Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

This case stems from a fatal plane crash in which a pilot, Chelsea Brittney Infanger, collided with exhaust stacks owned by a processing plant near the Burley Municipal Airport in Idaho. The stacks, which extended over 100 feet high, were situated within the runway’s approach path and had been the subject of prior regulatory concern. The pilot’s parents brought a wrongful death suit, alleging that the Idaho Department of Transportation’s Division of Aeronautics negligently failed to regulate or mitigate the known risk posed by these stacks, arguing that various statutory, common law, special relationship, and contractual duties compelled the Division to act.After settlements with other defendants, the case proceeded against the Division in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County. The Division moved for summary judgment, contending it owed no individualized duty to the deceased under the Airport Zoning Act, common law, or through a special relationship, and that it was immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court agreed, holding that the Division’s statutory duties were general obligations to the public, not specific duties to individual aviators, and found no basis for liability under special relationship or contract theories. The court granted summary judgment to the Division, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the Airport Zoning Act did not create a tort duty to a particular class of persons, but rather imposed general obligations for public safety, and thus could not support a negligence per se claim. The Court also found that the plaintiffs did not preserve or demonstrate the elements necessary for a special relationship or assumed duty sufficient to impose liability. The Court declined to award attorney fees, but granted costs to the Division. View "Infanger v. State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Several individuals living within a five-mile radius of the Seattle-Tacoma Airport sued two major airlines and the Port of Seattle. They alleged that pollution from aircraft takeoffs and landings caused harm to their health and property, particularly from particulate matter and other pollutants released by aircraft engines and fuselages. Plaintiffs claimed the defendants had knowledge of studies linking these pollutants to negative health outcomes and property devaluation but failed to remediate or prevent further pollution. The affected community was described as disproportionately composed of minority, immigrant, and low-income residents.The plaintiffs initially brought their case in King County Superior Court, but the defendants removed it to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs advanced state tort and constitutional claims, seeking various remedies including damages, injunctive relief, and remediation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were a collateral attack on federal agency actions, were expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, and failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motions, finding that the complaint did not directly challenge any specific agency order and that preemption was not clearly established at this stage. The district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal.Reviewing the case on interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction because the collateral attack doctrine did not apply; defendants could not identify any specific agency orders inescapably implicated by the plaintiffs’ claims. However, the court held that the claims were expressly preempted by Section 233 of the Clean Air Act, which bars states from enforcing any emission standards for aircraft pollutants unless identical to federal standards. The court reversed the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded the case. View "CODONI V. PORT OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

The case centers on an incident during a Delta Air Lines domestic flight, where a passenger’s behavior prompted concerns among fellow travelers and flight attendants. After an off-duty pilot and other passengers reported the passenger’s conduct as suspicious, the lead flight attendant, following consultation with the captain, approached the passenger and attempted to ask him to remain seated. This interaction escalated into a physical confrontation, leading the flight attendant to request assistance from a federal law enforcement agent onboard. The agent, with the flight attendant’s help, restrained the passenger until the plane landed. The passenger later alleged that he suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the restraint.At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, a jury found in favor of the passenger, awarding him substantial damages for bodily and emotional injuries. However, the district court vacated the verdict, citing excessive damages and the interdependence of liability and damages. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Delta Air Lines, concluding that the airline was immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) for any injuries sustained after the flight attendants reported the passenger’s behavior to law enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that ATSA immunity applies not only to the initial disclosure of suspicious activity to law enforcement but also to subsequent conduct stemming from law enforcement’s decisions following such disclosure. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the passenger’s conduct was objectively suspicious or whether Delta was solely responsible for the injuries. As Delta was immune for all physical injuries, the passenger could not recover for any alleged emotional injuries under the Montreal Convention. View "BANDARY V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC." on Justia Law

