Access to the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor, Ontario necessitated traversing city streets. The state contracted with the Company, which owns the Bridge, to construct new approaches from interstate roads. The contract specified separate jobs for the state and the Company. In 2010, the state obtained a state court order, finding the Company in breach of contract and requiring specific performance. The Company sought an order to open ramps constructed by the state, asserting that this was necessary to complete its work. The court denied the motion and held Company officials in contempt. In a 2012 settlement, the court ordered the Company to relinquish its responsibilities to the state and establish a $16 million fund to ensure completion. Plaintiffs, trucking companies that use the bridge, sought an injunction requiring the state to immediately open the ramps. The district court dismissed claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, the motor carriers statute, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c), and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. 31114(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. For purposes of the Commerce Clause and statutory claims, the state is acting in a proprietary capacity and, like the private company, is a market participant when it joins the bridge company in constructing ramps. View "Mason & Dixon Lines Inc. v. Steudle" on Justia Law

Deputy Dugle's police cruiser was struck by a Norfolk train as he left firearms training at the county range. Dugle spent 11 days in a coma, suffered broken bones, and incurred traumatic brain injury. The range is accessible by a gravel drive that crosses a farm and the tracks. There is no evidence that the county maintains the drive; it is not shown on the official map. Despite signs instructing crews to sound the horn on both approaches the crew failed to do so. Dugle had slowed as he approached the crossbuck sign with the words "railroad" and "crossing," but the parties dispute by how much and when. A camera on the train demonstrates that the cruiser was visible to the crew for about 4.25 seconds before impact. Norfolk claimed that it maintains its 30-foot right-of-way in compliance with Kentucky law and that any obstructions were on private property. The district court granted summary judgment for Norfolk, holding that the crossing was not ultrahazardous because Dugle could have avoided the collision by stopping at the sign. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that no Kentucky case has concluded that sight lines of over 400 feet indicated that a crossing is safe as a matter of law. View "Dugle v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, plaintiff’s car collided with a train owned by defendant. The train was stopped on the tracks in Louisville, Kentucky, blocking a crossing. Plaintiff never hit her brakes and slammed into the side of the red boxcar at 40 to 45 miles per hour. She survived the crash, claimed that warning lights were not flashing and that she never saw the train until the instant before the impact, and sued in state court for negligence and failure to comply with the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. 421, and other federal laws, including 49 U.S.C. 20134, by failing to properly maintain, employ, use and install proper warning devices and procedures at railway crossings. Defendant removed the case to federal court, where it was granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Although plaintiff never moved for remand, courts are required to consider jurisdiction. The cited federal regulations do not create or imply a cause of action. View "Hampton v. R.J. Corman R.R. Switching Co." on Justia Law

R+L, owns a patent relating to the less-than-a-load trucking industry and uses the patented method in its business. Carriers in the industry pick up freight from several different customers, often destined for different locations around the country. Freight is taken to a terminal where it is unloaded from the truck and consolidated with other freight headed in the same direction, then reloaded. The patent claims a method that “automates the process of receiving transportation documentation and producing advance loading manifests therefrom to optimize load planning and dynamic product shipment and delivery control.” The patented method enables shipping documents to be sent directly from the truck driver to a common point, such as a terminal, so billing and load planning can occur while the driver is en route with the freight. In 2008, R+L sent cease-and-desist letters to defendants, suspecting infringement. Defendants sought declaratory judgments of invalidity and non-infringement; R+L counterclaimed. The district court ruled against R+L. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. R+L failed to state a claim of contributory infringement, but adequately stated a claim of induced infringement View "R&L Carriers, Inc. v. Drivertech, LLC" on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles sought proposals from contractors to print and send registration renewal notices along with advertisements to raise revenue to defray costs. RMV would provide the contractor with information (name, address, date of birth, and license number) that was generally exempt from public disclosure under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721-25, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, sect. 7, cl. 26(n), that the contractor would need to safeguard from unlawful public disclosure. Defendant's winning bid indicated that it understood and accepted the terms. The contract specified that Massachusetts would continue to exercise ownership over all personal data, and that a violation of the DPPA or the Massachusetts privacy law would cause the contract to terminate. Plaintiff, who received a registration renewal notice that included advertisements, filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and other drivers who, without providing consent, had received advertisements from defendant. The district court granted defendant judgment on the pleadings based on failure to join the Commonwealth as an indispensable party. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no violation of the DPPA. Defendant does not disclose the information it legitimately receives, as the state's contractor, to others. View "Downing v. Globe Direct LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested after police officers found her intoxicated, sitting in the driver’s seat of her running, but legally parked, Hummer. She was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, but the state trial court dismissed her case, finding that she was not "operating" her Hummer as that term is defined under Michigan law. Plaintiff sued her arresting officers, arguing, among other things, that they unconstitutionally detained her without reasonable suspicion and arrested her without probable cause. The district court held that the officers had qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a reasonable basis to believe that plaintiff was operating her Hummer while intoxicated, and was therefore violating Michigan law. View "Nettles-Nickerson v. Free" on Justia Law

