Hackett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), and aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3). He moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle so that evidence gathered after the improper stop constituted fruit of an unlawful search. The stated basis for the stop was improper lane usage. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that momentary crossings of a highway lane line did not give the officer reasonable grounds to make the stop. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To establish probable cause that a violation of the lane usage statute has occurred, the officer must point to facts which support a reasonable belief that defendant has deviated from his established lane of travel and that it was “practicable” for him to have remained constant in his proper lane. A traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. Here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason; an investigatory stop was proper. View "People v. Hackett" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an accident involving an automobile and a tractor-trailer. Appellants, the driver of the automobile and his wife, filed suit against Appellees, the driver of the truck, the individual who leased the truck, and the owner of the truck, alleging negligence and requesting punitive damages for alleged violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). Before trial, the circuit court entered an order excluding evidence of Appellees' failure to conduct a post-accident drug-and-alcohol testing. Appellees also asked to bifurcate the proceedings to exclude from the compensatory-damages phase of the trial evidence that was relevant only to punitive damages, but the circuit court did not address the motion. At the conclusion of Appellants' case, the circuit court granted Appellees' motion for directed verdict with regard to punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that Appellees failed to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements of the FMCSR; and (2) Appellants' second argument that the circuit court erred in granting Appellees' motion for directed verdict on punitive damages, which was premised on bifurcation, was not appropriate, as an opinion the Court could offer would only be advisory.View "Brumley v. Keech" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiffs Jacon and Laura Jongeward, and Gordon and Jeannie Jongeward asserted a timber trespass claim against defendant BNSF Railway Company when a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed the Jongewards' trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Jongeward v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiff Broughton Lumber Company asserted a timber trespass claim against defendants BNSF Railway Company and Harsco Corporation in the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division, after a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed Broughton's trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

Oliver Arlington was employed by Miller's Trucking as a log truck driver and loader operator pursuant to an oral employment agreement. For his work, Miller's paid Arlington twenty-five percent of the "load rate" as calculated by Miller's. Arlington, however, asserted that according to the parties' oral agreement, he should have been paid a salary in the form of annual wages. Arlington filed a wage claim, seeking the pay he alleged he was owed in regular and overtime wages. The Department of Labor and Industry's bureau dismissed Arlington's claim for lack of merit and lack of sufficient evidence. On appeal, a bureau hearing officer dismissed Arlington's claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to require Miller's to produce material requested by Arlington and in refusing to admit tendered evidence, prejudicing the substantial rights of Arlington, and the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's judgment; and (2) the hearing officer and district court incorrectly determined that Arlington engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of the operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce and thus was exempt from overtime requirements. Remanded.View "Arlington v. Miller's Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision in "Fairchild v. South Carolina Department of Transportation," (385 S.C. 344, 683 S.E.2d 818 (Ct. App. 2009)). The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident. In relevant part, the Court of Appeals determined (1) Respondent Marilee Fairchild's claim for punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury; (2) the trial court should have charged the jury on the intervening negligence of a treating physician; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant William Leslie Palmer's motion under Rule 35, SCRCP for an independent medical examination (IME) to be performed by Dr. James Ballenger. This action arose out of a motor vehicle that occurred on March 1, 2001 while several vehicles were traveling on Interstate 95. Just before the accident, an employee with the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT), was driving a dump truck with an attached trailer transporting a backhoe. The employee was traveling in the left lane of the southbound traffic (closest to the median) when he pulled in to a paved "cross-over" in the median so he could turn around and enter the northbound lanes of I-95. While he was stopped waiting for the northbound traffic to clear, the back of his trailer allegedly protruded into the left traffic lane on the southbound side. Several cars traveling south in the left lane directly behind the SCDOT truck, saw the trailer and simultaneously switched to the right lane. When those cars moved over, Fairchild, who was behind them driving a minivan, saw the trailer partially blocking the left lane where she was traveling. She "flashed" her brakes and then continued to brake while staying ahead of the vehicle behind her. Fairchild managed to avoid the trailer, but she was struck by a truck traveling behind her that was driven by William Leslie Palmer. