Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Illinois requires that motor carriers of property, conducting intrastate operations, obtain a license from the Illinois Commerce Commission, which requires appropriate insurance or surety coverage. A carrier complies by submitting proof of insurance or bond coverage and is then issued a public carrier certificate, stating that the holder “certifies to the Commission that it will perform transportation activities only with the lawful amount of liability insurance in accordance with 92 Ill. Admin. Code 1425.” Drivers must have a copy of the license with them at all times. It is a Class C misdemeanor offense for an operator not to produce proof of registration upon request. Three carriers were cited by the ICC police for conducting regulated activity without a license. During a follow-up investigation, the carriers refused to comply, reasoning that documents sought by the ICC would reveal their rates, routes, and services, so the requirement was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c). The ICC rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the ICC, concluding that the document requests had no significant economic impact on rates, routes or services and, alternatively, that efforts to enforce the licensing requirement are exempted from preemption. View "Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application to the Department of Transportation (Department) for authority to operate two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service. The Department denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving the statutory requirement that his livery service would improve present or future “public convenience and necessity.” The trial court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal from the Department’s denial of his permit application, holding that the Department improperly interpreted the “public convenience and necessity” provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-103(a). Remanded for a new hearing. View "Martorelli v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

The TSA screens passengers and property moving by passenger aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) and is authorized to impose a “uniform fee . . . on passengers . . . in air transportation and intrastate air transportation originating at airports in the United States.” Airlines collect the fees from passengers and remit the funds to TSA. In 2013, Congress reset the fee to “$5.60 per one-way trip in air transportation or intrastate air transportation that originates at an airport in the United States.” TSA implemented the amendment; a “one-way trip” means a continuous trip from one point to another with no stopover exceeding specified limits, so that a trip from New York to Los Angeles to San Francisco and back to New York, with stopovers exceeding four hours would be three one-way trips. Airlines challenged TSA’s rules, arguing that TSA lacked authority to impose fees in excess of $11.20 on roundtrip itineraries that involved multiple “one-way trips.” While the case was pending, Congress amended the statute, mooting that claim. The airlines also claimed that the statute precludes TSA from charging a fee on travel that begins abroad but includes a connecting flight within the U.S. The D.C. Circuit held that the airlines have standing but accepted TSA’s explanation that its construction of ambiguous text better aligns the imposition of the fee with those who benefit from the security services provided. View "Airlines for Am. v. Transp. Sec. Admin" on Justia Law

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) has priority to use track systems owned by the freight railroads for passenger rail travel, at agreed rates or rates set by the Surface Transportation Board. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue “metrics and standards” addressing performance and scheduling of passenger railroad services, 122 Stat. 4907, including Amtrak’s on-time performance and delays caused by host railroads. The Association of American Railroads sued. The District of Columbia Circuit accepted a separation of powers claim, reasoning that Amtrak is a private corporation and cannot constitutionally be granted regulatory power. The Supreme Court vacated. For purposes of determining the validity of the standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The D.C. Circuit relied on the statutory command that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States,” 49 U.S.C. 24301(a)(3), and “shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation,” but independent inquiry reveals that the political branches control most of Amtrak’s stock and its Board of Directors, most of whom are appointed by the President. The political branches exercise substantial, statutorily mandated supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations: Amtrak is required to pursue broad public objectives; certain day-to-day operations are mandated by Congress; and Amtrak has been dependent on federal financial support during every year of its existence. Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise and, in jointly issuing the metrics and standards with the FRA, Amtrak acted as a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes. Treating Amtrak as governmental for these purposes is not an unbridled grant of authority to an unaccountable actor. On remand, the court may address any remaining issues respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards. View "Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads" on Justia Law

