Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Union Pacific Railway, and Stickle, alleging that failure to properly build and maintain railway bridges over the Cedar River caused or exacerbated the 2008 flood and that the decision to attempt to stabilize the bridges by weighing them down with railcars filled with ballast caused or exacerbated the flooding of their properties, either because bridges collapsed and effectively dammed the river and blocked drainage, or because railcars on bridges that did not collapse blocked the free flow of the river and diverted water into low-lying areas. Union Pacific filed Notice of Removal that asserted federal question jurisdiction and stated that attorneys for the co-defendants had no objection to removal, accompanied by a local rule certification that: “co-defendants have given their consent to the removal.” Stickle did not file notice of consent to removal until more than 30 days after Union Pacific was served. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved to remand, arguing that their claims were not completely preempted and that not all defendants had timely consented. The district court denied remand. The Eighth Circuit vacated, finding the consent adequate, but that the state claims were not completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 701. View "Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co." on Justia Law

James H. Goldthwaite lived in his Birmingham house for approximately 45 years. The house was adjacent to or near property on which were actively used railroad tracks owned by Norfolk Southern. The record reflected that Norfolk Southern used one of the railroad tracks located near Goldthwaite's house as a staging or temporary storage area for coal trains, which consist of empty rail cars and cars loaded with coal. In October 2013, Goldthwaite filed a complaint against Norfolk Southern alleging that his "life, health, liberty and possessions" have been harmed by noise and "noxious fumes" from the diesel locomotives that were left running in coal trains that are temporarily stored near his house. Norfolk Southern had the case removed to the United States District Court on the ground that Goldthwaite's claims were completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, and that the federal district court had federal question jurisdiction for the limited purpose of dismissing the action. In April 2014, the federal district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action because Goldthwaite's state-law claims were not completely preempted by the ICCTA. Holding that removal of the action from state court was not proper, the federal district court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. On remand, Norfolk Southern moved the circuit court to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted under the ICCTA because, it maintained, the nuisance action was an attempt to regulate transportation by rail carrier and actions related to the regulation and operation of rail carriers, pursuant to the ICCTA, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted by the ICCTA, the circuit court erred in denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment for Norfolk Southern, dismissing Goldthwaite's state court action. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Goldthwaite" on Justia Law

Union Pacific filed suit against Progress Rail, alleging that Progress Rail negligently reconditioned certain railcar axles, causing the axles to fail and two trains to derail. A jury returned a verdict for Progress Rail and Union Pacific appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Union Pacific's metallurgical engineer's opinion and in admitting the opinion of Progress Rail's expert. Progress Rail filed a conditional cross-appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the engineer's opinion that the axle failures were caused by corrosion pits that Progress Rail failed to remove when it reconditioned the axles because the engineer could not say when the corrosion pits formed and could not trace the fatigue cracks that caused the axles to fail to specific corrosion pits. In this case, the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping function in excluding the engineer's ultimate opinion as unreliable. The court also concluded that Progress Rail laid an adequate foundation for Progress Rail's expert's opinions and the district court acted within its discretion when it overruled Union Pacific's objections. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Progress Rail Serv. Corp." on Justia Law