Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

George Corson and his wife sued respondents, claiming injury from Corson's exposure to asbestos in locomotives and locomotive parts distributed by respondents. The Corsons alleged state-law claims of defective design and failure to warn of the dangers posed by asbestos. After Corson died, his wife was substituted as a party. Respondents removed the case to the Federal District Court, which granted respondents summary judgment, ruling that the state-law claims were pre-empted by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701, et seq. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Court held that petitioners' state-law design-defect and failure-to-warn claims fell within the field of locomotive equipment regulation pre-empted by the LIA, as that field was defined in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line. R. Co. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Kurns, et al. v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a terminal and switching railroad operating in the City, brought a declaratory judgment against the City alleging that a federal statute preempted all City ordinances that affected its transloading operations. The railroad wanted to expand its operations and the City opposed the expansion, claiming it violated several municipal ordinances. The court reversed the district court's holding of no preemption as to the standard construction details and road grading ordinance, resting its decision on express preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. The court's express preemption holding only pertained to the road and paving areas used in connection with the TCB-MAALT-Halliburton transloading operation. This preemption rendered the City's appeal from the denial of its request for civil penalties for ordinance violations moot. The court reversed what the court concluded was likely a holding by the district court that there was express preemption as to the older, 20-acre transloading center and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings. View "Texas Central Business Lines v. City of Midlothian" on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Delivery Association claimed that a state law is preempted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1569, which expressly preempts state attempts to regulate "a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," The challenged state law, part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sect. 148B(a)(2), which requires that an individual performing a service for another be classified as an employee unless "the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer." The MDA also claimed that the state statute imposes an undue burden which violates the Commerce Clause. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate because, while the Association is not itself a party to relevant state litigation, three of its members are defendants in state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General (defendant in this case) but by private parties. The First Circuit remanded for the court to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that any decision will not interfere with pending state cases. View "MA Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley" on Justia Law

The owner of retail liquor stores and two consumers challenged the constitutionality of an Indiana state law that prohibits shipment of wine to customers by motor carriers, such as UPS, Ind. Code. 7.1-3-15-3(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the challenges. The law may prevent the store from enlarging its sales area to encompass parts of Indiana remote from Fort Wayne; that is an effect on intrastate commerce, not interstate commerce. Plaintiffs did not establish even an incidental effect on interstate commerce The court also noted that the law is "within the Twenty-First Amendment's gravitational field," which includes matters relating to transportation of liquor.View "Lebamoff Enter., Inc. v. Huskey" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act No. 530, Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 48:394, which required that all railroad companies obtain permission from the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) before closing or removing private railroad crossings. During the pendency of this litigation, in 2010, the Louisiana Legislature adopted Act 858, amending Section 48:394 in light of the court's decision in Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Plaintiff filed the instant action against LPSC and its commissioners in their official capacity, seeking a declaration that Section 48:394 was preempted by federal law, and both preliminary and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of that section. The court held that Louisiana had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also held that, because the parties agreed that if the State was entitled to immunity the case would be dismissed, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the action. View "Union Pacific RR Co. v. LA Public Service Cmsn, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Trucking Ass'n v. The City of Los Angeles, et al." on Justia Law

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption. View "New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Authority" on Justia Law

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and two individuals petitioned for review of a decision by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to screen airline passengers by using advanced imaging technology (AIT) instead of magnetometers. EPIC argued that the use of AIT violated various federal statutes and the Fourth Amendment and, in any event, should have been the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking before being adopted. The court granted the petition for review with respect to claims that the TSA had not justified its failure to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking before announcing it would use AIT scanners for primary screening at airports. None of the exceptions urged by the TSA justified its failure to give notice of and receive comment upon such a rule, which was legislative and not merely interpretive, procedural, or a general statement of policy. The court denied the petition with respect to EPIC's statutory arguments and their claim under the Fourth Amendment, except their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., which the court dismissed for lack of standing. Finally, due to the obvious need for the TSA to continue its airport security operations without interruption, the court remanded the rule to the TSA but did not vacate it. View "Electronic Privacy Info. Center, et al. v. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, owner and operator of a flat-rate ground transportation service, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission's (Commission) regulations required him to obtain certificates and permits for his vehicles were preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14501, also known as the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. Specifically, plaintiff contended that section 14501(a)(1)(C) preempted the Commission's regulation regarding his 15-passenger vehicle and section 14501(c)(1) preempted the Commission's regulation regarding his 7-passenger minivan. The court affirmed the district court's decision rejecting plaintiff's first argument and adopted that court's reasoning. The court also held that, because plaintiff transported property only as an ancillary service to the transportation of passengers he was not a "[m]otor carrier of property" under section 14501(c). Consequently, it followed that the provision and its subparts did not preempt the Commission's luxury service transportation rule. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the Commission. View "Kozak v. Hillsborough County, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two national trade associations representing the private charter bus industry, challenged Senator Patty Murray's amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 172, related to charter bus services, alleging that the amendment ensured that the Federal Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. 5323(d)(1) ("Charter Rule"), could not spend appropriated funds to enforce the Charter Rule to bar King County Metro ("KCM") from providing bus service to Seattle Mariners games in Fiscal Year 2010. At issue was whether Congress could constitutionally permit a federally-subsidized transit system to take the residents of Seattle out to the ball game. The court held that Congress could and that the amendment was not unconstitutional where it did not violate plaintiffs' First Amendment right to petition, Fifth Amendment right to equal protection, procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, or separation of powers principles. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed. View "American Bus Assoc. v. Rogoff, et al." on Justia Law