Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Consumer Law
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Sky Moore rented a car from Budget Car and Truck Rental of Las Vegas, owned by Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. Sky named Daniel Moore as an additional driver, who later rear-ended Alelign Woldeyohannes while intoxicated. Alelign sued Daniel for negligence and Malco for negligent entrustment. Daniel did not respond, resulting in a default judgment against him. The case proceeded to arbitration, where Alelign was awarded $32,680.26. Malco requested a trial de novo, leading to a short trial where the judge entered a default judgment against Daniel for $37,886.82.Alelign moved to apply the default judgment against Malco under NRS 482.305(1), which holds short-term lessors liable for damages if they fail to provide minimum insurance coverage. Malco opposed, arguing that NRS 482.305 is preempted by the Graves Amendment, which prohibits states from holding vehicle lessors vicariously liable without negligence or wrongdoing. The short trial judge granted Alelign’s motion, and the district court affirmed, concluding that NRS 482.305 is a financial responsibility law preserved by the Graves Amendment’s savings clause.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that NRS 482.305 is not preempted by the Graves Amendment because it is a financial responsibility law preserved by the savings clause under 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b). The court emphasized that NRS 482.305 imposes a legal requirement for lessors to provide minimum coverage, rather than a mere financial inducement, and does not impose strict vicarious liability on lessors. View "Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. vs. Woldeyohannes" on Justia Law

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The Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a Rule on April 30, 2024, requiring airlines to disclose ancillary service fees, such as baggage and change fees, during the booking process. The Rule aims to protect consumers from surprise charges and is expected to provide significant societal and consumer benefits. The Rule took effect on July 1, 2024, with compliance deadlines for airlines and third-party ticket agents set for later dates. Various airlines and airline associations challenged the Rule, arguing it exceeds DOT’s authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and bypassed the required notice and comment process.The airlines and associations first sought a stay from the DOT, which was denied. They then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a stay pending review. The petitioners argued that the Rule exceeds DOT’s statutory authority under 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a), which allows the DOT Secretary to investigate and adjudicate unfair or deceptive practices but does not authorize the creation of detailed legislative rules. The petitioners also claimed that the Rule imposes significant compliance costs that would cause irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the petitioners made a strong showing that the Rule likely exceeds DOT’s authority. The court noted that the Rule mandates specific disclosure practices without the adjudicatory process required by the statute. The court also found that the petitioners would suffer irreparable harm due to the nonrecoverable compliance costs. The court concluded that there is no public interest in perpetuating unlawful agency action and expedited the petition for review to the next available oral argument panel. View "Airlines for America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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The case involves a truck driver, Frank McKenna, who sued his former employer, Dillon Transportation, LLC, for defamation based on a report Dillon sent to HireRight, a consumer reporting agency. The report claimed McKenna had an unsatisfactory safety record and had been involved in an accident. McKenna alleged the report was defamatory and resulted in his inability to secure employment. Dillon argued that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted McKenna’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Dillon. The court ruled that the FCRA does preempt McKenna's defamation claim. The court determined that under the FCRA, McKenna was a consumer, HireRight was a consumer reporting agency, and Dillon was a furnisher of information. The court found that the FCRA's preemption clause applied in this case, as it preempts state causes of action based on providing information to consumer reporting agencies like HireRight.Additionally, the court rejected McKenna’s argument that his suit was authorized under a Department of Transportation regulation that requires motor carriers to investigate the safety performance history of drivers, which preempts certain state-law claims against those providing such information. The court found the two preemption statutes, the FCRA, and the Department of Transportation regulation, complemented each other and could coexist. The court also ruled that the district court did not err in denying McKenna's request to postpone summary judgment to obtain additional documents related to his accident. View "McKenna v. Dillon Transportation, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her putative class action against the West Virginia Parkways Authority, in which she alleges that the Parkways Authority improperly collected fees. And the Parkways Authority appeals the district court’s holding that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the United States or West Virginia Constitutions.   Plaintiff relied on the Class Action Fairness Act for jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss without prejudice. The court concluded that here, Section 1332(d)(5)(A) bars jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2) of the Class Action Fairness Act. The court explained that the Parkways Authority is the only, and thus “primary,” defendant. And it is a “governmental entity.” The Parkways Authority’s sovereign-immunity claim is strong enough to conclude that the district court “may be foreclosed from ordering relief” against it. So Section 1332(d)(2)’s jurisdictional grant “shall not apply.” Since that is the only provision that Plaintiff relies on to establish jurisdiction over her putative class action, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. View "Blazine Monaco v. WV Parkways Authority" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs are commercial truck drivers who received citations for violating state vehicle safety laws. State officials reported these citations to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration for inclusion in the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), 49 U.S.C. 31106(a)(3)(B). After state courts dismissed misdemeanor charges arising from the citations, the drivers asked the Administration to remove them from the MCMIS. The Administration forwarded the requests to the relevant state agencies, which declined to remove the citations. The drivers later authorized the release of their PreEmployment Screening Program (PSP) reports to prospective employers.The drivers allege harm from the inclusion of their citations in the PSP reports and sought damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681e. The drivers alleged that the Administration violated FCRA by not following reasonable procedures to ensure that their PSP reports were as accurate as possible, by failing to investigate the accuracy of their PSP reports upon request, and by refusing to add a statement of dispute to their PSP reports. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Administration, in releasing MCMIS records as required by the SAFE Transportation Act, is not a “consumer reporting agency” under FCRA. View "Mowrer v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's final judgment against Plaintiffs on their claims that Uber Technologies competed unlawfully in the on-demand, ride-hail ground transportation in and around Boston, Massachusetts, holding that Uber did not compete unfairly in violation of statutory and common law prohibitions governing the commercial marketplace.Plaintiffs - owners of companies that dispatched, leased, and maintained taxicab vehicles and owned taxi medallions - brought this complaint alleging that, in violation of Boston regulations, Uber caused asset devaluation by competing unfairly under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, violating the common law for unfair competition, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy to engage in unfair competition. The district court issued judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Uber's conduct in the transportation market during a period of regulatory uncertainty did not violate the statutory or common law governing the commercial marketplace. View "Anoush Cab, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

