Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

A local government has the authority under Fla. Stat. 316.0083(1)(a) to contract with a private third-party vendor to review and sort information from red light cameras, in accordance with the local government’s written guidelines, before sending that information to a trained traffic enforcement officer, who determines whether probable cause exists and a citation should be issued.Petitioner received a traffic citation based on images from a red light camera. Petitioner argued that the City of Aventura’s red light camera enforcement program was illegal because it included the use of a third-party agent to review images from the City’s red light cameras before sending them to City police to determine whether a traffic citation should be issued. The court of appeal held that the City did not violate the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Program, see Fla. Stat. 316.0083(1)(a), which grants local governments’ traffic enforcement officers the power to issue citations for traffic infractions captured by red light cameras. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not exceed its statutory authority in contracting with a vendor to review the red light camera images and that the City’s use of its own standards for determining whether a traffic infraction has occurred did not violate the uniformity principle set forth in chapter 316. View "Jimenez v. State" on Justia Law

An officer responding to a midnight single-vehicle collision saw an SUV on the edge of the road moving forward and backward; one tire was missing and the wheel’s rim and brake system were extensively damaged. Munro got out of the driver’s seat. The officer noticed he was “extremely unsteady,” that his breath smelled like alcohol, his eyes were red, and his speech was slurred. The officer asked Munro to lean against the patrol car. Munro refused, denied being the driver, and denied consuming alcohol. The officer attempted to conduct a field sobriety test, asking Munro to follow his pen with his eyes. Munro closed his eyes and stated that he would not take a chemical test. The officer arrested Munro on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before the Department of Motor Vehicles may suspend a driver’s license for refusal to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his blood, the driver “shall be told [by the arresting officer] that ... failure to submit ... will result in ... the suspension of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle" for one year. (Veh. Code 23612(a)(1)(D). The officer intended to read Munro the Admonition but Munro began kicking and trying to slip out of his handcuffs. Three officers placed Munro into a restraint The officer never read the Admonition. The court of appeal reversed Munro's suspension. An officer is not relieved of the duty to at least attempt to provide the Admonition when the suspected drunk driver engages in disruptive behavior. View "Munro v. Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

American Sedan Services, Inc. is a commercial transportation service that has a permit from Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA) to provide ground transportation services at the Baltimore Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI). Vadim Roshchin, who was employed as a driver by American Sedan, was picking up passengers at BWI without displaying the permit as required by an MAA regulation when Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) police arrested him and impounded the American Sedan. Roshchin and American Sedan sued MAA, MdTA, the MdTA police, and the State, alleging, among other claims, false arrest and false imprisonment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State on all counts. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that there was no legal justification for the arrest of Roshchin. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the regulation requiring commercial transportation services to display permits was not required to be posted at the airport as a prerequisite to its enforcement; and (2) there was legal justification for the arrest, as nothing in the MAA regulation or the Transportation Article deprives a police officer of the general authority to arrest an individual who commits a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer. View "State v. Roshchin" on Justia Law

George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law

Columbus motorists reported a person driving erratically. One saw that the driver was a woman and that there was a child in the truck. Both witnessed the truck jump onto the median at least twice. One followed the truck, trying to help the police locate it. The truck crashed into a tree. At the scene, the police found Volpe, intoxicated and trapped behind the steering wheel. Volpe’s daughter, ejected from the truck, died days later from multiple injuries. Volpe was convicted on two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide (operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) and recklessly causing her daughter’s death), each with a specification that she had been convicted of three or more OVI or equivalent offenses within the last six years, and of OVI with a specification that she had been convicted of five or more equivalent offenses within the last 20 years. Volpe received a total prison term of 20 years and six months. She argued that convictions of both OVI, Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and aggravated vehicular homicide as a proximate result of OVI, 2903.06(A)(1)(a), violated the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of her habeas corpus petition.View "Volpe v. Trim" on Justia Law

The company, S.C. Johnson & Son, was injured by a bribery and kickback scheme involving a dishonest employee and transportation companies with which it had contracts and filed a tort lawsuit in Wisconsin state court. The company filed a second suit, against different transportation defendants, in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the suit, which raised state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation by omission; criminal conspiracy to violate Wisconsin’s bribery statute, Wis. Stat. 134.05; conspiracy to commit fraud; violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. 946.80, through racketeering activity and mail and wire fraud; and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by providing bribes and kickbacks. The court indicated that federal law preempted state tort claims because they could have “the force and effect of a law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was properly dismissed, but theories based on bribery and kickbacks fall outside the scope of the preemption provision. View "SC Johnson & Son Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Hackett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), and aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3). He moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle so that evidence gathered after the improper stop constituted fruit of an unlawful search. The stated basis for the stop was improper lane usage. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that momentary crossings of a highway lane line did not give the officer reasonable grounds to make the stop. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To establish probable cause that a violation of the lane usage statute has occurred, the officer must point to facts which support a reasonable belief that defendant has deviated from his established lane of travel and that it was “practicable” for him to have remained constant in his proper lane. A traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. Here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason; an investigatory stop was proper. View "People v. Hackett" on Justia Law

Howard and Brown ended their romantic relationship. Howard alternated between attempts to reconcile and attempts to harm Brown. Howard sent letters begging see their son, but hired someone to throw acid in her face and paid a man to shoot at the train on which she works as an engineer. He was convicted of: interfering with a passenger train engineer, with intent to endanger safety and with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 18 U.S.C. 1992(a)(6) and (10), 1992(b)(1); committing and attempting to commit use of a firearm, with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a train company employee while such person was inside of a passenger train located on tracks used in operation of a mass transportation vehicle, 18 U.S.C. 1992(a)(7) and (10), 1992(b)(1)’ and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “prior bad acts” challenge to admission of evidence to prove that Howard took repeated actions that were consistent with motive and intent to harm Brown and upholding denial of a motion to empanel a new jury after jurors sent notes to the judge concerning Howard’s behavior during voir dire. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested after police officers found her intoxicated, sitting in the driver’s seat of her running, but legally parked, Hummer. She was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, but the state trial court dismissed her case, finding that she was not "operating" her Hummer as that term is defined under Michigan law. Plaintiff sued her arresting officers, arguing, among other things, that they unconstitutionally detained her without reasonable suspicion and arrested her without probable cause. The district court held that the officers had qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a reasonable basis to believe that plaintiff was operating her Hummer while intoxicated, and was therefore violating Michigan law. View "Nettles-Nickerson v. Free" on Justia Law