Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

On the night of January 27, 2014, DND’s driver, Velasquez, crashed his semi-truck into two emergency vehicles and another semi which were stopped on an unlit highway. An Illinois Toll Authority employee was killed and a police officer was seriously injured. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) immediately revoked Velasquez’s commercial-driving privileges and opened a company-wide investigation. After a very thorough, two-month investigation, FMCSA issued an imminent-hazard out-of-service order (IHOOSO) without warning, directing DND to immediately halt its trucking operations nationwide and freeze trucks in place within eight hours. During the investigation DND had been permitted to continue normal operations and there were two or three minor problems. An administrative law judge opened a hearing nine days after the order issued and rendered his decision after another six days, finding that the IHOOSO should not have been issued and was an effective “death penalty” to the small company. Apparently, the sudden halt to the company’s operations put the company out of business. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of Article III standing, a petition for review seeking to correct a decision of an assistant administrator that upheld the ALJ grant of relief to DND. The case is moot. View "DND International, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law

W. Va. Code 11-15A-10a affords taxpayers a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, which offsets the West Virginia Motor Fuel Use Tax (“use tax”) a fuel importer must pay under W. Va. Code 11-15A-13a. After it was assessed a use tax on the fuel it uses in West Virginia, CSX Transportation sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid on its motor fuel purchases to cities, counties, and localities of other sales pursuant to section 11-15A-10a. The Tax Commissioner rejected the refund request. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) granted CSX’s refund request and vacated the assessment, finding that CSX was entitled to a credit under section 11-15A-10a for the sales taxes it paid to other states’ subdivisions on its purchases of motor fuel therein. The circuit court affirmed. The Tax Commissioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by not limiting the credit to sales taxes paid only to other states upon the purchase of a motor fuel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sales tax credit afforded by section 11-15A-10a applies both to sales taxes paid to other states and to sales taxes paid to the municipalities of other states. View "Matkovich v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, filed suit against the City and Gatso, alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates their right to procedural due process, their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code 602.6101, and causes unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate the ATE system. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that plaintiff Hughes lacks Article III standing where he does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or avoid the threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an ATE citation is sufficiently imminent, and plaintiff Mazgaj lacks third party standing where he failed to show a hindrance to his wife’s ability to protect her own interests. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff Lee's claims are ripe where he was found guilty of violating the ordinance and no further factual development is necessary. Thus, Lee has the hardship of citation and the cost of litigation. The court further concluded that the district court never had jurisdiction of Hughes and Mazgaj’s claims and therefore their claims should be remanded to state court. Plaintiffs Robinson, Sparks, Northrup, Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson have established standing to bring procedural-due-process claims. However, these plaintiffs failed to state a violation of their procedural due process rights. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the system violated their substantive rights, Equal Protection claim, and unjust enrichment claim. Because the City’s appeal of the IDOT’s ruling is still pending, this claim is not ripe. Therefore, the district court should dismiss without prejudice the drivers’ state-law claims based on the alleged violation of IDOT rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six drivers, filed suit against the City alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have relied on Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids because the facts here are materially different. The court concluded that Cedar Rapids and Des Moines offer direct access to the district court or an optional administrative proceeding with de novo appellate review. Based on this court’s holding, the other differences that the drivers allege are irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims are addressed in the Hughes opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Since 1935, federal law has regulated the hours of service of truck drivers operating in interstate commerce. Drivers must keep paper records showing their driving time and other on‐duty time. In 2012, Congress directed the Department of Transportation to issue regulations to require most interstate commercial motor vehicles to install electronic logging devices (ELDs) linked to vehicle engines to automatically record data relevant to hours of services: whether the engine is running, the time, and the vehicle’s approximate location. Congress instructed the Department to consider factors including driver privacy and preventing forms of harassment enabled by the ELDs, 49 U.S.C. 31137. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration promulgated the final rule: Electronic Logging Devices and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, 49 C.F.R. Pts. 385, 386, 390, 395 (2015). The Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and drivers. The court rejected arguments that the rule permits ELDs that are not entirely automatic; uses a narrow definition of “harassment” that will not sufficiently protect drivers; that the agency’s cost‐benefit analysis was inadequate; that the agency did not sufficiently consider confidentiality protections for drivers; and that the ELD mandate imposed, in effect, an unconstitutional search or seizure on truck drivers. Even if the rule imposes a search or a seizure, inspection of ELD data recorded would fall within the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) maintains a database of inspection history and safety records relating to commercial motor vehicle operators. Appellants, a group of commercial motor vehicle operators, brought suit against the FMSCA and the Department of Transportation, arguing that the potential disclosure to employers of “non-serious” driver-related safety records contained in the database violates the Privacy Act. The district court granted the FMCSA’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that 49 U.S.C. 31150 was ambiguous as to the agency’s authority to include non-serious driver-related safety violations in the database and, further, that the agency’s interpretation of section 31150 was a reasonable and permissible construction of the statute and was entitled to Chevron deference. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) section 31150 is ambiguous as to the question of non-serious driver-related safety violations; and (2) the agency’s interpretation of the statute is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. View "Flock v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a Va. Code Ann. 56-542(D) investigation by the State Corporation Commission of the tolls charged by Toll Road Investors Partnership II, LP for the Dulles Greenway, a privately owned toll road located primarily in Loudoun County. The Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County and David Ramadan (collectively, Appellants) requested that the Commission reduce the tolls. After concluding the investigation, the Commission issued an order in which it decided not to substitute new toll rates for the Greenway under the authority of section 56-542(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction and application of section 56-542(D); and (2) the Commission did not err in its factual findings that the Greenway’s existing toll rates satisfy the section 56-542(D) criteria while Appellants’ proposed rates did not. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Scenic filed suit challenging a guidance memorandum issued by the FHWA in 2007, which interpreted the prohibition on “flashing, intermittent or moving” lights to permit state approval of those digital billboards that met certain timing and brightness requirements. The Highway Beautification Act (HBA), 23 U.S.C. 131, requires the FHWA and each state to develop and implement individual federal-state agreements (FSAs), detailing, among other things, “size, lighting and spacing” standards for the billboards now found towering over many of our country’s interstate highways. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Scenic's notice-and-comment claim because Scenic failed to demonstrate that it has standing to bring that challenge. The court concluded that Scenic has standing to bring a claim under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that the Guidance constitutes final agency action. On the merits, the court concluded that, because the FHWA’s interpretation of the FSA lighting provision was reasonable, the interpretation cannot be “contrary to customary use.” Accordingly, Scenic's claim under section 706 fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for dismissal of Scenic's notice-and-comment claim. View "Scenic America, Inc. v. US DOT" on Justia Law

The City and Xerox appealed the trial court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of mandate. At issue is whether the City, as the “issuing agency” for notice of parking violations in the City, Veh. Code, 40202, must conduct the “initial review” of challenged citations, section 40215, subd. (a), or whether it may delegate that duty to Xerox, its "processing agency," section 40200.6, subd. (a), with which it contracts "for the processing of notices of parking violations," section 40200.5, subd. (a). The court held that, based on the language of section 40215, subdivision (a) and relevant legislative history, the City is required to conduct the initial review, and cannot contract with Xerox to perform that duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandate, as well as the trial court's award of approximately $722,000 in attorney fees pursuant to the California private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Weiss v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and one of its members, seek review of regulatory guidance issued by the FMCSA, which exempts from federal accident-reporting regulations certain accidents involving commercial motor vehicles known as attenuator trucks. The court dismissed the petition for lack of an Article III case or controversy because petitioners have failed to identify a concrete and particularized injury that would give them standing to proceed. View "OOIDA v. US Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law