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Fairchild's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found reversible error in the trial court's failure to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury and to charge the jury on the intervening negligence of a treating physician, and found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palmer's motion for an IME to be performed.View "Fairchild v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act a misrepresentation by a seller of a used motor home is subject to a defense that the misrepresentation was made in good faith. Plaintiff Robert Borgen bought a used Travelaire motor home from A&M Motors, Inc. in 2004. The motor home had previously been owned by Thom and Linda Janidlo; the Janidlos traded in the vehicle to A&M Motors about two weeks before Borgen bought it. When the Janidlos traded in the motor home, they indicated that it was a 2002 model. At some point, someone changed the model year to 2003 on the documents at A&M Motors. The title from the State of Alaska showed that the motor home was a 2003 model, but the vehicle identification number (VIN) indicated that the motor home was a 2002 model. Both trial experts testified that the tenth digit of a VIN of a chassis indicates the model year of the chassis, but their testimony as to whether the same holds true for the VIN of a coach was unclear. The VIN on the chassis is the VIN on the vehicle’s title, but a motor home’s model year is determined by the model year of the coach. A&M Motors sold the Travelaire to Borgen as a 2003 model. In August 2005 Borgen discovered documents in the motor home indicating the motor home was actually a 2002 model. He contacted A&M Motors to complain; the only compensation they offered him was a $1,000 service contract. Borgen sued A&M Motors, pleading three causes of action: (1) misrepresentation, (2) violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), and (3) breach of contract. Borgen moved for summary judgment on his UTPA claim in February 2008. The trial court denied that motion, and a jury ultimately decided that A&M Motors had not engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in its dealings with Borgen. Finding that the trial court did not err by finding the UTPA implied an unknowing affirmative misrepresentation of material fact would not give rise to liability, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to Borgen's UTPA claims, but remanded for further proceedings on treble damages. View "Borgen v. A&M Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

After his bicycle collided with a radar trailer that the Town's police department had placed on the road, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town, alleging, inter alia, a breach of statutory duty pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149 and a claim of nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiff's nuisance claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n, which provides that section 13a-149 is the exclusive remedy against a municipality for injuries caused by a defect in a road or bridge. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint removing all claims except his section 13a-149 claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish a highway defect claim under section 13a-149. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment striking the nuisance claim against the Town on the basis of its determination that section 13a-149 was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the Town, when it also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Town on the basis of its determination that Plaintiff had failed to establish an essential element of a highway defect claim under section 31a-149. View "Himmelstein v. Windsor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction over this matter as a sua sponte exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the proper forum for adjudicating appeals from the suspension of the certification of an official emission inspection mechanic under section 4726(c) of the Vehicle Code. Appellant Maher Ahmed Mohamed was a certified emission inspector by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (PennDOT). In 2007, a Quality Assurance Officer for PennDOT (Auditor), conducted a records audit at Keystone. The Auditor’s report concluded that Appellant performed faulty emission inspections on four vehicles by connecting the emission equipment to a vehicle other than the one being tested in order to obtain a passing result. The report further indicated that two of the vehicles tested and the vehicle used to obtain the passing results were owned by taxicab companies partly owned by Appellant. The Auditor also found that Appellant falsified the records of the four tested vehicles. Appellant failed to appear at a subsequent agency hearing to answer the charges against him, and the Auditor provided the only testimony by presenting the findings of his report. PennDOT sent Appellant an order notifying him that his certification as an official emission inspector was suspended. Instead of following the directions in the order regarding the filing of an appeal, Appellant filed a petition for review from PennDOT's suspension order in the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court affirmed PennDOT's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court: "it may be the established practice to file appeals under section 4726(c) in the courts of common pleas; however, such practice remains inconsistent with . . . statutory language. While the Commonwealth Court potentially may have been correct in concluding that the General Assembly intended to enact something different from the actual text of section 933 [of the Administrative Agency Law], the Commonwealth Court was without authority to correct an omission and, therefore, violated established legal principles by disregarding the clear statutory language." Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for PennDOT to conduct an administrative hearing on the question of Appellant's suspension in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Agency Law.View "Mohamed v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law