Plaintiff filed suit against various municipalities and their employees under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-25, after municipal and state personnel had accessed plaintiff’s personal information approximately sixty times between 2003 and 2012. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims without prejudice but allowed her to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff instead requested that the district court enter final judgment dismissing her case with prejudice. Then plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision without receiving the judgment she requested. The court concluded that, because plaintiff did not obtain a final judgment following the district court’s dismissal of her complaint with leave to amend, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Sapp v. City of Brooklyn Park" on Justia Law

Trailer Transit contracts with shippers for the movement of cargo, then contracts with independent drivers, who provide the rigs that carry the cargo, promising those 71% “of the gross revenues derived from use of the equipment leased herein (less any insurance related surcharge and all items intended to reimburse [Trailer Transit] for special services, such as permits, escort service and other special administrative costs.” In a class action, about 1,000 drivers claimed that Trailer Transit made a profit on its “special services” and owes 71% of that profit to the drivers. The district court rejected that argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining: “That just isn’t what the contract says. Drivers are entitled to 71% of the gross charge for “use of the equipment” (the rigs), but the contract does not provide for a share of Trailer Transit’s net profit on any other part of the bill.” View "Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue raised for the Supreme Court's review was whether freight brokerage services were excepted from local business privilege taxation1 under the “public utility” exception found in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the Local Tax Enabling Act (“LTEA”), Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. sec. 6924.301.1(f)(2). The Commonwealth Court concluded that S&H Transport was not excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision because the Supreme Court concluded that the rates of the common motor carriers with whom S&H did business were not fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, and thus the entire exception was inapplicable. View "S & H Transport v. City of York" on Justia Law

After CSX charged plaintiff, one of its employees, with "serious" violations of the company's safety policy, plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, alleging that he was disciplined in retaliation for his activities as local chairman of the transportation union. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CSX, concluding that plaintiff had failed to show that any CSX employee involved in the disciplinary process had also known about his union activities. The court held that the “knowledge” relevant for a retaliation claim under the FRSA must be tied to the decision-maker involved in the unfavorable personnel action. The court concluded that, because plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence that the relevant CSX decision-makers knew of his protected activities, his claims fail as a matter of law at the prima facie stage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA), under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et. seq.), addresses the obligations of an operator of a commercial Web site or online service regarding the posting of a privacy policy on the Internet. The state sought damages and injunctive relief under OPPA, alleging that Delta’s Fly Delta mobile application violated the privacy policy requirements. The trial court dismissed, finding the suit expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C. 41713 (b)(1)). The court of appeal affirmed. To compel Delta to comply with the OPPA would effectively interfere with the airline’s “selection and design” of its mobile application, a marketing mechanism “appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation service,” for which state enforcement has been held to be expressly preempted. View "Harris v. Delta Air Lines" on Justia Law

The Advice of Rights form assists law enforcement officers with making the advisements that are required by Md. Code, Transp. 16-205.1,2, (the implied consent, administrative per se law), which provides a basis for the automatic suspension of the licenses of drivers who refuse to submit to testing for alcohol and drugs. Seenath, a holder of a commercial driver’s license, argued that the Advice form violated due process under the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it does not advise that a holder of a commercial driver’s license who drives a non-commercial motor vehicle and fails an alcohol concentration test is ineligible for a “restrictive license,” which allows a driver to drive only for certain purposes, for example, in the course of employment. The Motor Vehicle Administration asked the Maryland Court of Appeal: “Does the standard Advice of Rights form (DR-15) provide the necessary information to a driver who holds a commercial driver’s license of the consequences of submitting to a test of blood alcohol content if the driver’s results are 0.08 or more?” That court responded “yes,” and held that the form is not misleading as to the eligibility for a restrictive license of a holder of a commercial driver’s license and comports with due process. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath" on Justia Law

The drivers worked transporting water to hydraulic fracking sites within Pennsylvania. The lead plaintiff asserts that he and his coworkers often worked more than 40 hours in a week, but were paid overtime only for work performed above 45 hours per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a) and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 333.104(c). Before trial, the court ordered briefing on whether the employers (trucking companies) were subject to the Motor Carrier Act exemption to the FLSA’s overtime requirements, applicable to certain interstate employment activity that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation. The employers stipulated to a judgment requiring them to pay overtime. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the movement of the fracking wastewater out of state could theoretically be one involving a practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, depending on the intent of the shipper at the time shipment commenced, the role the drivers played, whether the water is altered during the fracking process, and the steps for water removal and outgoing transportation, the employers produced no evidence concerning these matters and did not meet their burden to “plainly and unmistakably” show that the MCA exemption applies. View "Mazzarella v. Fast Rig Support LLC" on Justia Law

Stampley, an independent truck driver, sued Altom Transport, alleging that Altom had failed to pay him enough for driving his truck for it. Altom turned to its insurer, Westchester, for coverage in the suit. Westchester denied coverage; Altom handled its own defense; and the parties tried to settle. At that point, counsel for both Stampley and Altom tried to pull Westchester into the case, by making settlement offers within the limits of the Westchester policy and seeking Westchester’s approval. Westchester did not participate. Altom sought a declaratory judgment establishing that Westchester had a duty to defend, that it wrongfully had failed to do so, and that its handling of the matter had been unreasonable and vexatious. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, finding that all of the claims in the underlying suit arise directly from Stampley’s lease agreement with Altom and fell within the policy’s contract claim exception. View "Stampley v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, Hassell was employed as an electrician by the Railroad, responsible for the maintenance and repair of passenger railcars designed and manufactured by defendants' predecessors. Steam pipes running underneath those railcars were insulated with material containing asbestos. As a consequence of his exposure to asbestos, Hassell contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma. He died in 2009, during the pendency of his lawsuit. Defendants argued that state law claims were preempted by the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701, the Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. 20301, and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20101. The district court held that Hassell’s claims were preempted by the LIA. The Third Circuit vacated, noting the lack of evidence supporting defendants’ assertion that the railcar pipes at issued formed an “interconnected system” with the locomotive. Even assuming that evidence for the “interconnected system” could have been gleaned from the record, Hassell produced evidence from a former Railroad supervisor showing that, instead of being connected to locomotives, the pipes were connected to “power cars” that separately supplied steam heat to the passenger coaches. There was a genuine dispute material fact precluding summary judgment. View "In Re: Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig." on Justia Law

In February 2012, Alaska Airlines terminated Helen Lingley, a longtime employee, for violating company rules and polices after she allegedly took earbuds from a left-on-board box, made contradictory statements during the ensuing investigation, and made discourteous comments about her coworkers. The terms and conditions of Lingley’s employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by Lingley’s union,the International Association of Machinists and AerospaceWorkers, pursuant to the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA). This agreement broadly incorporated Alaska Airlines’ rules and policies and gave the company the right to change those rules and policies at any time. Lingley sued Alaska Airlines for wrongful termination without first attempting to arbitrate her claims under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the RLA. The superior court denied the Lingley leave to amend her complaint, concluding that her claims and proposed claims were precluded by failure to exhaust contractual remedies and were preempted by the RLA. The Supreme Court found the collective bargaining agreement did not clearly and unmistakably waive the Lingley's right to litigate her claims, a prerequisite to finding her claims precluded. "And a number of her proposed claims may have an independent state law basis that does not depend on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; such claims would not be preempted by the Railway Labor Act." Accordingly the Court reversed the superior court order denying leave to amend. View "Lingley v. Alaska Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law