This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Detroit International Bridge Company was immune from the City of Detroit’s zoning ordinances because it was a federal instrumentality for the limited purpose of facilitating commerce over the Ambassador Bridge, which connects Detroit to Ontario, Canada. The federal government was not a party to the suit. Commodities Export, which owned property near the Bridge, later filed suit against Detroit and the United States, claiming that the Bridge Company had unilaterally condemned roads around its property, cutting off the land and causing a regulatory taking. It claimed that Detroit was liable for failing to enforce its own ordinances and demanded that the United States take a position on the Bridge Company’s federal-instrumentality status and control the Company’s actions. The United States cross-claimed against Bridge Company, alleging that it had misappropriated the title of “federal instrumentality.” The district court granted summary judgment for the United States and dismissed the action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over the government’s cross-claim and owe no deference to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal common law. Bridge Company is not a federal instrumentality. View "Commodities Exp. Co. v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co." on Justia Law

The company, S.C. Johnson & Son, was injured by a bribery and kickback scheme involving a dishonest employee and transportation companies with which it had contracts and filed a tort lawsuit in Wisconsin state court. The company filed a second suit, against different transportation defendants, in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the suit, which raised state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation by omission; criminal conspiracy to violate Wisconsin’s bribery statute, Wis. Stat. 134.05; conspiracy to commit fraud; violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. 946.80, through racketeering activity and mail and wire fraud; and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by providing bribes and kickbacks. The court indicated that federal law preempted state tort claims because they could have “the force and effect of a law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was properly dismissed, but theories based on bribery and kickbacks fall outside the scope of the preemption provision. View "SC Johnson & Son Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was 12 years old when, in 2003, his left foot was severed above the toes when he attempted to jump onto a freight train that was moving by the parking lot of an apartment building in Chicago Ridge. The track was partially fenced off and there was a sign warning of danger and prohibiting trespassing. As a result, an amputation below the knee was performed. The company which operated the train settled for $25,000, but plaintiff sued three other railroad companies. The trial judge found that the question of whether the danger of jumping onto a moving freight train was so obvious as to preclude any duty by the defendants was a question of fact for the jury. The jury assessed $6.5 million; that amount was reduced to $3.9 million by the earlier settlement and because plaintiff was found to have been 40% negligent. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed without remand. Under Illinois law, a moving train is an obvious danger as to which any child old enough to be allowed at large should recognize the risk. The defendants never had a legal duty to the plaintiff trespasser in this situation.View "Choate v. IN Harbor Belt R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law

In 1903 the railroad acquired a right-of-way for a 100-foot wide, 76-mile long, strip across Arizona land near the Mexican border. After operating for about 100 years, the railroad initiated proceedings to abandon the railway with the Department of Transportation’s Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail or Abandonment (NITU) in 2006 authorizing conversion to a public trail under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The landowners sued, alleging that issuance of the NITU constituted a compensable taking. The claims court dismissed, reasoning that the government had not physically invaded the property. The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the takings claim accrued when the 2006 NITU issued. During discovery on remand, the government produced a NITU affecting the property that had issued in 1998. There was no indication that the NITU was published; the landowners submitted declarations that they were not aware of the 1998 NITU. The claims court held that the limitations period began in 1998 and that the claims were time-barred. The Federal Circuit reversed. In these circumstances, the government’s interest in bright-line legal rules must yield to the landowners’ right to receive actual or constructive notice that their claims have accrued. View "Ladd v. United States" on Justia Law

Binns was driving a truck on an interstate highway, transporting parts on behalf of U.S. Xpress. Binns was in the center lane negotiating a curve when he saw, in his mirror, a motorcycle sliding down the right lane. After pulling over, Binns ran back to find Betty Jordan lying on the pavement. She ultimately lost both legs below the knee. According to Binns, Betty repeatedly said, “it’s not his fault. It’s my fault.” Betty has no recollection of these statements or of seeing Binns. Binns relayed Betty’s statements to U.S. Xpress claims manager Bukovitz, State Trooper Litt, and insurance adjuster Niles; each of them testified to that effect at trial. Ted, who had been notified of his wife’s accident, had arrived on the scene and introduced himself to Binns. Binns testified that Ted said that Betty stated it was not Binns’s fault. Litt testified that Ted told him that Betty had said that the accident was her fault. Niles also testified that Ted told him that Betty said the accident was her fault. Ted denied the testimony. A jury returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the court erred in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless in light of expert testimony that Binns could not have caused the accident. View "Jordan v. Binns" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.068, an action for cargo damage against a common carrier, brought under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, relates back to an action for breach of an agreement to settle the cargo-damage claim. The answer depended on whether the cargo-damage claim was, in the words of section 16.068, "wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence" than the breach-of-settlement claim. A divided court of appeals held that the cargo-damage claim did not relate back and was therefore barred by limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the cargo-damage claim and the breach-of-settlement claim both arose out of the same occurrence, and therefore, the cargo-damage claim was not barred by limitations.View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc." on Justia Law

NHTSA is a federal agency within the Department of Transportation that writes and enforces safety standards for motor vehicles. NTEA is a trade organization representing manufacturers who customize bodies for special-purpose commercial vehicles. In 2005, NHTSA initiated a rulemaking proceeding at Congress’s behest to upgrade the safety standard establishing strength requirements for passenger compartment roofs in certain vehicles. NHTSA proposed, among other things, extending the scope of the safety standard to include a previously unregulated class of vehicles, many of which are produced by NTEA’s members. NTEA objected, but in 2009, NHTSA promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 216a. The Sixth Circuit denied review. “To ask for more process in a situation like this would render NHTSA’s standard-setting mission a practical impossibility.” The standard complies with “minimum substantive criteria” specified by Congress: that any new safety standard “shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms.” View "Nat'l Truck Equip. Assoc v. Nat'l Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law