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Taxi companies and taxi medallion owners sued Uber, alleging violations of the Unfair Practices Act’s (UPA) prohibition against below-cost sales (Bus & Prof. Code, 17043) and of the Unfair Competition Law (section 17200). The UPA makes it unlawful “for any person engaged in business within this State to sell any article or product at less than the cost thereof to such vendor, or to give away any article or product, for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition” but does not apply “[t]o any service, article or product for which rates are established under the jurisdiction of the [California] Public Utilities Commission [(CPUC)] . . . and sold or furnished by any public utility corporation.” Uber is a “public utility corporation” under section 17024 and is subject to CPUC’s jurisdiction. CPUC has conducted extensive regulatory proceedings in connection with Uber’s business but has not yet established the rates for any Uber service or product.The trial court ruled the exemption applies when the CPUC has jurisdiction to set rates, regardless of whether it has yet done so, and dismissed the case. The court of appeal affirmed, reaching “the same conclusion as to the applicability of section 17024(1) as have three California federal district courts, two within the last year, in cases alleging identical UPA claims against Uber.” View "Uber Technologies Pricing Cases" on Justia Law

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California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA), under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et. seq.), addresses the obligations of an operator of a commercial Web site or online service regarding the posting of a privacy policy on the Internet. The state sought damages and injunctive relief under OPPA, alleging that Delta’s Fly Delta mobile application violated the privacy policy requirements. The trial court dismissed, finding the suit expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C. 41713 (b)(1)). The court of appeal affirmed. To compel Delta to comply with the OPPA would effectively interfere with the airline’s “selection and design” of its mobile application, a marketing mechanism “appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation service,” for which state enforcement has been held to be expressly preempted. View "Harris v. Delta Air Lines" on Justia Law

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Respondent purchased a luxury sports car from Desert Audi. Defendant contracted with Nex-Day Auto Transport, Inc. to facilitate delivery of the vehicle to Washington. Nex-Day negotiated with Dynamic Transit Company/Knights Company (Knights) for delivery of the vehicle. Knights picked up the car, transported it to Washington, but demanded that Nex-Day tender payment for its unrelated past-due invoices before it would proceed with the delivery. Nex-Day failed to do so, and Knights refused to deliver Respondent's vehicle. Respondent brought an action against Knights, alleging various state-law claims. After filing its answer, Knights filed a motion to dismiss Respondent's complaint, asserting that Respondent's state-law claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment's federal liability limitation for interstate cargo carriers. The district court concluded that the Carmack Amendment was inapplicable and denied Knights' motion. The district court then granted judgment in Respondent's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Knights' motion to dismiss; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's judgment; and (3) the district court's award of damages was proper.View "Dynamic Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures" on Justia Law

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The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act a misrepresentation by a seller of a used motor home is subject to a defense that the misrepresentation was made in good faith. Plaintiff Robert Borgen bought a used Travelaire motor home from A&M Motors, Inc. in 2004. The motor home had previously been owned by Thom and Linda Janidlo; the Janidlos traded in the vehicle to A&M Motors about two weeks before Borgen bought it. When the Janidlos traded in the motor home, they indicated that it was a 2002 model. At some point, someone changed the model year to 2003 on the documents at A&M Motors. The title from the State of Alaska showed that the motor home was a 2003 model, but the vehicle identification number (VIN) indicated that the motor home was a 2002 model. Both trial experts testified that the tenth digit of a VIN of a chassis indicates the model year of the chassis, but their testimony as to whether the same holds true for the VIN of a coach was unclear. The VIN on the chassis is the VIN on the vehicle’s title, but a motor home’s model year is determined by the model year of the coach. A&M Motors sold the Travelaire to Borgen as a 2003 model. In August 2005 Borgen discovered documents in the motor home indicating the motor home was actually a 2002 model. He contacted A&M Motors to complain; the only compensation they offered him was a $1,000 service contract. Borgen sued A&M Motors, pleading three causes of action: (1) misrepresentation, (2) violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), and (3) breach of contract. Borgen moved for summary judgment on his UTPA claim in February 2008. The trial court denied that motion, and a jury ultimately decided that A&M Motors had not engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in its dealings with Borgen. Finding that the trial court did not err by finding the UTPA implied an unknowing affirmative misrepresentation of material fact would not give rise to liability, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to Borgen's UTPA claims, but remanded for further proceedings on treble damages. View "Borgen v. A&M Motors, Inc." on Justia Law