Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

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Sonia Breslow purchased a $250,000 watch from Jacob & Company, which was shipped from New York to the Iron Horse Golf Club in Montana. The Club repackaged the shipment and sent it via Federal Express (FedEx) “priority overnight” to a UPS store in Arizona. The shipping label did not declare a value for the package. Video evidence showed that after FedEx took possession, the yellow bag containing two boxes was no longer secured by a zip tie, and at the Scottsdale facility, an employee removed one box from the bag. Ultimately, FedEx delivered the bag to the UPS store, but the watch was missing. Sonia filed an insurance claim, and Pennsylvania Insurance paid the Breslows the purchase price, then sued FedEx as their subrogee.Pennsylvania Insurance initially brought claims for negligence, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and civil theft in Nebraska state court. FedEx removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. The district court ruled that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted the claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil theft, dismissed the conversion claim for lack of evidence, and found breach of contract but limited FedEx’s liability under the shipping contract to $100. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where the court found the breach and upheld the liability limit, entering judgment for Pennsylvania Insurance in the amount of $100.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state-law claims relating to FedEx’s package handling and transportation services. It found no error in the district court’s dismissal of the conversion claim and upheld the liability limit of $100, concluding that the Club had adequate notice and opportunity to purchase greater coverage. The court also affirmed that Pennsylvania Insurance had standing as subrogee and that FedEx breached the contract. View "Pennsylvania Insurance Co. v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

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Three individuals employed as customer service agents for a ground services provider and an airline at Denver International Airport brought a class action lawsuit asserting violations of Colorado’s wage laws. Their complaint alleged that the employers improperly deducted time for lunch breaks not taken, forced work during rest breaks, failed to pay overtime, and withheld commissions. Each employee’s contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the employers sought to enforce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Colorado law. The employees responded that, as transportation workers, their contracts were exempt from the FAA, and further argued that Colorado law voided such arbitration agreements for wage claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motions to compel arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court focused narrowly on the specific duties of the three employees, rather than considering the work typically performed by the broader class of customer service agents. It found that the employees “actually and routinely” handled passenger luggage and played a “gatekeeping” role with respect to cargo. On this basis, the court concluded they were transportation workers exempt from the FAA. The district court did not address the request to compel arbitration under Colorado law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by defining the relevant class of workers too narrowly—focusing only on the specific employees, rather than the typical duties of the class as a whole, as required by Supreme Court precedent (including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings to properly determine the attributes of the class of workers under the correct legal standard. View "Joyner v. Frontier Airlines" on Justia Law

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A municipal corporation operating a large regional commuter rail system in the Chicago area provided rail service on lines owned by a freight rail company. For decades, this service was conducted under a series of agreements, but in 2019, the freight rail company announced it would cease operating the commuter trains. Following litigation, the freight company obtained a declaratory judgment that it had no ongoing obligation to provide such service. While the commuter rail operator began transitioning to run the service itself, the parties failed to reach agreement on compensation for continued use of the lines. With no long-term agreement in place and negotiations at an impasse, the commuter rail operator applied to the federal Surface Transportation Board for terminal trackage rights, which would allow it to use the lines despite the lack of agreement.The Surface Transportation Board granted the application, finding the lines to be terminal facilities for a reasonable distance from the terminal, and that the use would be practicable, in the public interest, and not substantially impair the freight carrier’s operations. The Board did not set compensation or use conditions at that time but pledged to do so retroactively if the parties could not agree. The freight rail company sought review of this decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The Eighth Circuit held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in granting terminal trackage rights to the commuter operator, including over the full extent of the lines at issue, and properly concluded the public interest was served. However, the court found that the Board erred by granting immediate rights without first ensuring that compensation was paid or adequately secured, as required by statute. The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing time for the parties to address compensation. View "Union Pacific Railroad Company v. STB" on Justia Law

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Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Aerovias de México, S.A. de C.V. sought approval from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for a joint venture to provide integrated airline services between the United States and Mexico. DOT approved the joint venture in 2016, granting both approval and antitrust immunity after finding that it would increase competition and public benefits in the U.S.–Mexico aviation market. As part of the approval, DOT required the petitioners to divest certain take-off and landing slots at Mexico City’s airport and imposed a five-year limit on antitrust immunity, citing concerns about slot allocation practices at that airport.After the initial approval, the petitioners operated under these conditions and, in 2022, sought renewal of the joint venture’s approval and immunity. However, DOT issued show-cause orders in 2024, and subsequently a final order in 2025, terminating both the approval and antitrust immunity. The DOT’s decision was based primarily on changes to slot allocation and restrictions on all-cargo carriers by the Mexican government at Mexico City’s airport, which DOT concluded had undermined competition and the public interest. The petitioners challenged this final order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that DOT’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the petitioners. It found that DOT had departed from its uniform practice of conducting comprehensive market analyses, instead focusing narrowly on a single airport without adequate explanation. The court also determined that DOT had imposed a requirement for open skies agreement implementation on the petitioners that it had not imposed in similar cases involving other countries. The court held that DOT’s final order was arbitrary and capricious, and vacated the order. View "Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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A pilot was selected for a random drug test at work and tested positive for amphetamine, a prohibited substance under federal aviation regulations. He was immediately grounded by his employer but later reinstated after completing a return-to-duty process. The pilot explained that he had inadvertently ingested his son’s prescription medication, Vyvanse, mistaking it for his own, due to a stressful family medical emergency and similar-looking pill bottles. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiated proceedings to revoke his pilot and medical certificates, as such a violation typically warrants revocation.The case was first heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the pilot had violated the regulations but reduced the sanction from revocation to a 90-day suspension, citing mitigating circumstances. Both parties appealed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed the case de novo, concluded the pilot had proven his accidental-ingestion defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and upheld the 90-day suspension. The NTSB found aggravating factors as well, including the pilot’s failure to report the ingestion before performing safety-sensitive duties.The pilot then sought attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing that he was the prevailing party. An ALJ granted his application, but the NTSB reversed, concluding that although the pilot prevailed in obtaining a reduced sanction, the FAA’s position in seeking revocation was substantially justified. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NTSB’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the FAA’s actions throughout the proceedings had a reasonable basis in law and fact. View "Knight v. NTSB" on Justia Law

