal representatives of the decedents’ estates brought negligence and strict liability claims against BNSF in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. BNSF moved for summary judgment on the strict liability claims, arguing that it was protected by the common carrier exception, but the district court denied the motion. After a jury trial, the jury found for BNSF on negligence but for the plaintiffs on strict liability, awarding compensatory damages. The district court subsequently denied BNSF’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the strict liability claims, prompting BNSF’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of Montana law de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the common carrier exception too narrowly. The appellate court concluded that BNSF’s transportation of asbestos-containing vermiculite, including the resulting accumulation of asbestos dust, was conducted pursuant to its federally mandated duty as a common carrier. Montana law, including recent precedent from the Montana Supreme Court, supported applying the common carrier exception to shield BNSF from strict liability in these circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for BNSF. View "Wells v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

A plaintiff was injured in a collision at an intersection controlled by a malfunctioning traffic signal. Both drivers claimed to have stopped at the flashing red light and to have the right of way. The defendant was driving a truck for his employer, who was also named in the suit under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The plaintiff alleged negligence by the truck driver in failing to maintain control, keep a proper lookout, and yield, and sought damages for injuries and loss of consortium. The employer denied negligence and asserted contributory negligence by the plaintiff.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, granted the employer’s motion to exclude two of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses, finding their testimony would not aid the jury. The court also denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint shortly before trial, which sought to add direct negligence claims against the employer and violations of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). Additionally, the court refused a jury instruction on those regulations. At trial, the jury found the defendant negligent but determined the plaintiff was contributorily negligent to a degree greater than slight, awarding no damages.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend as to direct negligence claims against the employer due to untimeliness and prejudice, but erred in denying amendment as to the truck driver’s alleged FMCSR violations, since those allegations provided statutory grounds for existing negligence claims and were not prejudicial or futile. The Supreme Court also held that excluding the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, as it would have assisted the jury, and that refusal to instruct the jury on FMCSRs was erroneous. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Hamer V. Duffy" on Justia Law

A passenger was seriously injured after the driver of a remotely rented vehicle, accessed via a membership-based car-sharing service, crashed while under the influence of alcohol. The driver, a university student and approved member of the rental service, reserved the vehicle through a mobile app late at night after consuming alcohol at a party. The process for renting and accessing the car involved no face-to-face interaction with company staff, and the company had no prior knowledge of the driver’s intoxication or any history of impaired driving. Following the crash, the driver was convicted of felony DUI causing injury.The injured passenger sued the car-sharing company and its affiliated vehicle owner in the Superior Court of Yolo County, alleging negligent entrustment for providing the car to an unfit driver, negligent maintenance for failing to include technology to detect driver impairment, and vicarious liability based on vehicle ownership. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled for the defendants, holding that the company owed no duty to inquire about a renter’s impairment at the time of a remote rental, had no duty to install alcohol-detection devices, and was shielded from vicarious liability by federal law (the Graves Amendment).On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that remote rental car companies are exempt from statutory requirements to inspect for signs of impairment at the time of rental, per Civil Code section 1939.37, and that courts should not impose additional investigatory duties absent legislative action. The court also held that the Graves Amendment preempts state law claims of vicarious liability based solely on vehicle ownership. Judgment for the defendants was therefore affirmed. View "Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc." on Justia Law