Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

In 1953, New York and New Jersey entered into the Waterfront Commission Act, establishing the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to govern operations at the Port of New York‐New Jersey. At that time, individual pieces of cargo were loaded onto trucks, driven to the pier, and then unloaded for loading, piece‐by‐piece, onto the vessel. Similarly, arriving cargo was handled piece-by-piece. Containerization transformed shipping: a shipper loads cargo into a large container, which is loaded onto a truck and transported to the pier, where it is lifted aboard a ship. Continental operates warehouses, including one at 112 Port Jersey Boulevard, Jersey City. Continental picks up containers from the Global Marine Terminal, transports them to the Warehouse, unloads them, and removes their contents. Continental stores the freight and provides other services, such as sampling, weighing. and wrapping. In 2011, the Commission advised Continental that it was required to obtain a stevedore license, concluding that the property line and building of the 112 Warehouse were within 1,000 yards of a pier. Continental sought a declaratory judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that Continental engages in stevedoring activities at the warehouse and that the warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ under the Act and within the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Cont'l Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor" on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Shipper engaged Common Carrier to transport computer equipment belonging to Company. Company claimed the shipment was damaged on arrival, and Common Carrier refused to pay the amount that Company claimed Common Carrier had agreed to settle the claim for. Company asserted a claim against Shipper, whose Insurer paid Company. As subrogee, Insurer sued Common Carrier for breach of the settlement agreement. Insurer avoided removal to federal court by not asserting a cargo-damage claim, but, on remand, amended its petition to assert one. Common Carrier contended the cargo-damage claim was barred by limitations because Insurer filed it more than four years after Common Carrier rejected Company's claim. Insurer argued the cargo-damage claim related back to its original action for breach of the settlement agreement and thus was timely filed. The trial court agreed and rendered judgment against Common Carrier. The court of appeals held the cargo-damage claim did not relate back and was therefore barred by limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for Insurer, holding that Insurer's cargo-damage claim was not barred by limitations, as the cargo-damage claim and breach-of-settlement claim both arose out of the same occurrence and, therefore, the relation-back doctrine applied.View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.068, an action for cargo damage against a common carrier, brought under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, relates back to an action for breach of an agreement to settle the cargo-damage claim. The answer depended on whether the cargo-damage claim was, in the words of section 16.068, "wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence" than the breach-of-settlement claim. A divided court of appeals held that the cargo-damage claim did not relate back and was therefore barred by limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the cargo-damage claim and the breach-of-settlement claim both arose out of the same occurrence, and therefore, the cargo-damage claim was not barred by limitations.View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U. S. C. 14501(c)(1). Pelkey sued in New Hampshire state court, alleging that Dan’s towing company towed his car from a parking lot without Pelkey’s knowledge, failed to notify him of its plan to auction the car, held an auction despite Pelkey’s notice that he wanted to reclaim the car, and traded the car away without compensating Pelkey. Pelkey alleged Dan’s did not meet the requirements of New Hampshire statutes, chapter 262, which regulates disposal of abandoned vehicles by a “storage company;” violated New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act; and violated its duties as a bailee The court granted Dan’s summary judgment, concluding that the FAAAA preempted Pelkey’s claims. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding FAAAA preemption inapplicable to claims related to conduct in post-storage disposal, as opposed to conduct concerning “transportation of property,” or a “service.” The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 14501(c)(1) does not preempt state-law claims stemming from the storage and disposal of a towed vehicle. Pelkey’s claims are not related to “transportation of property” nor the “service” of a motor carrier. The words “with respect to the transportation of property” limit the FAAAA’s preemptive scope. Transportation of Pelkey’s car from his landlord’s parking lot was a service that ended months before the conduct on which Pelkey’s claims are based. The New Hampshire prescriptions Pelkey invokes hardly constrain participation in interstate commerce by requiring a motor carrier to offer services not available in the market. Nor do they “freez[e] into place services that carriers might prefer to discontinue in the future.” View "Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U. S. C. 14501(c)(1). Pelkey sued in New Hampshire state court, alleging that Dan’s towing company towed his car from a parking lot without Pelkey’s knowledge, failed to notify him of its plan to auction the car, held an auction despite Pelkey’s notice that he wanted to reclaim the car, and traded the car away without compensating Pelkey. Pelkey alleged Dan’s did not meet the requirements of New Hampshire statutes, chapter 262, which regulates disposal of abandoned vehicles by a “storage company;” violated New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act; and violated its duties as a bailee The court granted Dan’s summary judgment, concluding that the FAAAA preempted Pelkey’s claims. