Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, when it terminated his employment for harassing a co-worker and threatening a supervisor. The district court ultimately granted BNSF summary judgment on the merits and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because he failed to submit evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer that his FRSA-protected activities were a contributing factor in BNSF's decision to discharge him for harassing and intimidating a co-worker. Because BNSF did not sufficiently develop its alternative waiver argument, did not raise a laches or estoppel defense in the district court or on appeal, and presented insufficient proof (if any) on these fact intensive issues, the court left these questions for another day. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gunderson v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the complaints based on statute of limitations grounds. The Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) maintains a Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID), which contains drivers' personal information. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants repeatedly accessed plaintiffs' private information through the DAVID database without their knowledge or consent. The court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on plaintiffs' claims when the alleged DPPA violations occurred; plaintiffs have failed to present any theory that would entitle their claims to be treated as filed within the limitations period; and thus their actions are time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Indian River County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four bus companies operating buses over routes in and around the cities of New Britian and Hartford. Each plaintiff had authority to operate a bus service over a specific route pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity. When a new busway was constructed by the state, the state sought to hire new companies to operate buses over the routes Plaintiffs currently operate. In a separate action, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Commissioner of Transportation from transferring the routes at issue to new operators. While that case was pending, the Commissioner condemned the certificates pursuant to the State’s power of eminent domain. Plaintiff filed the actions that were the subject of this appeal, claiming that the Commissioner lacked the statutory authority to condemn their certificates. The trial court consolidated the actions and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-36(a) gave the Commissioner authority to condemn the certificates. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the term “facilities” in the statute to refer to intangible operating rights reflected in the certificates at issue. View "Dattco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation" on Justia Law

W. Va. Code 11-15A-10a affords taxpayers a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, which offsets the West Virginia Motor Fuel Use Tax (“use tax”) a fuel importer must pay under W. Va. Code 11-15A-13a. After it was assessed a use tax on the fuel it uses in West Virginia, CSX Transportation sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid on its motor fuel purchases to cities, counties, and localities of other sales pursuant to section 11-15A-10a. The Tax Commissioner rejected the refund request. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) granted CSX’s refund request and vacated the assessment, finding that CSX was entitled to a credit under section 11-15A-10a for the sales taxes it paid to other states’ subdivisions on its purchases of motor fuel therein. The circuit court affirmed. The Tax Commissioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by not limiting the credit to sales taxes paid only to other states upon the purchase of a motor fuel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sales tax credit afforded by section 11-15A-10a applies both to sales taxes paid to other states and to sales taxes paid to the municipalities of other states. View "Matkovich v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, filed suit against the City and Gatso, alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates their right to procedural due process, their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code 602.6101, and causes unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate the ATE system. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that plaintiff Hughes lacks Article III standing where he does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or avoid the threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an ATE citation is sufficiently imminent, and plaintiff Mazgaj lacks third party standing where he failed to show a hindrance to his wife’s ability to protect her own interests. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff Lee's claims are ripe where he was found guilty of violating the ordinance and no further factual development is necessary. Thus, Lee has the hardship of citation and the cost of litigation. The court further concluded that the district court never had jurisdiction of Hughes and Mazgaj’s claims and therefore their claims should be remanded to state court. Plaintiffs Robinson, Sparks, Northrup, Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson have established standing to bring procedural-due-process claims. However, these plaintiffs failed to state a violation of their procedural due process rights. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the system violated their substantive rights, Equal Protection claim, and unjust enrichment claim. Because the City’s appeal of the IDOT’s ruling is still pending, this claim is not ripe. Therefore, the district court should dismiss without prejudice the drivers’ state-law claims based on the alleged violation of IDOT rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six drivers, filed suit against the City alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have relied on Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids because the facts here are materially different. The court concluded that Cedar Rapids and Des Moines offer direct access to the district court or an optional administrative proceeding with de novo appellate review. Based on this court’s holding, the other differences that the drivers allege are irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims are addressed in the Hughes opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Since 1935, federal law has regulated the hours of service of truck drivers operating in interstate commerce. Drivers must keep paper records showing their driving time and other on‐duty time. In 2012, Congress directed the Department of Transportation to issue regulations to require most interstate commercial motor vehicles to install electronic logging devices (ELDs) linked to vehicle engines to automatically record data relevant to hours of services: whether the engine is running, the time, and the vehicle’s approximate location. Congress instructed the Department to consider factors including driver privacy and preventing forms of harassment enabled by the ELDs, 49 U.S.C. 31137. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration promulgated the final rule: Electronic Logging Devices and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, 49 C.F.R. Pts. 385, 386, 390, 395 (2015). The Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and drivers. The court rejected arguments that the rule permits ELDs that are not entirely automatic; uses a narrow definition of “harassment” that will not sufficiently protect drivers; that the agency’s cost‐benefit analysis was inadequate; that the agency did not sufficiently consider confidentiality protections for drivers; and that the ELD mandate imposed, in effect, an unconstitutional search or seizure on truck drivers. Even if the rule imposes a search or a seizure, inspection of ELD data recorded would fall within the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

From 1992-2013, a Milwaukee ordinance limited taxicab permits to those in existence on January 1, 1992 that were renewed. The ordinance lowered the ceiling over time by virtue of the nonrenewals. By 2013 the number of permits had diminished from 370 to 320. The price of permits on the open market soared as high as $150,000. In 2013, after a successful equal protection and substantive due process challenge, the city conducted a lottery, which attracted 1700 permit seekers. Milwaukee had only one taxicab per 1850 city residents, a much lower ratio than comparable cities. The city eliminated the cap in 2014. In the meantime, “ridesharing” companies such as Uber, had diminished the profitability of the existing taxi companies. Plaintiffs, cab companies, alleged that the increased number of permits has taken property without compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The taxi companies were aware that there was no guarantee that the ordinance would remain in force indefinitely, and that, were it repealed, they would be faced with new competition that would threaten their profits. The ordinance gave them no property right; its repeal invaded no right conferred by the Constitution. The court similarly rejected state-law claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. View "Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own and operate Chicago taxicabs or livery vehicles or provide services to such companies, such as loans and insurance. Taxi and livery companies are tightly regulated by the city regarding driver and vehicle qualifications, licensing, fares, and insurance. Ride-share services, such as Uber, are less heavily regulated and have a different business model. Chicago’s 2014 ride-share ordinance allows the companies to set their own fares. The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on four Constitutional and three Illinois-law grounds. The district judge dismissed all but the two claims that accuse the city of denying the equal protection of the laws by allowing the ride-shares to compete with taxi and livery services without being subject to the same regulations. The Seventh Circuit ordered dismissal of all seven claims. There are enough differences between taxi service and ride-share service to justify different regulatory schemes. Chicago has legally chosen deregulation and competition over preserving the traditional taxicab monopolies. A legislature, having created a statutory entitlement, is not precluded from altering or even eliminating the entitlement by later legislation. View "Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed separate actions against various Minnesota cities, counties, and law enforcement entities alleging violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2724(a). In separate orders, the district court denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss, including claims by many defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The City of Minneapolis appeals the denial of qualified immunity in the Karasov action, and numerous Minnesota counties appeal the denial of qualified immunity in the Kampschroers action. After the parties briefed these appeals, the court issued its decision in McDonough v. Anoka County, which squarely addressed the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded that McDonough is controlling precedent. The court also concluded that its decision that the statutory term “obtain” is unambiguous controls defendants' additional argument that the rule of lenity entitles them to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kampschroer v. Ramsey County" on Justia Law