Kruse, a Norfok train conductor, was injured on the job in March, reported his injury, and took leave until August. Shortly after he returned to work, Kruse was suspended for 30 days without pay for exceeding speed limits. Kruse’s union appealed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153. Both the on-property investigation and the arbitration board concluded that Norfolk “was justified,” but reduced the suspension. While his grievance-related appeal was pending before the arbitration board, Kruse filed a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) complaint with the Department of Labor, claiming that his suspension was in retaliation for reporting his prior work-related injury. The ALJ ruled in favor of Kruse, denying Norfolk’s motion to dismiss based on FRSA, which prohibits a railroad carrier from retaliating against employees who report work-related injuries and potential safety violations, and provides that “[a]n employee may not seek protection under both this section and another provision of law for the same allegedly unlawful act of the railroad carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(f). The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied review, reasoning that prior arbitration of a grievance under the RLA did not trigger the FRSA’s election-of-remedies provision. View "Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Perez" on Justia Law

After the FAA suspended petitioner's license as an airplane mechanic, the NTSB vacated the suspension and found that the FAA's position had been unreasonable and not substantially justified. Petitioner filed suit seeking recovery of legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The NTSB denied fee-shifting under the Act because it concluded that petitioner had not "incurred" the fees associated with his legal defense in the license suspension proceedings. The court held that the NTSB's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious where the NTSB should have considered that under the Alabama law of quantum meruit, petitioner was obligated to pay his attorneys for the value of their services. Therefore, petitioner "incurred" fees and may obtain EAJA fee-shifting. The court granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. NTSB" on Justia Law

New York City filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Amtrak was liable for rehabilitation of a bridge carrying a public highway over a parcel of land in the Bronx. In this appeal, the City asserts that a 1996 agreement obligating Amtrak's predecessor to maintain and repair the bridge is a covenant running with the land which survived the land's subsequent Rail Act, 45 U.S.C. 743(b)(2), conveyance made "free and clear of any liens or encumbrances." The City also seeks to recoup payments it made to Amtrak in exchange for Amtrak's removal of electrical equipment attached to the bridge. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak on both claims. The district court held that the Rail Act extinguished the obligation and the City was not entitled to recover its already-incurred costs under the narrow theory of restitution it advanced. The court agreed with the district court that the City's claim against Amtrak for the rehabilitation of the bridge should be rejected. The court rejected the City's reformulated restitution claim as an "unjust enrichment" claim because the City failed to file a Rule 59(e) or 60(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of New York v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

The FAA may “delegate to a qualified private person . . . the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate … and … issuing the certificate,” 49 U.S.C. 44702(d)(1), and may rescind delegation “at any time for any reason.” Airworthiness Representative-Maintenance (DAR-T) authorization to conduct aircraft inspections and issue airworthiness certificates has no expiration. Burdue was appointed as a DAR-T in 2001. In 2013, Burdue’s supervisors were informed of issues related to Burdue’s export certifications. The FAA’s Special Emphasis Investigations Team (SEIT) concluded that Burdue performed multiple aircraft inspections out of his assigned geographic area without authorization and had issued export certificates to aircraft owned by his wife, a conflict of interest. After review of Burdue’s response, Burdue’s certificate was revoked, both “for cause,” 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(4) and under the discretionary-revocation provision, 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(6). An Appeal Panel affirmed. Burdue brought a Bivens action, claiming due process violations and wrongful termination, then filed statutory claims in the Sixth Circuit. The district court stayed the Bivens proceedings. The Sixth Circuit declined to review the statutory claims because the FAA’s decision is committed to agency discretion and declined to review the constitutional claims that belong in the district court View "Burdue v. Fed. Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

TPI filed a rate complaint with the STB, alleging that numerous CSX common carrier rates were unreasonable and CSX moved for an expedited procedure with respect to questions related to market dominance. The Board granted the motion and bifurcated the adjudication into a market dominance phase and a second rate reasonableness phase. Then the Board issued a decision, concluding that CSX had market dominance over 51 contested rates. The Board rejected requests for reconsideration and CSX sought review of the Board's interlocutory ruling regarding the 51 rates. The court agreed with the Board that the appeal must be dismissed because the contested dominance decision is a non-final order. There is no final order because the Board has yet to inquire into the reasonableness of CSX's rates and has issued no adverse ruling with respect to any rates. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "CSX Transportation v. STB" on Justia Law