The Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 962, passed in 1794, is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation in support of the obligations of neutrality. The Act makes it unlawful to furnish, fit out, or arm a vessel within the U.S. with the intent of having the vessel used in the service of a foreign state or people to commit hostilities against another foreign state or people with whom the U.S. is at peace. Vessels covered by the Act are subject to forfeiture, and persons who give information leading to the seizure of such vessels may recover a bounty. Bauer sought to pursue a claim under the Act, claiming to have informed the government of vessels that had been funded, furnished, and fitted by anti-Israel organizations in the U.S., together with violent and militant anti-Israel organizations from other countries. The complaint alleged that the vessels were to be employed in the service of Hamas, a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, to commit hostilities against Israel. The district court dismissed, holding that the statute lacks an express private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that informers lack standing to sue on their own. View "Bauer v. Mavi Marmara" on Justia Law

Bus driver Bumpass hit the brakes as he approached a stop sign. Robinson, a standing passenger on the bus, fell backward and broke her leg. Robinson sued WMATA, claiming that Bumpass violated WMATA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) and that the “jerk” caused by Bumpass’ application of the brakes was of such extraordinary force that his negligence could be inferred. Bumpass admitted that he did not check his mirror before leaving the stop that morning. He knew there were several open seats up front, he said, and he assumed Robinson had sat down by the time he closed the doors and started driving. Robinson testified that the bus was going “fast, faster than normal buses,” and that it “was jerking and then [there] was an abrupt stop.” The district court rejected a jury award of $404,713.28. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could not have decided in Robinson’s favor. Robinson failed to establish a causal relationship between Bumpass’ deviation from SOPs and her injury; unusual and extraordinary force cannot be inferred from mere descriptive adjectives and conclusions alone. View "Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

TPI filed a rate complaint with the STB, alleging that numerous CSX common carrier rates were unreasonable and CSX moved for an expedited procedure with respect to questions related to market dominance. The Board granted the motion and bifurcated the adjudication into a market dominance phase and a second rate reasonableness phase. Then the Board issued a decision, concluding that CSX had market dominance over 51 contested rates. The Board rejected requests for reconsideration and CSX sought review of the Board's interlocutory ruling regarding the 51 rates. The court agreed with the Board that the appeal must be dismissed because the contested dominance decision is a non-final order. There is no final order because the Board has yet to inquire into the reasonableness of CSX's rates and has issued no adverse ruling with respect to any rates. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "CSX Transportation v. STB" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between Franks and Union Pacific over whether Franks has the right to cross Union Pacific's train tracks on certain property in Caddo Parish originally owned by the Levy family at the turn of the 20th Century. On appeal, Franks challenged the district court's final judgment granting summary judgment for defendant and dismissing Franks's claims with prejudice. Franks argued that the district court erred in denying the existence of a predial servitude in the three crossings at issue. The court concluded that, under the law applicable to the interpretation of the 1923 deed, the contract is unambiguous; it does not establish a predial servitude with respect to Texas and Pacific Railway Company's obligation to provide three crossings across what was then its property; but, rather, it is merely a personal obligation which does not bind the railway's successors-in-interest. View "Franks Investment Co, L.L.C. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a declaratory relief action where the Railroad sought a determination of the rent due from the Pipeline for the continued use of its easements from 2004 to 2014. The Railroad obtained a declaration that the rent due was in excess of $14 million per year. The trial court entered judgment reflecting the total back rent due, plus interest, up to the date of entry of judgment. The Pipeline appealed. The court addressed the law relating to railroad rights-of-way in an effort to resolve the legal issues that apply to property interests in the land and, by extension, the Railroad's right to grant and lease subsurface easements to the Pipeline. The court reversed and remanded the trial court's finding as to the "total fee value" for purposes of its ATF calculation; directed the trial court to determine the total fee value of those parcels of land in which the Railroad had sufficient interest to entitle it to collect rent on the Pipeline's easements between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2013; concluded that the trial court committed no error with respect to its determinations regarding issue preclusion, use of the ATF method, - calculations of the rental rate, the enhancement factor, and the use factor -, and the dates of abandonment of certain easements by the Pipeline; and reversed and remanded that part of the judgment awarding prejudgment interest under Civil Code 3287(a) in order for the trial court to determine whether the Pipeline was liable for the payment of rent on the reserved easements, the abandoned easements, or Line Section 101, which rent it unilaterally withheld. View "Union Pacific Railroad v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines" on Justia Law

