Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

BeavEx is a same-day delivery service that uses 104 couriers to carry out its customers’ orders throughout Illinois. By classifying its couriers as independent contractors instead of employees, Beav-Ex attempted to avoid the requirements of state and federal employment laws, including the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115, which prohibits an employer from taking unauthorized deductions from its employees’ wages. Plaintiffs, and the putative class, were or are couriers who allege that they should have been classified as employees of BeavEx for purposes of the IWPCA, and that any deductions taken from their wages were illegal. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts any state law that is “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier.” The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt the IWPCA and denied BeavEx’s motion for summary judgment. The court also denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class but granted their motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs are employees under the IWPCA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of BeavEx’s motion for summary judgment, vacated the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceeding View "Costello v. BeavEx, Inc." on Justia Law

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

After Continental and United Air Lines merged, they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity rosters for pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association represents all of the pilots. In 2012 the new United and the Union reached an agreement that sets pilot pay based on: rank (captain vs. first officer), type of aircraft flown, and longevity, defined as all time since the date a pilot was hired, including time spent on furlough. Pre-merger, pilots on furlough accrued seniority but not longevity. Plaintiffs challenged ancillary Agreement 25, under which pilots in active service longer than four years and seven months would receive no credit for furlough time; pilots who had four years and six months of service could claim only one month of furlough; and so on. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision slots 475 former United pilots into the table behind former Continental pilots who were hired before May 6, 2008, in violation of the main agreement, and accused the Union of inadequate representation (DFR claim). Defendants replied that the main agreement governs the future, after Agreement 25 determines the pilots’ starting positions. The district judge dismissed United as a party because disputes about the meaning of an airline industry collective bargaining agreement are within the exclusive authority of an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act, leaving plaintiffs unable to establish both that United violated the contract and that the union did not represent workers fairly. They then argued that the Union negotiated a bad contract. The district court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, with pilots on different sides of the issue, a compromise that favored some over others was inevitable. View "Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Lilliputian, manufacturer of micro fuel cells powered by butane, challenged the prohibition in a final rule against airline passengers and crew carrying butane fuel cell cartridges in their checked baggage. Lilliputian argued that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious in light of the dissimilar treatment of other products that were not subject to the rigorous safety specifications imposed on fuel cell cartridges. The court concluded that the Safety Administration failed to provide the required "reasoned explanation and substantial evidence" for the disparate treatment. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Safety Administration to provide further explanation for the prohibition, including its response to Lilliputian's comments. View "Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

Northwest terminated plaintiff’s membership in its frequent flyer program. A provision in the frequent flyer agreement gave Northwest sole discretion to determine whether a participant had abused the program. Plaintiff claimed that Northwest breached its contract by revoking his membership without valid cause and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing because it terminated his membership in a way that contravened his reasonable expectations. The district court dismissed, holding that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 pre-empted the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that claim “too tenuously connected to airline regulation to trigger” ADA pre-emption. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The Act pre-empts a state-law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if it seeks to enlarge contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted. The Act prohibits states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to [an air carrier’s] price, route, or service,” 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). The phrase “other provision having the force and effect of law” includes state common-law rules like the claimed implied covenant. Exempting common-law claims would disserve the Act’s central purpose: to eliminate federal regulation of rates, routes, and services so they could be set by market forces. Northwest’s program connects to “rates” by awarding credits redeemable for tickets and upgrades, thus eliminating or reducing ticket prices. It also connects to “services,” i.e., access to flights and higher service categories. Because the implied covenant claim sought to enlarge contractual agreement, it is pre-empted. Under controlling Minnesota law, parties may not contract out of the implied covenant; when state law does not authorize parties to free themselves from the covenant, a breach of covenant claim is pre-empted. Participants in frequent flyer programs can protect themselves by avoiding airlines with poor reputations and enrolling in more favorable rival programs; the Department of Transportation has authority to investigate complaints about frequent flyer programs. The Court also noted that the plaintiff did not appeal his breach of contract claim. View "Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law

Claiming that the FAA, DOT, and SSA violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A), by sharing his records with one another, respondent filed suit alleging that the unlawful disclosure to the DOT of his confidential medical information, including his HIV status, had caused him "humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other severe emotional distress." The District Court granted summary judgment against respondent, concluding that respondent could not recover damages because he alleged only mental and emotional harm, not economic loss. Reversing the District Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "actual damages" in the Act was not ambiguous and included damages for mental and emotional distress. Applying traditional rules of construction, the Court held that the Act did not unequivocally authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress. Accordingly, the Act did not waive the Government's sovereign immunity from liability for such harms. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. View "FAA v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Northwest terminated plaintiff’s membership in its frequent flyer program. A provision in the frequent flyer agreement gave Northwest sole discretion to determine whether a participant had abused the program. Plaintiff claimed that Northwest breached its contract by revoking his membership without valid cause and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing because it terminated his membership in a way that contravened his reasonable expectations. The district court dismissed, holding that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 pre-empted the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that claim “too tenuously connected to airline regulation to trigger” ADA pre-emption. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The Act pre-empts a state-law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if it seeks to enlarge contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted. The Act prohibits states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to [an air carrier’s] price, route, or service,” 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). The phrase “other provision having the force and effect of law” includes state common-law rules like the claimed implied covenant. Exempting common-law claims would disserve the Act’s central purpose: to eliminate federal regulation of rates, routes, and services so they could be set by market forces. Northwest’s program connects to “rates” by awarding credits redeemable for tickets and upgrades, thus eliminating or reducing ticket prices. It also connects to “services,” i.e., access to flights and higher service categories. Because the implied covenant claim sought to enlarge contractual agreement, it is pre-empted. Under controlling Minnesota law, parties may not contract out of the implied covenant; when state law does not authorize parties to free themselves from the covenant, a breach of covenant claim is pre-empted. Participants in frequent flyer programs can protect themselves by avoiding airlines with poor reputations and enrolling in more favorable rival programs; the Department of Transportation has authority to investigate complaints about frequent flyer programs. The Court also noted that the plaintiff did not appeal his breach of contract claim. View "Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law

While working as a flight attendant, LeGrande was injured when the aircraft encountered severe turbulence. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, alleging that air traffic controllers employed by the FAA negligently had failed to warn the flight’s captain that turbulence had been forecast along the flight path. The district court concluded that FAA employees did not breach any duty owed LeGrande and granted summary judgment for the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. LeGrande argued, for the first time, that her injuries resulted from the negligence of a National Weather Service meteorologist. The court concluded that the FAA breached no duty owed to LeGrande and that LeGrande failed to give the NWS the notice that the FTCA requires. View "LeGrande v. United States" on Justia Law