Plaintiff was unloading a railway tank car filled with sulfuric acid when its chemical contents exploded, spraying across his face and chest and inflicting severe burns. He sought damages under the common law, but the district court held that his lawsuit was preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Act expressly preempts any common law requirement about the design of a package, container, or packaging component qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce. The tank car at issue is a container qualified for such use, regardless of whether what plaintiff was doing constituted transport or his employment status at the precise moment of his injury. View "Roth v. Noralfco, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the standard of causation applicable in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., which rendered railroads liable for employees' injuries or deaths "resulting in whole or in part from [carrier] negligence." Respondent, a locomotive engineer with petitioner, an interstate railroad, sustained a debilitating hand injury and subsequently filed suit under the FELA. At issue was whether the causation instruction endorsed by the Seventh Circuit was proper in FELA cases where that instruction did not include the term "proximate cause," but did tell the jury defendant's negligence must "pla[y] a part-no matter how small-in bringing about the [plaintiff's] injury." In accord with the text and purpose of the Act, the Court's decision in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., and the uniform view of federal appellate courts, the Court held that the Act did not incorporate "proximate cause" standards developed in nonstatutory common law tort actions. The Court held that the charge proper in FELA cases simply tracked the language Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's negligence played any part in bringing about the injury. Accordingly, the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride" on Justia Law

NMSA, a trade association representing marine terminal operators, petitioned for review of OSHA's vertical tandem lifts ("VTLs") Standard. At issue was whether OSHA failed to demonstrate that VTLs posed a significant risk of worker safety; whether two of the Standard's requirements were not technologically feasible; whether the Standard was not reasonably necessary or appropriate in light of the "safe work zone" requirement; whether OSHA's authority was limited to requiring, not prohibiting, workplace practices; and if the Standard was otherwise valid, whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 651-678, had made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to OSHA. The court denied NMSA's petition for review in large part, granted the petition in part, vacating and remanding only that portion of the VTL Standard providing for the inspection requirement for ship-to-shore VTLs and the total ban on platform container VTLs. View "Nat'l Maritime Safety Assoc. v. OSHA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' predecessors bought their Wisconsin land from the federal government in 1882-1884 and the railroad obtained an easement to cross the land by condemnation. The railroad abandoned the easement in 1980 by obtaining ICC permission and removing tracks. More than 20 years later, the county, wanting to construct a snowmobile trail, claimed that the land reverted to county ownership by virtue of a law enacted in 1852. The district court ruled in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first rejecting the county's claim that only the federal government had standing to challenge non-compliance with conditions of the 1852 law. When an easement is abandoned, rights ordinarily revert to the fee owner and, under the applicable laws, plaintiffs acquired any right-of-way a year and a day after the abandonment. The county was aware of the abandonment and considered buying the easement from the railroad at that time, but "waited a quarter of a century and then claimed a right to obtain the right of way for nothing." View "Johnson v. Bayfield County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two national trade associations representing the private charter bus industry, challenged Senator Patty Murray's amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 172, related to charter bus services, alleging that the amendment ensured that the Federal Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. 5323(d)(1) ("Charter Rule"), could not spend appropriated funds to enforce the Charter Rule to bar King County Metro ("KCM") from providing bus service to Seattle Mariners games in Fiscal Year 2010. At issue was whether Congress could constitutionally permit a federally-subsidized transit system to take the residents of Seattle out to the ball game. The court held that Congress could and that the amendment was not unconstitutional where it did not violate plaintiffs' First Amendment right to petition, Fifth Amendment right to equal protection, procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, or separation of powers principles. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed. View "American Bus Assoc. v. Rogoff, et al." on Justia Law

The State brought a complaint against BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF") in November 2009 seeking a declaratory judgment requiring BNSF to abide by the terms of a 1984 agreement between them and a declaration that BNSF was in violation of that agreement; specific performance by BNSF of the agreement, and damages for BNSF's alleged breach of the agreement. The State subsequently filed an application for a preliminary injunction in June 2010 to prohibit BNSF from terminating the payment to the State and its short line operator per loaded car for each car handled in interchanges as required by Section 9 of the agreement. At issue was whether the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction where it went beyond the State's requested relief and effectively ordered specific performance on the agreement under new terms substantially different than the prior agreed upon terms which severely limited termination of the new interchange agreement and was never part of the 1984 or 1986 agreements. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and resolved the injunction, remanding for further proceedings.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainment ("BLET") filed a claim with the Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP") seeking reinstatement and backpay for a member of the BLET when UP terminated him while he was working under a governing collective-bargaining agreement between the UP and the United Transportation Union ("UTU"). At issue was whether the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") properly dismissed the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that the NRAB did not ignore the Article C-17 contract provision in the agreement while interpreting the contract; that the NRAB's interpretation of Article C-17 did not violate 45 U.S.C. 153 First (j); the NRAB acted well within its power by invoking a "claim-processsing" rule; the NRAB was well within its authority in construing the agreement as enunciating the "usual manner" in this workplace; once the NRAB determined that the agreement was controlling, the other agreements and bargaining history became largely irrelevant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion where discovery would not have justified setting aside the NRAB's interpretation of the agreement, nor would it have uncovered a due process violation by the NRAB.

QT Trading, L.P. ("QT") sued defendants for rust damage to its steel pipes that allegedly occurred during their transport from Dalian, China to Houston, Texas. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to in personam defendants on QT's claims for damages under the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. 30701 note (Carriage of Goods by Sea), and for negligent bailment of its goods. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the district court properly dismissed QT's COGSA claims where QT failed to establish genuine issues of material fact where none of the defendants were "carriers" and thus could not be liable for damages under the statute. The court also held that the district court properly dismissed QT's bailment claims where QT failed to show that a certain defendant had exclusive possession of the cargo.

Petitioner applied for a first-class airman medical certificate pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44703 and, after a period of evaluation, a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") Federal Air Surgeon issued a denial based on the conclusion that petitioner did not meet the medical standards set out in the relevant regulations. At issue was whether the National Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") affirmance of the denial of petitioner's medical certificate was supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the NTSB's decision and held that the petition for review was denied where there was no doubt that the FAA's submissions provided substantial evidence for the denial and where petitioner failed to show that it was unreasonable for the NTSB to credit the FAA's evidence over his own.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.