Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Parker Noland operated a construction debris removal business in Flathead County, Montana, but was ordered by the Montana Public Service Commission to cease operations due to lacking a required Class D motor carrier certificate. Noland formed PBN LLC and applied for the certificate, but withdrew his application after finding the administrative process—including requests for sensitive financial information by competitors—too burdensome. He then limited his business to activities not requiring the certificate. Subsequently, Noland filed suit in the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County, seeking a declaratory judgment that two provisions of the Montana Motor Carrier law, known as the public convenience and necessity (PCN) provisions, were unconstitutional under both the Montana and United States Constitutions.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Montana and Evergreen Disposal, Inc., which had intervened. The court held that Noland lacked standing to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge, reasoning he sought to vindicate only a future injury and had not shown how the statutes would be unconstitutionally applied to him. However, the court found Noland had standing to bring a facial challenge, but ruled against him, concluding the provisions were not facially unconstitutional because some applicants had previously received Class D certificates.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s rulings de novo. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision that Noland lacked standing for an as-applied challenge, holding that he failed to demonstrate a concrete injury or how the statutes were applied to him. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of Noland’s facial challenge, holding that he had standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality on its face, since the procedural requirements themselves could constitute injury regardless of outcome. The case was remanded for further consideration of the facial constitutional challenges. View "Noland v. State" on Justia Law

Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate. View "Panting v. United States" on Justia Law

Pedro Castaneda died in a traffic accident at an intersection on State Highway 249 that was under construction. At the time, the intersection’s traffic lights were installed but not yet operational, and there was a dispute about whether they were properly covered to indicate their status. Castaneda’s family sued the contractors involved in the project, SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. and Third Coast Services, LLC, alleging that negligence in the construction and installation of the traffic signals contributed to the fatal accident. The construction project was governed by an agreement between the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and Montgomery County, with the County responsible for the project’s design and construction, but with TxDOT retaining authority over the adjacent frontage roads and final approval of plans.The trial court denied the contractors’ motions for summary judgment that sought dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 97.002, which grants immunity to contractors under certain conditions. The contractors appealed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Section 97.002 applies only to contractors who are in direct contractual privity with TxDOT, and since neither contractor had a direct contract with TxDOT, they could not invoke the statute’s protection.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that Section 97.002 does not require direct contractual privity with TxDOT for a contractor to qualify for statutory immunity. The court determined that, based on the summary judgment record, SpawGlass and Third Coast performed work "for" TxDOT within the meaning of the statute, as their activities directly related to frontage roads that TxDOT would own and maintain. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the contractors met the remaining requirements of Section 97.002. View "THIRD COAST SERVICES, LLC v. CASTANEDA" on Justia Law

A commuter airline that had provided federally subsidized air service to a small community in West Virginia for several years sought to continue serving that community under the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) solicited bids for a new three-year EAS contract. Four airlines, including the incumbent, submitted proposals. The DOT evaluated the applications based on five statutory factors: reliability, agreements with larger carriers, community preferences, marketing plans, and total compensation requested. After reviewing the proposals and soliciting input from the local community, which favored a different airline, the DOT selected a new carrier that offered larger aircraft, a codeshare agreement with a major airline, and a subsidy request within the competitive range.The incumbent airline challenged the DOT’s selection in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and exceeded its statutory authority. The petitioner contended that the DOT failed to meaningfully analyze the statutory factors and improperly chose a more expensive proposal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the DOT’s order under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). On the merits, the court found that the DOT’s findings regarding each statutory factor were supported by substantial evidence and that the agency’s reasoning was adequately explained. The court concluded that the DOT’s selection process was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and that the agency did not exceed its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and upheld the DOT’s selection of the new EAS carrier. View "Southern Airways Express, LLC v. DOT" on Justia Law