After Continental and United Air Lines merged, they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity rosters for pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association represents all of the pilots. In 2012 the new United and the Union reached an agreement that sets pilot pay based on: rank (captain vs. first officer), type of aircraft flown, and longevity, defined as all time since the date a pilot was hired, including time spent on furlough. Pre-merger, pilots on furlough accrued seniority but not longevity. Plaintiffs challenged ancillary Agreement 25, under which pilots in active service longer than four years and seven months would receive no credit for furlough time; pilots who had four years and six months of service could claim only one month of furlough; and so on. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision slots 475 former United pilots into the table behind former Continental pilots who were hired before May 6, 2008, in violation of the main agreement, and accused the Union of inadequate representation (DFR claim). Defendants replied that the main agreement governs the future, after Agreement 25 determines the pilots’ starting positions. The district judge dismissed United as a party because disputes about the meaning of an airline industry collective bargaining agreement are within the exclusive authority of an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act, leaving plaintiffs unable to establish both that United violated the contract and that the union did not represent workers fairly. They then argued that the Union negotiated a bad contract. The district court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, with pilots on different sides of the issue, a compromise that favored some over others was inevitable. View "Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging that BNSF violated the anti-retaliation mandate in the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109(a), when BNSF terminated him. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's FRSA claim failed because he failed to present a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination where plaintiff's protected activity was completely unrelated to the fouling-the-tracks incident that led to his discharge. BNSF submitted clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged plaintiff whether or not he had made unrelated reports that were activity protected by the FRSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded in mid-air and crashed eight miles south of Long Island, New York. After an investigation that was the largest and most expensive in the history of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the NTSB accepted the CIA’s assessment of eyewitness accounts and concluded that a mechanical explosion caused the crash. Theorizing that the CIA was covering up the true cause of the crash, Plaintiff requested certain documents from the investigation. The district granted summary judgment for the CIA, concluding that the Freedom of Information Act permitted the agency to withhold the requested documents. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the CIA’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the CIA properly withheld the materials under the Act. View "Stalcup v. Cent. Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

The “B Prong” of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B(a)(2), requires that workers perform a service outside the usual course of the employer’s business to be classified as independent contractors. The Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA) filed an action for a declaration that the B Prong is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Act (FAAAA), and for an injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing section 148B(a)(2) against the MDA’s members. The FAAAA preempts state laws that “relate to” the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier “with respect to the transportation of property.” The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt section 148B(a)(2). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted the preemption test under the FAAAA and incorrectly applied the test to section 148B(a)(2). Remanded. View "Mass. Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley" on Justia Law

North Coast Railroad Authority (NCRA), a public agency established by Government Code section 93000, entered into a contract with the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (NWPRC), allowing NWPRC to conduct freight rail service on tracks controlled by NCRA. Two environmental groups filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21050, 21168.5, to challenge NCRA’s certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of NWPRC’s freight operations. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding CEQA review was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA; 49 U.S.C. 10101) and rejecting a claim that NCRA and NWPRC were estopped from arguing otherwise. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the ICCTA preempts only the “regulation” of rail transportation, whereas NCRA agreed to conduct a CEQA review of the rail operations and related repair/maintenance activities as part of a contract allowing it to receive state funds. NCRA and NWPRC are not estopped from claiming no EIR was required, due to positions taken in previous proceedings and the EIR was not insufficient for improperly “segmenting” the project, given that additional rail operations were contemplated on other sections of the line. View "Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast RR. Auth." on Justia Law