Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston's Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA's environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town's petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA's final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves. View "Milton, MA v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, addressed two questions relating to the interpretation of Section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The questions pertained to the application of this statute when a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the court could have had jurisdiction had the claimants properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts and when the subsequent action is to be filed within 60 days after the dismissal becomes final.The first question was whether Section 16.064(a) applies when the prior court dismissed the action because of lack of jurisdiction, but the court would have had jurisdiction if the claimants had properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court of Texas answered in the affirmative, concluding that the statute applies even if the prior court could have had jurisdiction, as long as it dismissed the action due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.The second question was whether the subsequent action was filed within sixty days after the dismissal became final. The Supreme Court of Texas also answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a dismissal or other disposition becomes final under Section 16.064(a)(2) when the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the courts' power to alter the dismissal has ended.The factual background of the case involved two flight attendants who alleged that they were injured when a smoke detector on a flight malfunctioned. They initially filed a suit against The Boeing Company in a federal district court in Houston, then refiled their claims in a federal district court in Dallas. After the Dallas district court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction (based on inadequate pleading of diversity jurisdiction), the flight attendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the flight attendants subsequently refiled their claims in state court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the action based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Houston district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, leading to the certified questions. View "SANDERS v. THE BOEING COMPANY (U.S. Fifth Circuit 22-20317)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in contested cases before the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA), arguments not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the general session.Appellant received two administrative citations for improperly staging its vehicles at its casino without a charter order, in violation of Appellant's certificate restriction and NAC 706.360. Appellant agreed to the fines, and a hearing officer recommended that the NTA accept Appellant's stipulations and enter the fines against Appellant. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, arguing that its certificate restriction was federally preempted. The district court concluded that the certificate was related to safety and thus not federally preempted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce Appellant's certification restriction; and (2) Appellant waived its preemption argument by entering into the stipulation. View "Highroller Transportation, LLC v. Nev. Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law

CSX Transportation, Inc. is a freight railroad company. General Mills, Inc. operates a cereal processing plant in Georgia near one of CSX’s rail lines. A small connecting railroad connects CSX’s main rail line to General Mills’s plant. A contract between CSX and General Mills governs the use of the sidetrack.A General Mills employee suffered severe injuries while working on the sidetrack and then sued CSX for negligence. A jury found CSX liable, and CSX sought indemnification from General Mills, citing a contractual provision providing General Mills was required to indemnify CSX—regardless of whether CSX alone was responsible. The district court dismissed one of CSX’s breach-of-contract claims and granted General Mills summary judgment on the other.The Eleventh Circuit found that, under the parties’ agreement, General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely negligent. However, the court disagreed with the district court that Georgia's vouchment doctrine barred CSX from litigating the issue of General Mills’s negligence. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for the district court to determine if General Mills was at least partially at fault for the injury. If so, then General Mills must indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settlement and related expenses. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained. View "Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court interpreting Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, 2413-A to permit a determination that Defendant had committed three civil violations and to authorize the trial court to impose consecutive license suspensions, holding that the trial court did not err.Defendant admitted to three counts of committing a motor vehicle violation resulting in death pursuant to section 2413-A(1). After a penalty hearing, the trial court imposed a $5,000 fine and a three-year license suspension for each of the counts, with the fines being cumulative and the suspensions to be imposed consecutively. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the penalties, holding (1) section 2413-A(1) authorizes separate violations for each death that occurs as a result of a driving violation and authorizes trial courts to impose consecutive license suspensions under their discretion; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the consecutive suspensions. View "State v. Santerre" on Justia Law

The United States Maritime Administration (“MARAD”) approved a shipping company’s request to replace two vessels operating in the Pacific trade within the Maritime Security Program. Matson Navigation Co., a competitor in the Pacific, petitions for review of the replacements. As a source of jurisdiction, Matson points to the Hobbs Act, under which the DC Circuit had original jurisdiction over some acts of MARAD.   The DC Circuit reversed two orders of the district court, consolidated with these petitions, that held jurisdiction over Matson’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and was exclusive in the court of appeals. The court wrote that Matson was not a “party” to the replacement proceedings for either vessel, therefore, the court denied the petitions for direct review. The court explained that whether a case begins in district court or is eligible for direct review in the court is a policy decision that is for “Congress rather than us to determine.” The court wrote that as Matson’s counsel stated at oral argument, the company is just “trying to get review.” Because sending limited comments based on limited information to an informal agency proceeding does not confer “party” status under the Hobbs Act, that review starts in the district court. View "Matson Navigation Company, Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law

A former BNSF Railway Company employee died from lung cancer in 2018. Plaintiff, on behalf of her late husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that her husband’s cancer was caused by his exposure to toxins at work. The district court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and granted summary judgment to BNSF.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos or diesel combustion fumes. Even if a jury could infer that Plaintiff’s husband had been exposed, there is no evidence of the level of exposure. The court explained that while a quantifiable amount of exposure is not required to find causation between toxic exposure and injury, there must be, at a minimum, “evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered,” There is no such evidence here. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the expert’s opinion lacked a sufficient foundation and that, in turn, his methodology for proving causation was unreliable. View "Rebecca Lancaster v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law