A fatal traffic accident occurred when a tractor trailer, driven by Andre Hill, ran a stop sign and collided with a vehicle driven by Olivia Mendoza, resulting in her death. Prior to the accident, Hill had picked up produce from Irigoyen Farms for delivery to a Walmart distribution center. The transportation of the produce involved several intermediaries: Irigoyen Farms contracted with a freight broker, who in turn contracted with other logistics companies, ultimately resulting in Hill being hired as an independent contractor by the motor carrier. Law enforcement determined that Hill’s extreme fatigue contributed to the crash.The decedent’s mother, Christina Casarez, filed suit in the Superior Court of Fresno County against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart, alleging motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and wrongful death. She claimed that both defendants were directly negligent in their roles: Walmart for imposing contractual requirements that allegedly incentivized unsafe conduct, and Irigoyen Farms for loading the truck and sending Hill on his way despite knowledge of his fatigue. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Casarez’s claims. The superior court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the FAAAA expressly preempts state law negligence claims against parties whose actions relate to the price, route, or service of a motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property, regardless of whether the party is a motor carrier, broker, or shipper. The court further held that the FAAAA’s safety exception did not apply because the claims did not directly concern the safety of the motor vehicle itself. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s judgments in favor of Irigoyen Farms and Walmart. View "Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms" on Justia Law

Yazam, Inc., operating as Empower, is a private vehicle-for-hire company that provides a digital app connecting drivers with passengers. Unlike other rideshare platforms, Empower sells monthly subscriptions to drivers, who then set their own fares and retain the full payment from riders. The District of Columbia Department of For-Hire Vehicles (DFHV) ordered Empower to cease operations in the District for failing to register as required by law. Empower requested an expedited hearing before the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which upheld the cease-and-desist order.Previously, DFHV had issued a similar order in 2020, which OAH upheld, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof of immediate and irreparable harm to the public from Empower’s nonregistration. After that decision, DFHV issued a compliance order requiring Empower to register and provide documentation. When Empower did not respond, DFHV issued another cease-and-desist order, citing specific registration statutes and regulations. OAH found that Empower’s failure to register, along with other statutory violations, posed a substantial risk of immediate and irreparable harm, particularly through the impoundment of vehicles belonging to Empower drivers who were unaware of the risks.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the OAH decision, applying a standard that requires affirmance if OAH made findings of fact on each contested issue, those findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusions flow rationally from the findings. The court held that OAH properly upheld the cease-and-desist order based on the immediate and irreparable harm caused by Empower’s nonregistration, specifically the risk of vehicle impoundments. The court also rejected Empower’s due process arguments regarding discovery, hearing scheduling, and the telephonic nature of the hearing, finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error. The order of OAH was affirmed. View "Yazam, Inc. d/b/a Empower v. D.C. Department of For-Hire Vehicles" on Justia Law

