About 100 years ago, the then-owners of land abutting a 2.88-mile stretch of rail corridor near the City of South Hutchinson, Kansas granted deeds covering that land to the predecessor of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF). The corridor was used by BNSF until 2004. It was then converted to a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The current owners asserted that the conversion constituted a taking and sought compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Federal Claims entered summary judgment in favor of the government, finding that none of the plaintiffs possessed a fee-simple property interest in the land underlying the rail corridor that could be the subject of a taking because the land had been conveyed to the BNSF’s predecessor in fee simple and not by easements. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, finding that some of the land was conveyed to the BNSF’s predecessor in fee simple, but that the railroad was only granted an easement over other land. With respect to others, the issue was clouded by chain-of-title questions. View "Biery v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the Board addressed a rate dispute between a shipper and two railroads. The railroads contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the shipper and the shipper contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the railroads. The railroads and the shippers petitioned for review. The court concluded that the Board reasonably interpreted that the prior rates were not reasonable based on a Stand-Alone-Cost test that employs a hypothetical Stand Alone Railroad that is optimally efficient; the Board's calculation of the railroads' variable costs was reasonable and reasonably explained; and Arizona Electric lacked standing where the court could not detect a current injury to Arizona Electric from the Board's decision regarding the switch to proportional rates. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

The Union petitioned for review of the FRA's decision that the agency lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Union Pacific Railroad Company had authority under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to designate terminals for a new service the railroad had instituted in California. The court concluded that, because this was a dispute regarding interpretation of the CBA, it was governed by the procedures of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151a, for disputes requiring interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. The FRA correctly determined that this was fundamentally an issue of contract interpretation beyond its adjudicatory powers. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "United Transp. Union v. Foxx" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging claims under MCA 39-2-703, which governs the liability of a railway for negligent mismanagement. BNSF removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of BNSF. The district court found that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-88. Applying the Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's state claim concerning a collision was not preempted. The right of railway employees to sue on the basis of negligence or mismanagement resulting in termination may be unusual in other jurisdictions, but such a right is undoubtedly recognized in Montana. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim concerning the conduct leading to the collision was independent of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and did not require interpretation by the CBA. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was not preempted by the RLA. The court also concluded that BNSF's disciplinary proceedings were not the legal cause of plaintiff's suspension and termination. Consequently, plaintiff's punitive damages claim was reinstated. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wolfe v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

BNSF filed suit seeking refunds of certain taxes that it, and its predecessor companies, paid under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U.S.C. 3201 et seq. The court concluded that, at least as applied to Non-Qualified Stock Options (NQSOs), the term "compensation", as used and defined by the RRTA, was inherently ambiguous; the IRS's definition was reasonable as applied to the NQSOs; although RRTA "compensation" may exclude certain in-kind benefits such as free rail passes that would otherwise be compensation under section 3121, the court concluded that NQSOs were properly included as "compensation" under the RRTA as interpreted by Treasury Regulation 31.3231(e)-1; the court's conclusion found firm support in the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the RRTA; and therefore, NQSOs were properly taxed as compensation under the RRTA. The court also concluded that, although the informal claims that BNSF filed for the employee tax paid on moving-expense benefits in 1996 and 1997 may satisfy the informal clams doctrine, it was undisputed that BNSF failed to perfect those claims prior to filing the present suit. Accordingly, BNSF's refund claims for those years must be dismissed. The court further concluded that a more reasonable interpretation of section 3231(e)(1)(iii) permitted exclusion of payments to employees for traveling expenses and bona fide and reasonable expenses related to travel, an interpretation harmonizing section 3231(e)(1)(iii) and section 3231(e)(5) as required by the specific-general canon and the rule against superfluities. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Crompton began working as a railroad conductor for BNSF in 2001. In 2011, he was working on BNSF 5695, travelling from Paducah, Kentucky, to Centralia, Illinois. Before the train departed on the day at issue, a BNSF engineer performed the required daily inspection and found no defects with the locomotive, including its doors and latches. During the trip, Crompton exited the front cab door several times, and found nothing wrong with the door or its latch. As the train approached Neilson Junction, traveling downhill, Crompton exited the front cab door to throw a switch. He claims that he closed and latched the front cab door before he stepped out onto the platform. The door remained closed for 51 seconds, and then suddenly flew open, knocking Crompton off the train. He suffered injuries to his head, neck, and back. He sued under the Federal Employment Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-60 and the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 20701, claiming that BNSF failed to keep the locomotive and its parts in good working order, and that he was injured due to BNSF’s negligence. A jury awarded damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to establish negligence.View "Crompton v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

The Brotherhood represents Norfolk employees who work to ensure that railways remain clear, safe, and navigable. The collective bargaining agreements entitle Brotherhood members to an investigation before Norfolk takes disciplinary action. Norfolk fired four Brotherhood members for making false statements about injuries they suffered while on duty. The investigation followed the procedures typical of a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. As part of the investigation before the firing, Norfolk submitted reports from a consulting engineer, but the engineer did not testify. The Brotherhood sought an injunction to ban the use of accident reconstruction reports in employee disciplinary investigations unless Norfolk adheres to additional pre-hearing procedures. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute arose from application of the collective bargaining agreement in employee disciplinary actions. Norfolk met its burden of proving that its use of the disputed reports at investigations was justified by a contractual right, albeit an implied one. The suit is a “quintessential” minor dispute under the Act and there is “no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.” View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner received a citation for failing to obey a Montana traffic ordinance and a record of the citation made its way into a database administered by FMCSA. Petitioner complained that, in maintaining the record of citation, FMCSA violated the statute authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to maintain the database. Because the court concluded that FMCSA's action fell short of being a rule, a regulation or final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2342(3), the court lacked jurisdiction under that provision and transferred the case to the district court under 28 U.S.C. 1631. View "Weaver, Jr., et al. v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment giving collateral-estoppel effect, in his Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, suit, to a finding of fact made by a Public Law Board in the course of plaintiff's pursuit of his rights under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with BNSF. The court concluded that, because it was the railroad that conducted the investigation and hearing and terminated plaintiff, and because the Board only reviewed a close record, the procedures were not adequate for collateral estoppel to apply. The court rejected BNSF's election-of-remedies argument where plaintiff sought protection under the CBA for his contractual claims and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, was not itself the source of law under which plaintiff sought protection. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law