Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

After the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, that Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7521(a))requires regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from vehicles, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued coordinated rules governing the greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy of cars and trucks. In 2012 the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s car emission standards. Opponents, including purchasers of new vehicles and POP, a business that makes after-market modifications to diesel engines enabling them to run on vegetable oil, then challenged the car rules on procedural grounds; challenged EPA’s truck standards on procedural grounds; and challenged both agencies’ regulations concerning trucks as arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit declined to reach the merits. The purchasers of new vehicles, arguing that EPA neglected to comply with a nondiscretionary statutory duty to provide its emission standards to the Science Advisory Board prior to issuing them, lacked standing, having failed to identify a discrete injury that a favorable decision by the court would remedy. POP’s interest in promoting alternative fuel does not fall within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. 7521, the provision of the Clean Air Act governing emissions standards for motor vehicles. View "Delta Constr. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

North Coast Railroad Authority (NCRA), a public agency established by Government Code section 93000, entered into a contract with the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (NWPRC), allowing NWPRC to conduct freight rail service on tracks controlled by NCRA. Two environmental groups filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21050, 21168.5, to challenge NCRA’s certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of NWPRC’s freight operations. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding CEQA review was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA; 49 U.S.C. 10101) and rejecting a claim that NCRA and NWPRC were estopped from arguing otherwise. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the ICCTA preempts only the “regulation” of rail transportation, whereas NCRA agreed to conduct a CEQA review of the rail operations and related repair/maintenance activities as part of a contract allowing it to receive state funds. NCRA and NWPRC are not estopped from claiming no EIR was required, due to positions taken in previous proceedings and the EIR was not insufficient for improperly “segmenting” the project, given that additional rail operations were contemplated on other sections of the line. View "Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast RR. Auth." on Justia Law

This dispute concerns the Bonner Bridge, which provides highway access between mainland North Carolina and the Outer Bank's Hatteras Island. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f, and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. Defendants settled on a plan that essentially mirrors what currently exists: replacing the Bonner Bridge and maintaining NC 12 on Hatteras Island. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' NEPA challenge where defendants have not engaged in unlawful segmentation with respect to the five studied parallel bridge alternatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' Section 4(f) challenge because a Section 4(f) analysis is irrelevant if the joint planning exception applies. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. NC Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

The Federal Highway Administration and the Indiana Department of Transportation decided to complete an Indiana segment of I-69, which will eventually run from Canada to Mexico. Environmentalists opposed the route and sued under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States. A permit will be denied if there is “a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,” 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a), or if the discharge “would be contrary to the public interest.” 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1). The permit at issue allows six streams to be filled where the highway crosses them and permits destruction of wetlands. The environmentalists proposed, in the alternative, simply upgrading to federal interstate highway standards, and existing route. In an environmental impact statement, the Corps concluded that no less environmentally damaging alternative was practicable, that the project was not contrary to the public interest, that damage to wetlands would be modest and would be offset by creation of new wetlands. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the environmental analysis. View "Hoosier Envtl. Council, v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

ATO challenged the City's enactment of an ordinance offering taxicabs certified to run on compressed natural gas (CNG) a "head-of-the-line" privilege at a municipally-owned airport. At issue was whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). The court concluded that the ordinance, enacted using traditional police powers, was not superseded by any clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress's term "standard" had been identified as one "susceptible" to a mandate/incentive distinction. The court also concluded that the ordinance could have its intended effect and substitute CNG cabs for traditional cabs at the airport but it did not show that the City's cab drivers faced such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects as to force them to switch vehicles. Accordingly, the ordinance was not preempted by section 209(a) of the Act and the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ass'n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

The Institute challenged the final rule promulgated by the FRA to implement section 104 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432 section 104(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4848, 4857. Section 104 required a qualifying rail carrier to submit an implementation plan to install a "positive train control" (PTC) system no later than December 31, 2015 on certain tracks used for passenger service or for transporting "poison- or toxic- by-inhalation" hazardous material (PIH or TIH). The court concluded that the Institute's challenge was not ripe because it had not established that its members now faced a present or imminent injury from the 2012 Final Rule's omission of a two-part risk assessment test. Accordingly, the court dismissed the Institute's petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. FRA, et al." on Justia Law

As the tanker Athos neared Paulsboro, New Jersey, an abandoned anchor in the Delaware River punctured its hull and caused 263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill. The owner of the tanker, Frescati, paid $180 million in cleanup costs and ship damages, but was reimbursed for nearly $88 million by the U.S. government under the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 2701. Frescati made claims against CARCO, which ordered the oil and owned the terminal where the Athos was to unload, claiming breach of the safe port/safe berth warranty made to an intermediary responsible for chartering the Athos and negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The government, as a statutory subrogee for the $88 million reimbursement reached a limited settlement agreement. The district court held that CARCO was not liable for the accident, but made no findings of fact and conclusions of law, required by FRCP 52(a)(1). The Third Circuit remanded for findings, but stated that the Athos and Frescati were implied beneficiaries of CARCO‘s safe berth warranty; that the warranty is an express assurance of safety; and that the named port exception to that warranty does not apply to hazards that are unknown and not reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that it is not clear that the warranty was actually breached, absent findings as to the Athos‘s actual draft or the clearance provided. The court further stated that CARCO could be liable in negligence for hazards outside the approach to CARCO‘s terminal. View "United States v. Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co." on Justia Law

Philadelphia International Airport is the ninth busiest airport in the U.S. Since 1999, PHL has been among the 10 most delayed airports and has contributed to delays at airports nationwide because its runways are too short, too close together, and too few. After receiving the City’s proposal for expansion in 2003, the FAA prepared an Environmental Impact Statement. In 2008 the FAA published a three-volume, 900-page draft EIS. The EPA submitted comments, citing alleged data omissions in the FAA’s analysis. The FAA considered and responded to each of the EPA’s comments in the final EIS. Although disagreements remained, in 2010, the FAA published its Record of Decision, which approved the expansion and delineated reasons for approval, including a finding that the project was reasonably consistent with existing plans of public agencies for development of areas surrounding the airport, as required by the Airport and Airway Improvement Act (AAIA), 49 U.S.C. 47106(a)(1. Objectors alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 and the AAIA. The Third Circuit denied review, finding that the FAA decision was not arbitrary. View "Twp. of Tinicum v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The federal government has maintained navigation in the Delaware River for more than 100 years. In 1992, the Army Corps of Engineers published an Environmental Impact Statement, recommending deepening of five feet along 102-miles. The EIS identified potential adverse impacts, but concluded these would be minimal and were outweighed by benefits of reduced shipping costs. In 1997, after engineering, the Corps published a Supplemental EIS. The project stalled until 2008, when the Philadelphia River Port Authority agreed to share costs. Improved technology reduced the amount of sediment; wetlands restoration was deferred. An oil spill had increased sediment toxicity. Expected expansion of sturgeon, potentially increased blasting risks. A 2009 Environmental Assessment recommended the project proceed. The district court rejected state challenges under the Coastal Zone Management Act, which requires a “consistency determination” for any state whose coastal zone will be affected, 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(1); the Clean Water Act, which requires compliance with state water pollution law, 33 U.S.C. 1323(a); and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. The states had attempted to revoke CZMA clearances. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that dredging has begun. The 2009 EA was not arbitrary. CWA’s “congressionally authorized” exception to state approvals applies. The Corps reasonably concluded that it need not provide supplemental CZMA consistency determinations to states. View "State of DE v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Trucking Ass'n v. The City of Los Angeles, et al." on Justia Law