Two licensed wrecker services in Connecticut were summoned by state police to remove a severely damaged tractor trailer from a highway accident. The wrecker services used specialized equipment, including a costly rotator truck, to recover and tow the vehicle, then transported it to their storage facility. They sent an itemized invoice to the vehicle owner’s insurer, which included charges for the use of special equipment and supervisory personnel. The insurer paid the invoice under protest and subsequently filed a complaint with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, arguing that the charges were excessive and not permitted under state regulations.A Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer determined that the wrecker services had overcharged for their nonconsensual towing services by using their own rate schedule based on equipment rather than the hourly labor rate set by the commissioner. Most equipment-based charges were disallowed, and the wrecker services were ordered to pay restitution and a civil penalty. The Superior Court dismissed the wrecker services’ administrative appeal, finding the hearing officer’s conclusions supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the regulations required fees for exceptional services to be based solely on the hourly labor rate, excluding equipment costs.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the relevant regulation, § 14-63-36c (c), was ambiguous and could reasonably be interpreted to allow wrecker services to charge additional fees for exceptional services, including costs associated with special equipment, provided those fees are itemized and posted in accordance with regulatory requirements. The Court held that prohibiting such charges would prevent wrecker services from recouping necessary costs and could undermine the availability of exceptional towing services. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Several commercial air tour operators challenged federal regulations that banned all commercial air tours over Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park. The dispute arose after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service, in response to statutory requirements and litigation, issued air tour management plans (ATMPs) in 2023 that prohibited such tours, citing negative impacts on visitor experience, wildlife, and tribal cultural resources. The operators argued that the agencies’ actions were arbitrary and capricious, violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and failed to consider reasonable alternatives or aviation safety.Previously, the agencies had attempted to negotiate voluntary agreements with the tour operators, as permitted by the Air Tour Management Act. However, after one operator declined to participate, the agencies shifted to developing ATMPs. This change was influenced by a writ of mandamus issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, which compelled the agencies to bring certain parks into compliance with the Act. The agencies then considered several alternatives before ultimately banning all commercial air tours in the final plans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the petitions for review filed by the tour operators. The court held that the agencies’ decision to end voluntary agreement negotiations and proceed with ATMPs was not arbitrary or capricious. It further found that the agencies complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements, used reasonable data, considered an adequate range of alternatives, and sufficiently addressed aviation safety concerns. The court concluded that the agencies’ decisions were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions to vacate the air tour management plans. View "Badger Helicopters Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the owners and operators of a tourist attraction, Bear World, and the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) over the closure of an intersection on Highway 20 in Madison County, Idaho. Bear Crest Limited LLC owns parcels of land leased to Yellowstone Bear World Inc., and Michael Ferguson is associated with both entities. In 1973, the original landowners (the Gideons) conveyed land to ITD’s predecessor for highway expansion, reserving “Access to the County Road Connection.” In 2016, as part of a highway upgrade to controlled-access status, ITD closed the intersection nearest Bear World, requiring visitors to use a more circuitous route, increasing travel distance by about five miles.After the intersection closure, the plaintiffs sued ITD for breach of contract and inverse condemnation, arguing that the closure violated the reserved access right in the Gideon deed and constituted a taking of property without just compensation. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County, granted summary judgment to ITD, finding that the deed did not guarantee access to Highway 20, only to a county road, and that the closure did not amount to a compensable taking since alternative access remained.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed in part, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded. The Court held that Bear Crest Limited had standing and that the Gideon deed unambiguously reserved access to the specific Highway 20 connection, not merely to a county road. The Court found that ITD’s closure of the intersection breached the deed and substantially impaired Bear Crest’s access rights, constituting a taking under Idaho law. The Court directed entry of partial summary judgment for Bear Crest on both claims, reserving damages and other issues for further proceedings. View "Bear Crest Limited LLC v. State of idaho" on Justia Law

West Central Agri Services operates a grain handling facility in Missouri, where employees load grain into railcars by accessing the tops of the cars, which are about fifteen feet above the ground. Employees open and close lids on the railcars to facilitate grain transfer, and a Trackmobile moves the railcars into position. An OSHA inspector, investigating an unrelated explosion, discovered that employees frequently worked atop railcars without wearing fall protection personal protective equipment (PPE), despite the facility having a fall protection system in place on one track and safety training instructing use of such equipment. Supervisors were aware of the lack of PPE use, and employees were not disciplined for noncompliance.Following the investigation, the Secretary of Labor cited West Central for a willful and serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(d)(1)(i), which requires employers to ensure employees use appropriate PPE for identified hazards. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission upheld the citation and imposed a penalty of $122,878.80, finding that West Central recognized the fall hazard and failed to enforce PPE use. The Commission denied discretionary review of the ALJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has exercised statutory authority over the working conditions on top of railcars, specifically through its 1978 policy statement asserting jurisdiction over walking-working surfaces and employee protection around railcars. As a result, the FRA’s authority preempts OSHA’s jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1). The court vacated the citation and reversed the ALJ’s order, concluding that OSHA cannot enforce its PPE regulation for employees working on top of railcars at this facility. View "MFA Enterprises, Inc. v. OSHRC" on Justia Law