Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the decedent, brought a defective highway action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-144 against the Department of Transportation alleging that a truck lost control as it traveled down Avon Mountain along Route 44, resulting in the death of the decedent. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to state a claim under section 13a-144, claiming that the allegations did not fall within the limited exception to the general rule barring design defect claims under the defective highway statute. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to allege an actionable highway defect under section 13a-144. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly determined that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim under section 13a-144, as the plan of design providing for the steep downhill grade, together with the absence of tangible safety measures, as implemented, did not create an otherwise actionable highway defect as defined by case law. View "Stotler v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a defective highway action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-144 against the Department of Transportation alleging that he sustained severe injuries when a truck descending Avon Mountain along Route 44 experienced brake failure and collided with multiple vehicles, including Plaintiff’s. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 13a-144, and therefore, the action was barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, Defendant asserted that the allegations did not fall within the limited exception to the general rule barring design defect claims under the defective highway statute. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of action under section 13a-144. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity because it did not fall within the ambit of the defective highway statute. View "Cummings v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

This dispute concerns the Bonner Bridge, which provides highway access between mainland North Carolina and the Outer Bank's Hatteras Island. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f, and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. Defendants settled on a plan that essentially mirrors what currently exists: replacing the Bonner Bridge and maintaining NC 12 on Hatteras Island. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' NEPA challenge where defendants have not engaged in unlawful segmentation with respect to the five studied parallel bridge alternatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' Section 4(f) challenge because a Section 4(f) analysis is irrelevant if the joint planning exception applies. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. NC Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Sompo and Nipponkoa, subrogees of the cargo owners/shippers, filed suit against Defendants Norfolk Southern and KCSR to recover for the damages sustained to cargo by a train derailment. At issue in these appeals was the meaning and enforceability of provisions found in the bills of lading that purport to designate the ocean carrier as the sole entity responsible to the cargo owners for damage to the cargo. Further, Docket No. 13-3501 challenged Nipponkoa's ability to maintain its claim for contractual indemnification, a claim assigned to it by the upstream ocean carrier, against defendants. The court affirmed the judgment in Docket No. 13-3416 and concluded that summary judgment for defendants was proper where defendants are entitled to enforce the liability-limiting provision in the upstream carrier's bill of lading against plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment in Docket No. 13-3501 because defendants' arguments for reversal of Nipponkoa's judgment against them are all either waived or without merit. View "Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The People filed a complaint against Defendants, Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (Pac Anchor) and Alfredo Barajas, for violating the unfair competition law (UCL), alleging that Defendants misclassified drivers as independent contractors and committed other violations of California’s labor and unemployment insurance laws. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in Defendants’ favor, determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the People’s action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the People’s UCL action was not related to Pac Anchor’s price, route, or service as a motor carrier, the FAAAA did not preempt this action against Defendants. After noting that the FAAAA does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and services, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FAAAA did not preempt the People’s UCL action against Defendants in this case, as the UCL action was independent of Defendants’ price, routes, or services with respect to the transportation of property. View "People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

C.H. Robinson was the Customs-bonded carrier for three 2001 entries of wearing apparel from China, which entered the U.S. as Transportation & Exportation (T&E) entries, but were never exported and are “missing.” A Mexican company was the importer of record and consignee of the merchandise; the T&E entry documents indicated that the merchandise was to be delivered to Laredo, Texas, for exportation to Mexico. The merchandise left Los Angeles, but it is not clear what happened after that. Customs never inspected or took possession of the subject merchandise at the Port of Laredo. During an audit, Customs contacted Mexican Customs authorities and learned that stamped importation forms were false. Customs issued notices of liquidated damages claims against C.H. Robinson’s custodial bond, charging misdelivery. Based upon mitigation guidelines, Customs reduced the amount of liquidated damages from $75,000. C.H. Robinson paid $57,212 in 2004 and sought a refund. Customs also made a demand, under 19 U.S.C. 1553, for payment of $106,407.86, plus interest, for duties, taxes, and fees on the entries. C.H. Robinson did not protest the demand or pay the duties, and its challenge to Commerce’s assessment of liquidated damages remained stayed. The Court of International Trade held C.H. Robinson liable for duties, taxes, and fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. C.H. Robinson Co." on Justia Law

The Village petitioned for review of the Board's denial of its request to reopen a 2008 proceeding in which the Board approved a railroad's acquisition of a Chicago-area railway company. The Village sought to reopen the proceeding based on a new study on traffic projection, based in part on post-acquisition traffic conditions. The court denied the petition for review because it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Village's claims of material error and because the Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the Village's new evidence did not warrant reopening of the Board's original decision. View "Village of Barrington, IL v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

CSX challenged the Board's issuance of a decision modifying its procedures for rate reasonableness cases. The court rejected CSX's argument that the Board violated its statutory mandate when it made simplified procedures available for all cases. The court concluded that the Board adequately explained its adoption of a new revenue-allocation methodology as well as its rationale for adopting a new interest rate for reparations. However, the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in raising the relief cap for its most simplified rate reasonableness procedure. It appears that the Board double-counted costs in producing its estimate without explanation. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Board to address this issue. View "CSX Transp., Inc., et al. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of PowerPoint presentations that the FMCSA posted on its website on May 16, 2012. Petitioners claimed that the presentations represented an "astonishing" change in agency policy, which the agency failed to subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the presentations did nothing more than explain the agency's Safety Measurement System, which was announced and implemented in 2010. The court dismissed the petition as untimely because, under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, challenges to agency rules, regulations, or final orders must be brought within 60 days of their issuance. View "Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transp., et al. v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law