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding FAAAA preemption inapplicable to claims related to conduct in post-storage disposal, as opposed to conduct concerning “transportation of property,” or a “service.” The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 14501(c)(1) does not preempt state-law claims stemming from the storage and disposal of a towed vehicle. Pelkey’s claims are not related to “transportation of property” nor the “service” of a motor carrier. The words “with respect to the transportation of property” limit the FAAAA’s preemptive scope. Transportation of Pelkey’s car from his landlord’s parking lot was a service that ended months before the conduct on which Pelkey’s claims are based. The New Hampshire prescriptions Pelkey invokes hardly constrain participation in interstate commerce by requiring a motor carrier to offer services not available in the market. Nor do they “freez[e] into place services that carriers might prefer to discontinue in the future.” View "Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey" on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific train derailed in Oklahoma causing extensive damage to both the railroad and the train’s cargo. Kawasaki, K-Line, and Union Pacific sought damages, alleging that Plano’s steel injection molds were improperly packed, broke through their crate, and fell onto the track. The district court granted Plano summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Negligence claims were properly rejected, Plano had no indication that the parties with which it dealt would be unable to properly package and transport its steel molds from China to the United States, nor did Plano have any special knowledge of any unique danger the molds would pose during transit. Plano owed no special duty of care to the carriers. There were, however, unresolved questions of fact material to the determination of one contract claim, based on a bill of lading. It was unclear whether Plano or another arranged the molds’ shipment. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law

TAMS, a medical device manufacturer, hired Comtrans to coordinate shipment of equipment to a trade show in Chicago. Comtrans is not a carrier. It used its affiliate, ACS, which retained Atlas to perform the actual shipment. The Atlas truck was involved in a serious accident, leaving TAMS with more than $1 million in losses. TAMS’s insurance company sued on behalf of TAMS. Atlas is an interstate motor carrier authorized by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to transport goods in interstate commerce. Claims are subject to the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 14706, which provides that a carrier of property in interstate commerce is liable for the actual loss or injury to the property caused b” the carrier, which may be limited “to a value established by written or electronic declaration of the shipper or by written agreement between the carrier and shipper if that value would be reasonable under the circumstances.” Atlas relied on the contract it had in place with ACS and the bill of lading delivered signed by a Comtrans warehouse manager when Atlas picked up TAMS’s shipment, as limiting liability to $0.60 per pound. The district court entered summary judgment for Atlas. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further development of the facts. View "Nipponkoa Ins. Co., L v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1998, the Supreme Court held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax, 26 U.S.C. 4461-4462, was unconstitutional as applied to exports. U.S. Customs enacted procedures for refunds and established a separate HMT database with data from its ACS database, through which HMT payments had been processed. Customs discovered wide-spread inaccuracies in its HMT database, but was unable to make corrections related to payments made before July 1, 1990, because it no longer had original documents. Customs established different requirements for supporting documentation, depending on whether an exporter was seeking a refund of pre- or post-July 1, 1990 payments. Ford sought HMT refunds for both pre- and post-July 1, 1990, payments and has received more than $17 million, but claims that Customs still owes about $2.5 million. In addition to a FOIA Report of Ford’s pre-July 1, 1990 payments was drawn from information in the ACS database, Ford submitted an affidavit attesting that it was only claiming refunds of HMT paid on exports and declarations about the consistency and quality of its quarterly HMT payment records. Customs denied the claims. The Trade Court entered judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The claims were insufficient because there still was high potential for error. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The owner of retail liquor stores and two consumers challenged the constitutionality of an Indiana state law that prohibits shipment of wine to customers by motor carriers, such as UPS, Ind. Code. 7.1-3-15-3(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the challenges. The law may prevent the store from enlarging its sales area to encompass parts of Indiana remote from Fort Wayne; that is an effect on intrastate commerce, not interstate commerce. Plaintiffs did not establish even an incidental effect on interstate commerce The court also noted that the law is "within the Twenty-First Amendment's gravitational field," which includes matters relating to transportation of liquor.View "Lebamoff Enter., Inc. v. Huskey" on Justia Law