A helicopter owned and operated by the Huntington Beach Police Department crashed in 2022, resulting in the death of Officer Nicholas Vella and serious injury to Officer RJ Garwood. The plaintiffs alleged that the crash was caused by a defect in the helicopter’s stability augmentation system. The helicopter, a model MD520N, was manufactured by The Boeing Company in 1998 and delivered to the police department that same year. It had a seating capacity of five and was type and airworthiness certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).The plaintiffs initially brought their claims for strict products liability, breach of warranties, and negligence in California state court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The defendants, including The Boeing Company and MacD Helicopters, moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act’s (GARA) 18-year statute of repose. The plaintiffs contended that GARA did not apply to “public aircraft” such as those owned by governmental entities. The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, found that the helicopter met GARA’s definition of “general aviation aircraft,” and granted the motions to dismiss. The court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal and stayed further proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether GARA’s statute of repose applied to the police helicopter. The court held that the statute’s definition of “general aviation aircraft” includes government-owned aircraft, as long as the statutory requirements are met. The panel expressly rejected the argument that the Federal Aviation Act’s “public aircraft” definition is incorporated into GARA and concluded that GARA contains no “public aircraft” exception. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. View "VELLA V. MACD HELICOPTERS, INC." on Justia Law

Sonia Breslow purchased a $250,000 watch from Jacob & Company, which was shipped from New York to the Iron Horse Golf Club in Montana. The Club repackaged the shipment and sent it via Federal Express (FedEx) “priority overnight” to a UPS store in Arizona. The shipping label did not declare a value for the package. Video evidence showed that after FedEx took possession, the yellow bag containing two boxes was no longer secured by a zip tie, and at the Scottsdale facility, an employee removed one box from the bag. Ultimately, FedEx delivered the bag to the UPS store, but the watch was missing. Sonia filed an insurance claim, and Pennsylvania Insurance paid the Breslows the purchase price, then sued FedEx as their subrogee.Pennsylvania Insurance initially brought claims for negligence, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and civil theft in Nebraska state court. FedEx removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. The district court ruled that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted the claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil theft, dismissed the conversion claim for lack of evidence, and found breach of contract but limited FedEx’s liability under the shipping contract to $100. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where the court found the breach and upheld the liability limit, entering judgment for Pennsylvania Insurance in the amount of $100.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state-law claims relating to FedEx’s package handling and transportation services. It found no error in the district court’s dismissal of the conversion claim and upheld the liability limit of $100, concluding that the Club had adequate notice and opportunity to purchase greater coverage. The court also affirmed that Pennsylvania Insurance had standing as subrogee and that FedEx breached the contract. View "Pennsylvania Insurance Co. v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Three individuals employed as customer service agents for a ground services provider and an airline at Denver International Airport brought a class action lawsuit asserting violations of Colorado’s wage laws. Their complaint alleged that the employers improperly deducted time for lunch breaks not taken, forced work during rest breaks, failed to pay overtime, and withheld commissions. Each employee’s contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the employers sought to enforce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Colorado law. The employees responded that, as transportation workers, their contracts were exempt from the FAA, and further argued that Colorado law voided such arbitration agreements for wage claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motions to compel arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court focused narrowly on the specific duties of the three employees, rather than considering the work typically performed by the broader class of customer service agents. It found that the employees “actually and routinely” handled passenger luggage and played a “gatekeeping” role with respect to cargo. On this basis, the court concluded they were transportation workers exempt from the FAA. The district court did not address the request to compel arbitration under Colorado law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by defining the relevant class of workers too narrowly—focusing only on the specific employees, rather than the typical duties of the class as a whole, as required by Supreme Court precedent (including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings to properly determine the attributes of the class of workers under the correct legal standard. View "Joyner v. Frontier Airlines" on Justia Law

A municipal corporation operating a large regional commuter rail system in the Chicago area provided rail service on lines owned by a freight rail company. For decades, this service was conducted under a series of agreements, but in 2019, the freight rail company announced it would cease operating the commuter trains. Following litigation, the freight company obtained a declaratory judgment that it had no ongoing obligation to provide such service. While the commuter rail operator began transitioning to run the service itself, the parties failed to reach agreement on compensation for continued use of the lines. With no long-term agreement in place and negotiations at an impasse, the commuter rail operator applied to the federal Surface Transportation Board for terminal trackage rights, which would allow it to use the lines despite the lack of agreement.The Surface Transportation Board granted the application, finding the lines to be terminal facilities for a reasonable distance from the terminal, and that the use would be practicable, in the public interest, and not substantially impair the freight carrier’s operations. The Board did not set compensation or use conditions at that time but pledged to do so retroactively if the parties could not agree. The freight rail company sought review of this decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The Eighth Circuit held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in granting terminal trackage rights to the commuter operator, including over the full extent of the lines at issue, and properly concluded the public interest was served. However, the court found that the Board erred by granting immediate rights without first ensuring that compensation was paid or adequately secured, as required by statute. The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing time for the parties to address compensation. View "Union Pacific Railroad Company v. STB" on Justia Law

Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Aerovias de México, S.A. de C.V. sought approval from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for a joint venture to provide integrated airline services between the United States and Mexico. DOT approved the joint venture in 2016, granting both approval and antitrust immunity after finding that it would increase competition and public benefits in the U.S.–Mexico aviation market. As part of the approval, DOT required the petitioners to divest certain take-off and landing slots at Mexico City’s airport and imposed a five-year limit on antitrust immunity, citing concerns about slot allocation practices at that airport.After the initial approval, the petitioners operated under these conditions and, in 2022, sought renewal of the joint venture’s approval and immunity. However, DOT issued show-cause orders in 2024, and subsequently a final order in 2025, terminating both the approval and antitrust immunity. The DOT’s decision was based primarily on changes to slot allocation and restrictions on all-cargo carriers by the Mexican government at Mexico City’s airport, which DOT concluded had undermined competition and the public interest. The petitioners challenged this final order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that DOT’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the petitioners. It found that DOT had departed from its uniform practice of conducting comprehensive market analyses, instead focusing narrowly on a single airport without adequate explanation. The court also determined that DOT had imposed a requirement for open skies agreement implementation on the petitioners that it had not imposed in similar cases involving other countries. The court held that DOT’s final order was arbitrary and capricious, and vacated the order. View "Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

A pilot was selected for a random drug test at work and tested positive for amphetamine, a prohibited substance under federal aviation regulations. He was immediately grounded by his employer but later reinstated after completing a return-to-duty process. The pilot explained that he had inadvertently ingested his son’s prescription medication, Vyvanse, mistaking it for his own, due to a stressful family medical emergency and similar-looking pill bottles. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiated proceedings to revoke his pilot and medical certificates, as such a violation typically warrants revocation.The case was first heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the pilot had violated the regulations but reduced the sanction from revocation to a 90-day suspension, citing mitigating circumstances. Both parties appealed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed the case de novo, concluded the pilot had proven his accidental-ingestion defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and upheld the 90-day suspension. The NTSB found aggravating factors as well, including the pilot’s failure to report the ingestion before performing safety-sensitive duties.The pilot then sought attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing that he was the prevailing party. An ALJ granted his application, but the NTSB reversed, concluding that although the pilot prevailed in obtaining a reduced sanction, the FAA’s position in seeking revocation was substantially justified. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NTSB’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the FAA’s actions throughout the proceedings had a reasonable basis in law and fact. View "Knight v. NTSB" on Justia Law

Several railroads and industry groups challenged a federal regulation requiring most freight trains to operate with at least two crewmembers unless the use of a one-person crew is shown to be equally safe. The regulation, issued by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in 2024, responded to safety concerns about the reduction of train crew sizes as technology advanced, citing specific accidents and research on the importance of crew redundancy for safety. The rule provides exemptions for smaller railroads with established one-person operations and offers a special approval process for others, especially those transporting hazardous materials.Previously, the FRA had declined to regulate crew size, withdrawing a proposed rule in 2019 based on insufficient evidence that one-person crews were less safe. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated this withdrawal, criticizing the agency's reasoning and its attempt to preempt state crew-size laws. Following a new rulemaking process, the FRA finalized the 2024 regulation after considering thousands of public comments, a public hearing, and new safety data.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed consolidated petitions from several railroads and associations. The petitioners argued, among other points, that the FRA exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, failed to adequately consider costs, and violated statutory deadlines. The Eleventh Circuit held that the FRA acted within its broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety, provided reasonable explanations for its policy changes and regulatory choices, adequately considered evidence and public input, and did not violate the law by taking more than twelve months to finalize the rule. The court denied all petitions for review, upholding the Crew Size Rule. View "Florida East Coast Railway LLC v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law