Plaintiffs in these cases were judgment debtors whose bank accounts were frozen by judgment creditors in anticipation of enforcement of a money judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 52. Plaintiffs brought putative class actions in federal court seeking injunctive relief and money damages against their banks on the grounds that their bank accounts were restrained in violation of the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA), which requires banks, when served with restraining notices by judgment creditors, to forward certain notices and forms to judgment debtors. In these cases, the banks allegedly failed to send the required forms. The district courts granted the banks' motions to dismiss, concluding that the EIPA does not imply a private right of action. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) a private right to bring a plenary action for injunctive relief and money damages cannot be implied from the EIPA; but (2) a judgment debtor can secure relief from a bank arising from a violation of the EIPA in an Article 52 special proceeding. View "Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a civil suit brought by the estates and wrongful-death beneficiaries of Christopher Allan Bloodworth, Steven Earl Tallant Jr., Marcus Richardson, and A.W. Hilson, four men killed at a railroad crossing when a freight train collided with the truck in which they were traveling. The beneficiaries of Bloodworth, Tallant, Richardson, and Hilson filed their complaint(s) against Illinois Central Railroad Company and several of its employees, including the track crew, as well as other employees of Illinois Central’s track department. Defendants filed two motions for summary judgment; the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims alleging negligent operation of the train. The circuit court also granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on three of four contested issues regarding the engineering and maintenance of the railroad crossing, leaving one surviving claim. The circuit court then granted five of Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude Plaintiffs’ evidence. Finding that, without the excluded evidence, Plaintiffs could not support the remaining claim, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment in their entirety and issued a judgment and certificate pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decisions to the Supreme Court, and Defendants cross-appealed as to certain trial court rulings. Because the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on each claim by Plaintiffs, the Court dismissed Defendants’ cross-appeal as moot. View "Estate of Bloodworth v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, driver of commercial motor vehicles, filed suit against Wal-Mart and others after he was injured when pallets fell onto him from a trailer. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could have found that the absence of securing devices was anything other than open and obvious to plaintiff. Further, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations placed the duty to secure cargo on carriers to inspect cargo to confirm that it is secure before and during transport of the cargo in a commercial motor vehicle. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the exceptions to this rule applied to him where he had not set forth sufficient facts to show that he was carrying a sealed load and was ordered to break the seal to secure the load, nor has he established that inspecting the cargo was impracticable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Aragon v. Wal-Mart Stores East, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a Project that provided for the design and construction of a new Midtown Tunnel. The Commonwealth Transportation Board affirmed the Project and specifically approved and ratified the imposition and collection of tolls on the Project as contemplated by a Comprehensive Agreement entered into by Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) and Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC (ERC). Plaintiff and other individuals filed a complaint against ERC and VDOT, alleging, inter alia, that the General Assembly, through its enactment of the Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA), unconstitutionally delegated its power of taxation to VDOT and ERC in violation of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court concluded that the General Assembly exceeded its authority in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Project tolls were user fees and not taxes, and therefore, the General Assembly did not delegate its power of taxation to agencies such as VDOT in violation of the Virginia Constitution; (2) the General Assembly properly delegated to VDOT and ERC the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees in the form of tolls under the terms of the PPTA; and (3) the Comprehensive Agreement did not abridge the Commonwealth's police power. View "Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board's decision rejecting his application for a certificate authorizing the acquisition and operation of a small length of industrial railroad track because his application refused any obligation to transport "toxic inhalation hazard" products. While the court concluded that petitioner did not forfeit his argument on appeal, the court found petitioner's arguments unpersuasive on the merits. Because the Board had permissibly determined the scope of a freight railroad's common carrier obligation under 49 U.S.C. 11101(a), and the Board's rejection of petitioner's application was reasonable, the court denied the petition for review. View "Riffin v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, working for Defendant since 1967, was a brakeman on a crew taking a freight train from Defendant’s Cleveland yard to Medina County, Ohio, in 2006. At a Valley City stop, Plaintiff operated a ground switch to move the alignment of the track. Plaintiff stood behind the switch and operated it for 30 minutes to an hour. Witnesses testified and pictures indicated that the ground where Plaintiff worked was muddy and was not covered with ballast. Plaintiff had to urinate while operating the switch and planned to urinate outside, rather than in the toilet compartment of the locomotive, because he found that compartment to be “dirty” and “unusable.” Once Plaintiff completed his tasks, he began to walk from the switch to a field behind the tracks. Within steps of the switch, Plaintiff slipped and twisted his knee. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn right meniscus and underwent surgery to repair the cartilage. The district court rejected jury verdicts in favor of Plaintiff on his claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient proof of causation between the jury-determined violations under FELA and LIA and Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Bennett was walking her dog in Garfield Heights, Ohio when she was struck on the left knee by a vehicle driven by Pastel. The accident threw Bennett onto the car’s hood. Bennett sued Pastel’s insurer, State Farm, which characterized as “ridiculous” her assertion that she was an “occupant” of the car, as that term is defined by State Farm’s policy, at the time she was on the vehicle’s hood. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The policy defines “occupying” as “in, on, entering or alighting from.” The court stated that “we have no reason to explore Bennett’s relationship with the car… the policy marks out its zone of coverage in primary colors.” View "Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins." on Justia Law

The Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs alleged that the Port Authority enforced state gun laws against its non-resident members at Newark Airport. The district court held that 18 U.S.C. 926A does not create a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that, in enacting the amended section 926A, Congress did not intend to confer the right upon the plaintiff. Section 926A confers protection upon those who wish to engage in the interstate transportation of firearms: Notwithstanding any other … law … any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle…. The court concluded that Congress did not intend the amended section 926A to benefit those who wish to transport firearms outside of vehicles. View "Ass'n of NJ Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v.Port Auth. of NY & NJ " on Justia Law

Madden had almost reached the railroad crossing when her car stalled. She re‐started it and drove onto the crossing; the car stalled again. The crossing gates began to descend, the warning lights began flashing, and the crossing bells sounded. Madden tried to restart her car, according to witnesses, and another driver got out of his car and started walking toward the crossing. He saw Madden open her car door when the train was only 45 to 50 yards from the crossing, and start to run. The train struck the car, pushing it against her, causing fatal injuries. Her estate sued the railroad, claiming that the crossing gates had descended, the warning lights had begun flashing, and the locomotive horn had been blown, all fewer than 20 seconds before the train reached the crossing, in violation of federal safety regulations, 49 C.F.R. 222.21(b)(2), 234.225. The district court entered judgment in favor of the railroad. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that neither “the children’s testimony, reflecting their incompetent efforts to reconstruct the accident, nor the experts’ worthless evidence, nor both bodies of evidence combined (0 + 0 = 0), would enable a reasonable jury to infer negligence on the part of the railroad. View "Nunez v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Dandino petitioned under 49 U.S.C. 521(b)(9) for review of an order of the FMCSA affirming a civil penalty to Dandino for transporting goods after the agency had revoked its operating authority and before that authority was reinstated. The court held that, for purposes of section 521(b)(9), when a final agency order was mailed to a party, and there was no proof of actual receipt, there was a rebuttable presumption that the order was received within three days of mailing. Applying this holding to these circumstances, the court concluded that Dandino's petition was timely. However, on the merits, the court concluded that Dandino's concession that it operated "without the required operating authority" was dispositive of its petition on the merits. The court rejected Dandino's remaining claim and dismissed the petition for review. View "Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law