Linda Brown sued a common carrier and its driver (SunTran) after sustaining serious injuries from being thrown from her wheelchair when the bus she was riding braked sharply. SunTran requested the judge to instruct the jury that common carriers have a duty to passengers to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The judge rejected that instruction and instead instructed that a failure to exercise the highest degree of care under the circumstances was negligence. The jury awarded compensatory damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a common carrier has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care practicable under the circumstances or only the duty to exercise reasonable care. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the general negligence standard, reasonable care under all the circumstances, applies. Remanded for a new trial.View "Nunez v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt. of Tuscon, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellees Germantown Cab Company and Sawink, Inc., received fines and suspensions for violations of regulations promulgated by the Philadelphia Parking Authority (the Authority or PPA), pertaining to driver licensure, currency of vehicle inspection, and tire tread wear. The companies pursued declaratory relief and appellate remedies, claiming that the Authority's regulations were invalid, since they were not filed with the Legislative Reference Bureau in accordance with the Commonwealth Documents Law, which is generally applicable to Commonwealth agencies. The Authority took the position that its regulations were proper, though they were not promulgated in accordance with the CDL, in light of the Authority's "unique local focus and consistent with provisions of its enabling legislation." The Commonwealth Court ultimately sustained the appeals, disagreeing with the Authority's arguments that, as "a unique hybrid agency with a local focus," it should be deemed exempt from statutory rulemaking procedures generally applicable to Commonwealth agencies. According to the court, the applicability of the CDL does not turn on an agency's particular focus; rather, it applies to "all agencies, past, present and future, regardless of their mission." Upon review of the applicable legal authorities and the parties' appellate briefs, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court in sustaining Appellees' appeals.View "Germantown Cab Co. v. Philadelphia Parking Authority" on Justia Law

A jury awarded more than $20 million for the death of three persons in a 2002 collision between a car and a tractor-trailer. Original defendants included the truck driver, his employer, the owner of the load being carried, the owner of the tractor (Adler), and the owner of the semi-trailer. The driver and his employer obtained a substitution of judge, but a second motion to substitute the judge was denied on the ground that it had been requested by the same entity (employer) operating under a different name. A motion for substitution brought by the Adler was denied on the ground that the determination concerning the employer was a substantial ruling. Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives all defendants the right to one substitution of judge, provided no substantial ruling has yet been made in the case. The appellate court ordered a new trial. The parties agreed to dismiss Adler, releasing it from liability. The Supreme Court vacated the new trial order, but remanded on other issues. Once Adler, whose request to substitute had been denied, was no longer in the case, no other defendant had standing to challenge that denial. View "Powell v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

This case involved the regulations of the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission, limiting rates that could be charged by owners of taxicabs who leased those cabs to drivers. Owners challenged a Commission regulation that prohibited owners from collecting sales tax in addition to the maximum permitted lease rates. The court held that the regulation must be annulled because the Commission had not shown any rational basis for it.View "Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade v NYC Taxi & Limousine Commn." on Justia Law

Richard Halverstadt was convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6.294 and 60-6,300 after being cited for hauling an overweight load on a Nebraska roadway. Halverstadt's load exceeded both the weight limits of his special county permit and the statutory weight limits on two axles and in gross weight. The district court affirmed. Halverstadt appealed, contending that the statutes did not apply to his actions because he possessed a special permit. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Halverstadt's convictions under section 60-6,294 for axle weight violations, holding that Halverstadt was properly cited and convicted under that statute; (2) held that the county court improperly revoked Halverstadt's special permit when his violation consisted solely of exceeding the weight limitations specified by the county permit; and (3) reversed Halverstadt's conviction for violating section 60-6,300 for a statutory gross weight violation because he was operating under a special permit. Remanded. View "State v. Halverstadt" on Justia Law

Appellant Tymar, LLC filed an application with the Nebraska Public Service Commission seeking authority to operate as a common carrier of household goods in intrastate commerce. Appellees, other common carriers in the area, filed protests to Tymar's application. After a hearing, the Commission denied the application, determining that Tymar had failed to establish its prima facie case that it met the standards for approval of its application under the regulatory scheme imposed by Neb. Rev. Stat. 75-301. The district court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether requests for admissions Tymar tendered to Appellees but which Appellees did not answer should have been deemed admitted under Neb. R. Civ. P. R. 36. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission erred when it did not give legal effect to the substance of the unanswered requests, and the district court erred as a matter of law when it failed to correct the Commission's rulings regarding these requests for admissions. Remanded with directions to reconsider Tymar's application.View "Tymar, LLC v. Two Men and a Truck" on Justia Law

The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) entered into an agreement, pursuant to the Rail Enhancement Fund created by Va. Code Ann. 33.1-221.1:1.1, to grant funds to Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) for the development of an intermodal terminal in Montgomery County. Appellant, Montgomery County, instituted on action against DRPT, DRPT's director, and the Commonwealth Transportation Board, claiming that section 33.1-221.1:1.1 and the agreement were unconstitutional pursuant to the state Constitution's internal improvements clause and credit clause, and sought to enjoin their administration. Norfolk Southern subsequently intervened as a defendant. The circuit court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 33.1-221.1:1.1, as applied in this case, did not violate either the internal improvements clause or the credit clause of the Constitution of Virginia.View "Montgomery County v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp." on Justia Law

Krista Rosencrans was severely injured when a train collided with a motor vehicle in which she was a passenger. Rosencrans and her mother (collectively, Appellants) brought a negligence action against Union Pacific and the operator of the motor vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, determining, among other things, that the claims that the train crew failed to maintain a proper lookout and failed to slow or stop the train to avoid a specific hazard were excessive speed claims and thus preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in finding that Appellants' state law negligence claim based on failure to slow the train was preempted where Appellants' claim based on Union Pacific's alleged failure to exercise ordinary care once it appeared that a collision would probably occur was not necessarily speed based and thus preempted. Remanded.View "Dresser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025. View "State Comm'r of Transp. v. Kettleson" on Justia Law

The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) issued a show cause order alleging that Bartlett Grain Company solicited for-hire motor carriers who violated several motor carrier safety laws. Bartlett answered the show cause order, contesting the KCC's jurisdiction over it with respect to its hiring of third-party motor carriers. Upon reconsideration, the KCC found it had jurisdiction over Bartlett to proceed. On review, the district court affirmed. Bartlett appealed, and the KCC stayed the ongoing agency proceedings pending judicial review. The Supreme Court transferred the case to its court on its own motion. Before considering the merits of the jurisdictional issue, the Court first addressed the issue raised sua sponte by the Court, i.e., whether the agency's order finding it had jurisdiction over the substantive violations alleged in the show cause order was a final agency action subject to judicial review. The Court held that the action from which Bartlett appealed was a nonfinal agency action and, therefore, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.View "Bartlett Grain Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law