Decedent died when a 28-ton beam struck an overpass, fell off of the trailer transporting it, and crushed the cab of his truck, which was on the highway behind the trailer. The district court granted motions for summary judgment in favor of companies responsible for loading the beam on the trailer, hiring the trucking company, and obtaining permits. The court construed Michigan Compiled Laws 257.719(1) as forbidding recovery from anyone other than the owner of a vehicle that collides with a lawfully established bridge. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The estate did not bring suit directly under the statute. In a common-law negligence case, all principles concerning common-law liability and defenses apply. The statute may imply that others who pay may be able to shift their liability to an owner, not that they can have no liability in the first instance. The fact that liability for all damages and injury is fixed on the owner of the vehicle even where concurrent or intervening acts of negligence precipitate the accident, does not imply that tortfeasors responsible for those concurrent or intervening acts cannot also be liable. View "Roquemore v. ER Express" on Justia Law

In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the airline extracted concessions that resulted in an approximate 40 percent wage cut for pilots in return for an $888 million claim in bankruptcy to be disbursed as stock shares. The union first suggested that a pilot's share should reflect time that the pilot worked during the 85-month concessionary period, but ultimately adopted a cutoff date for determining which pilots would receive full shares. The cutoff assumed that any pilot employed on the effective date of the Restructuring Agreement would remain employed through its termination four years later. Any pilot who left before the date would receive a share based the number of months that the pilot worked during the concessionary period. All participants in the Early Retirement Program retired after the cutoff date. Plaintiffs, retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and left before the cutoff, received shares at least $100,000 less than expected. The union rejected appeals. The district court granted summary judgment to the union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the union breached its duty of fair representation, Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 15, and discriminated based on age, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(c)(1), and Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2204(a). View "Bondurant v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against BNSF, alleging common law negligence and seeking compensation for injuries he suffered when the automobile he was driving hit a BNSF railcar that was stopped at a railroad crossing. The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims. Because the court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the warning regulations did not create a federal standard of care under which the railroad was expected to act, the 2007 Amendments to the Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20106, had no effect on the prior case law relating to those regulations. As such, Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin was not overruled by the 2007 Amendment and was controlling. Therefore, plaintiff's warning claims were preempted because the B Street Crossing warning system was paid for in party by federal funds. Further, the local-condition savings clause under the FRSA was not applicable. The court also held that the district court was correct in determining that plaintiff's claim of negligence based on failure to equip the railcar with reflective devices was preempted; the district court appropriately granted summary judgment based on lack of causation and the court need not reach the issue of whether plaintiff's claim was preempted; and the district court properly granted summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim that BNSF was negligent in failing to keep its rolling stock under reasonable and proper control and supervision. View "Grade v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

In 1998, the Supreme Court held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax, 26 U.S.C. 4461-4462, was unconstitutional as applied to exports. U.S. Customs enacted procedures for refunds and established a separate HMT database with data from its ACS database, through which HMT payments had been processed. Customs discovered wide-spread inaccuracies in its HMT database, but was unable to make corrections related to payments made before July 1, 1990, because it no longer had original documents. Customs established different requirements for supporting documentation, depending on whether an exporter was seeking a refund of pre- or post-July 1, 1990 payments. Ford sought HMT refunds for both pre- and post-July 1, 1990, payments and has received more than $17 million, but claims that Customs still owes about $2.5 million. In addition to a FOIA Report of Ford’s pre-July 1, 1990 payments was drawn from information in the ACS database, Ford submitted an affidavit attesting that it was only claiming refunds of HMT paid on exports and declarations about the consistency and quality of its quarterly HMT payment records. Customs denied the claims. The Trade Court entered judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The claims were insufficient because there still was high potential for error. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law