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Several railroads and industry groups challenged a federal regulation requiring most freight trains to operate with at least two crewmembers unless the use of a one-person crew is shown to be equally safe. The regulation, issued by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in 2024, responded to safety concerns about the reduction of train crew sizes as technology advanced, citing specific accidents and research on the importance of crew redundancy for safety. The rule provides exemptions for smaller railroads with established one-person operations and offers a special approval process for others, especially those transporting hazardous materials.Previously, the FRA had declined to regulate crew size, withdrawing a proposed rule in 2019 based on insufficient evidence that one-person crews were less safe. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated this withdrawal, criticizing the agency's reasoning and its attempt to preempt state crew-size laws. Following a new rulemaking process, the FRA finalized the 2024 regulation after considering thousands of public comments, a public hearing, and new safety data.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed consolidated petitions from several railroads and associations. The petitioners argued, among other points, that the FRA exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, failed to adequately consider costs, and violated statutory deadlines. The Eleventh Circuit held that the FRA acted within its broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety, provided reasonable explanations for its policy changes and regulatory choices, adequately considered evidence and public input, and did not violate the law by taking more than twelve months to finalize the rule. The court denied all petitions for review, upholding the Crew Size Rule. View "Florida East Coast Railway LLC v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

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Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

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Two individuals died in a 2012 plane crash involving a Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee 6 aircraft powered by a Lycoming engine manufactured by Avco Corporation in the early 1970s. The engine had undergone overhauls in 1983 and 2004, with several component parts serviced or replaced during those processes. The estates and families of the decedents brought suit in Rhode Island Superior Court against Avco, alleging strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Avco asserted a defense under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which bars certain claims against aircraft manufacturers after eighteen years, subject to specific exceptions for misrepresentation and newly installed parts.The Providence County Superior Court addressed the applicability of GARA’s exceptions. The court found that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to plead, with the required specificity, facts showing that Avco knowingly misrepresented or withheld information from the FAA as required by GARA’s misrepresentation exception. As a result, discovery on this theory was limited. On the rolling provision, the court allowed discovery on specific parts allegedly replaced within eighteen years prior to the crash but found plaintiffs failed to prove that any such part was both manufactured by Avco and causally related to the accident. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Avco on all claims.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that GARA requires plaintiffs to plead specific facts to invoke the misrepresentation exception, which the plaintiffs had not done. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the application of GARA’s rolling provision, as they did not establish that any newly installed part made by Avco caused the crash. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of Avco. View "Williams v. Avco Corporation" on Justia Law

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The case concerns a challenge to a Colorado statute enacted in 2024, which imposed a “congestion impact fee” of up to $3 per day on all short-term vehicle rentals in the state, including rentals at airports and elsewhere. The fee revenue is designated for transportation infrastructure projects to reduce traffic congestion and benefit users of rental vehicles. The statute specifies that the fee applies to all short-term vehicle rentals statewide, including both traditional rental companies and car-sharing programs.The American Car Rental Association, representing car rental companies operating in Colorado, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Association argued that the Colorado fee was preempted by the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (“AHTA”), specifically 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)(2)(A)(v), which prohibits states from imposing certain taxes or fees “upon any business located at a commercial service airport” unless those taxes or fees are generally imposed on sales or services by the state. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, finding that the fee was not preempted by the AHTA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but for a different reason. The Tenth Circuit held that the AHTA’s preemption provision applies only to fees or taxes imposed directly upon airport businesses, while Colorado’s congestion impact fee is imposed on consumers who rent vehicles, not on the rental businesses themselves. The court determined that rental companies and car-sharing programs merely act as collection agents for the fee, which is ultimately paid by consumers. Therefore, the federal statute does not preempt Colorado’s fee, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "American Car Rental Association v. Humphreys" on Justia Law

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Five individuals residing near a New Orleans hospital brought suit after the hospital moved its helicopter landing pad from a one-story building near the Mississippi River to the top of a new tower in the center of the hospital complex. The plaintiffs, claiming that the new helipad created excessive noise and vibrations, sought a mandatory injunction requiring the hospital to relocate the helipad or otherwise abate the disturbance, as well as damages for nuisance and negligence.The defendants removed the case from state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request to remand the case to state court, finding that their subsequent removal of class-action allegations and request to decline supplemental jurisdiction amounted to improper forum shopping. The district court then granted the defendants partial summary judgment, holding that Federal Aviation Administration regulations preempted any permanent injunction to relocate the helipad. The court also dismissed some of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages, but allowed their claims for general nuisance damages to proceed to trial. Before trial, the plaintiffs appealed the order, seeking review of the denial of their request for an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the district court’s order did not explicitly deny an injunction and, even if it had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief, the plaintiffs did not show that they satisfied the requirements for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and Carson v. American Brands, Inc. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners" on Justia Law