Plaintiffs filed a qui tam action against DHL under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that DHL billed the United States jet-fuel surcharges on shipments that were transported exclusively by ground transportation. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal for failure to satisfy a statutory notice requirement. The court concluded that the 180-day rule, which barred a challenge to a shipping charge before the STB, could not apply to a qui tam action under the FCA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. DHL Express (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Lilliputian, manufacturer of micro fuel cells powered by butane, challenged the prohibition in a final rule against airline passengers and crew carrying butane fuel cell cartridges in their checked baggage. Lilliputian argued that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious in light of the dissimilar treatment of other products that were not subject to the rigorous safety specifications imposed on fuel cell cartridges. The court concluded that the Safety Administration failed to provide the required "reasoned explanation and substantial evidence" for the disparate treatment. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Safety Administration to provide further explanation for the prohibition, including its response to Lilliputian's comments. View "Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin." on Justia Law

BNSF petitioned for review of the Board's decision to adhere to a revenue-allocation methodology, known as Modified ATC, in determining that the rates BNSF charged WFA were unreasonably high. In 2010, the court remanded the case to the Board so that it could address one of BNSF's objections to Modified ATC in the first instance. On remand, the Board concluded that portions of BNSF's arbitrary challenge fell outside the scope of the case given the specificity of the court's 2010 remand. The court concluded that the Board erred in its failure to address BNSF's proportionality challenge on remand. Because the court never actually resolved BNSF's arbitrary and capricious challenge to Modified ATC, the court granted the petition, vacated the Board's decision, and again remanded the case to the Board. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

Reed, a trackman with NSR, experienced a bout of severe abdominal pain while working. He claimed that the company was reluctant to provide medical treatment and pressured him into signing a statement that he had not been “injured on or at work.” Reed was on medical leave for seven months. After he returned, a company claims agent urged him to state whether the incident was work‐related. Reed stated that, notwithstanding his earlier attestation, he felt that his work did play a role in his injury. NSR fired Reed for making inconsistent statements and for violating an internal rule requiring same‐day reporting of on‐site injuries. Reed and his union believed that his termination violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, Reed appealed his dismissal. While arbitration proceedings before the Board were pending, Reed filed a complaint with OSHA, alleging violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which prohibits discriminating against employees who “notify, or attempt to notify, the railroad carrier … of a work‐related personal injury,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). After an appropriate period, Reed filed in district court. The Board awarded him reinstatement without back pay. The district court denied NSR’s motion for summary judgment under the FRSA election-of-remedies provision, reasoning that the arbitration proceedings were not an “election” of remedies because arbitration was mandatory, and that a collective bargaining agreement was not “another provision of law.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Reed v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Salem, under contract, coordinated Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) shipments around the country. Estes, a federal motor carrier, handled some shipments under its common carrier tariff, without a written contract. The Salem-MCCS contract provided that Salem would pay carriers directly and invoice MCCS. Salem agreed not to represent itself as a representative of MCCS. All bills of lading indicated that “third party freight charges” were to be billed to “Marine Corps Exchange C/O Salem Logistics.” Delivery receipts specified that charges should be billed to the “Marine Corps Exchange” and were signed by a representative of the MCCS or MCX delivery location. MCCS paid Salem for some of the shipments; Salem never paid Estes. After becoming aware that Salem was not paying carriers, MCCS began paying carriers directly, for shipments for which it had not yet paid Salem. Estes sued Salem and the government, seeking to recover $147,645.33. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that there was no privity of contract between Estes and the government and rejecting a claim under 49 U.S.C. 13706, which governs the liability of consignees for shipping charges incurred by a common carrier. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the bills of lading were sufficient to establish privity. View "Estes Express Lines v. United States" on Justia Law

George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law

In 1983, Appellant, the owner and chief executive officer of an asphalt company, pled guilty to violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for unlawfully bidding on state highway construction contracts. In order to have his company's privilege of bidding on new contracts reinstated, Appellant agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's (AG) investigation and proffered information pertaining to Appellant's involvement in a scheme to "rig" bids for highway construction contracts with the Kentucky Department of Transportation. In 2009, reporters for several newspapers submitted an Open Records Act (ORA) request to have the proffer disclosed. When Appellant learned the AG intended to release the proper, Appellant brought this action against the AG and ORA reporters seeking to have the release enjoined under the privacy exemption or the law enforcement exemption to the ORA. In 2011, the trial court ruled that the proffer should be released to the ORA requestors. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not have standing to invoke the law enforcement exemption provision to the ORA; and (2) matters of sufficient public interest warranted an invasion of Appellant's limited privacy interest in keeping his proffer from being disclosed. View "Lawson v. Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

CBP imposed almost $38 million in penalties against UP under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1584(a)(2), after finding illegal drugs secreted on trains brought to the U.S. border by Ferromex or KCSM, both Mexican railroads. The district court found that CBP lacked statutory authority to penalize UP and found in UP's favor. The government appealed. The court rejected CBP's constitutionally suspect contention that the Act authorizes the heavy fines at issue in this case; the statute does not authorize penalties against UP for drugs found on railcars UP neither owned nor controlled; and the statute did not authorize CBP to require UP, as a common carrier, to do more than reasonably possible to prevent Mexican drug cartels from hiding drugs on trains UP did not control in a country in which UP had no operations. The court concluded, however, that the district court's imprecise injunction must be corrected. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacating only the injunction. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Washington statutes that require a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" (PCN) in order to operate a ferry on Lake Chelan in central Washington sate. The court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass a right to operate a public ferry on intrastate navigable waterways and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The court also held that the district court properly abstained from deciding on plaintiffs' challenges to the PCN requirement as applied to the provision of boat transportation services on the lake. The district court properly abstained under the Pullman doctrine, but the district court should have retained jurisdiction instead of dismissing the claim. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded this claim with instructions to the district court to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge. View "Courtney, et al. v. Goltz, et al." on Justia Law

Illinois Central Railroad Company appealed a jury verdict for Perry Brent awarded under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for injuries he sustained during his employment with Illinois Central. While the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in failing to grant Illinois Central's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict on the FELA negligence per se claim, the Court affirmed the jury's general verdict based on Brent's FELA negligence claim. View "Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Brent" on Justia Law