Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Kruse, a Norfok train conductor, was injured on the job in March, reported his injury, and took leave until August. Shortly after he returned to work, Kruse was suspended for 30 days without pay for exceeding speed limits. Kruse’s union appealed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153. Both the on-property investigation and the arbitration board concluded that Norfolk “was justified,” but reduced the suspension. While his grievance-related appeal was pending before the arbitration board, Kruse filed a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) complaint with the Department of Labor, claiming that his suspension was in retaliation for reporting his prior work-related injury. The ALJ ruled in favor of Kruse, denying Norfolk’s motion to dismiss based on FRSA, which prohibits a railroad carrier from retaliating against employees who report work-related injuries and potential safety violations, and provides that “[a]n employee may not seek protection under both this section and another provision of law for the same allegedly unlawful act of the railroad carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(f). The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied review, reasoning that prior arbitration of a grievance under the RLA did not trigger the FRSA’s election-of-remedies provision. View "Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Perez" on Justia Law

After the FAA suspended petitioner's license as an airplane mechanic, the NTSB vacated the suspension and found that the FAA's position had been unreasonable and not substantially justified. Petitioner filed suit seeking recovery of legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The NTSB denied fee-shifting under the Act because it concluded that petitioner had not "incurred" the fees associated with his legal defense in the license suspension proceedings. The court held that the NTSB's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious where the NTSB should have considered that under the Alabama law of quantum meruit, petitioner was obligated to pay his attorneys for the value of their services. Therefore, petitioner "incurred" fees and may obtain EAJA fee-shifting. The court granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. NTSB" on Justia Law

New York City filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Amtrak was liable for rehabilitation of a bridge carrying a public highway over a parcel of land in the Bronx. In this appeal, the City asserts that a 1996 agreement obligating Amtrak's predecessor to maintain and repair the bridge is a covenant running with the land which survived the land's subsequent Rail Act, 45 U.S.C. 743(b)(2), conveyance made "free and clear of any liens or encumbrances." The City also seeks to recoup payments it made to Amtrak in exchange for Amtrak's removal of electrical equipment attached to the bridge. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak on both claims. The district court held that the Rail Act extinguished the obligation and the City was not entitled to recover its already-incurred costs under the narrow theory of restitution it advanced. The court agreed with the district court that the City's claim against Amtrak for the rehabilitation of the bridge should be rejected. The court rejected the City's reformulated restitution claim as an "unjust enrichment" claim because the City failed to file a Rule 59(e) or 60(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of New York v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

The FAA may “delegate to a qualified private person . . . the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate … and … issuing the certificate,” 49 U.S.C. 44702(d)(1), and may rescind delegation “at any time for any reason.” Airworthiness Representative-Maintenance (DAR-T) authorization to conduct aircraft inspections and issue airworthiness certificates has no expiration. Burdue was appointed as a DAR-T in 2001. In 2013, Burdue’s supervisors were informed of issues related to Burdue’s export certifications. The FAA’s Special Emphasis Investigations Team (SEIT) concluded that Burdue performed multiple aircraft inspections out of his assigned geographic area without authorization and had issued export certificates to aircraft owned by his wife, a conflict of interest. After review of Burdue’s response, Burdue’s certificate was revoked, both “for cause,” 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(4) and under the discretionary-revocation provision, 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(6). An Appeal Panel affirmed. Burdue brought a Bivens action, claiming due process violations and wrongful termination, then filed statutory claims in the Sixth Circuit. The district court stayed the Bivens proceedings. The Sixth Circuit declined to review the statutory claims because the FAA’s decision is committed to agency discretion and declined to review the constitutional claims that belong in the district court View "Burdue v. Fed. Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

TPI filed a rate complaint with the STB, alleging that numerous CSX common carrier rates were unreasonable and CSX moved for an expedited procedure with respect to questions related to market dominance. The Board granted the motion and bifurcated the adjudication into a market dominance phase and a second rate reasonableness phase. Then the Board issued a decision, concluding that CSX had market dominance over 51 contested rates. The Board rejected requests for reconsideration and CSX sought review of the Board's interlocutory ruling regarding the 51 rates. The court agreed with the Board that the appeal must be dismissed because the contested dominance decision is a non-final order. There is no final order because the Board has yet to inquire into the reasonableness of CSX's rates and has issued no adverse ruling with respect to any rates. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "CSX Transportation v. STB" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of PowerPoint presentations that the FMCSA posted on its website on May 16, 2012. Petitioners claimed that the presentations represented an "astonishing" change in agency policy, which the agency failed to subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the presentations did nothing more than explain the agency's Safety Measurement System, which was announced and implemented in 2010. The court dismissed the petition as untimely because, under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, challenges to agency rules, regulations, or final orders must be brought within 60 days of their issuance. View "Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transp., et al. v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the Board addressed a rate dispute between a shipper and two railroads. The railroads contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the shipper and the shipper contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the railroads. The railroads and the shippers petitioned for review. The court concluded that the Board reasonably interpreted that the prior rates were not reasonable based on a Stand-Alone-Cost test that employs a hypothetical Stand Alone Railroad that is optimally efficient; the Board's calculation of the railroads' variable costs was reasonable and reasonably explained; and Arizona Electric lacked standing where the court could not detect a current injury to Arizona Electric from the Board's decision regarding the switch to proportional rates. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner received a citation for failing to obey a Montana traffic ordinance and a record of the citation made its way into a database administered by FMCSA. Petitioner complained that, in maintaining the record of citation, FMCSA violated the statute authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to maintain the database. Because the court concluded that FMCSA's action fell short of being a rule, a regulation or final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2342(3), the court lacked jurisdiction under that provision and transferred the case to the district court under 28 U.S.C. 1631. View "Weaver, Jr., et al. v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

Lilliputian, manufacturer of micro fuel cells powered by butane, challenged the prohibition in a final rule against airline passengers and crew carrying butane fuel cell cartridges in their checked baggage. Lilliputian argued that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious in light of the dissimilar treatment of other products that were not subject to the rigorous safety specifications imposed on fuel cell cartridges. The court concluded that the Safety Administration failed to provide the required "reasoned explanation and substantial evidence" for the disparate treatment. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Safety Administration to provide further explanation for the prohibition, including its response to Lilliputian's comments. View "Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin." on Justia Law

BNSF petitioned for review of the Board's decision to adhere to a revenue-allocation methodology, known as Modified ATC, in determining that the rates BNSF charged WFA were unreasonably high. In 2010, the court remanded the case to the Board so that it could address one of BNSF's objections to Modified ATC in the first instance. On remand, the Board concluded that portions of BNSF's arbitrary challenge fell outside the scope of the case given the specificity of the court's 2010 remand. The court concluded that the Board erred in its failure to address BNSF's proportionality challenge on remand. Because the court never actually resolved BNSF's arbitrary and capricious challenge to Modified ATC, the court granted the petition, vacated the Board's decision, and again remanded the case to the Board. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law