Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff David Brown appealed the dismissal of his action challenging his ban from using public transportation provided by the Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority ("MTTA"). Brown claimed violations of his federal and state constitutional rights. Brown sued the MTTA over a series of events in 2007 in which he was alleged to have been disruptive, intoxicated behaved badly. Initially Brown brought suit in state court. That case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He then refiled the case with the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the MTTA as well as defendants J.D. Eppler, Ray Willard, Jane Doe, and Janet Doe (collectively "employee defendants"). In so doing, the court concluded Brown did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in access to MTTA services. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal on Brown's procedural due process claim; the district court judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. Eppler, et al" on Justia Law

This case concerned challenges to the 2011 Hours of Service (HOS) rule issued by the FMCSA. In Case No. 12-1092, ATA asserted that the new safety-oriented provisions in the final HOS rule were overly restrictive and costly. In Case No., 12-1113, Public Citizen claimed that the rule was insufficiently protective of public safety. The court concluded that what remains of the 2003 Final Rule after two remands and three rulemakings were highly technical points best left to the agency. Therefore, the court generally affirmed the rule and vacated only the agency's application of the 30-minute break to short-haul drivers where the agency failed to explain its decision under the requirements of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. View "American Trucking Ass'ns v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

In connection with the Utah Transit Authority's construction of a high-speed commuter rail line, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) classified a certain railroad crossing as public. The Public Service Commission upheld the classification. Union Pacific Railroad sought review of the Commission's decision upholding UDOT's public classification. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in determining that UDOT correctly classified the crossing as public, as Union Pacific failed to present enough evidence to support its arguments that the crossing was formally vacated or abandoned or that the crossing was a new road that never became public. View "Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, 49 U.S.C. 24101, empowers Amtrak and the FRA to jointly develop performance measures to enhance enforcement of the statutory priority Amtrak's passenger rail service has over trains. AAR challenged the statutory scheme as unconstitutional. The court concluded that section 207 impermissibly delegated regulatory authority to Amtrak. The court need not reach AAR's separate argument that Amtrak's involvement in developing the metrics and standards deprived its members of due process. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Assoc. of American Railroads v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., et al." on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

ATO challenged the City's enactment of an ordinance offering taxicabs certified to run on compressed natural gas (CNG) a "head-of-the-line" privilege at a municipally-owned airport. At issue was whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). The court concluded that the ordinance, enacted using traditional police powers, was not superseded by any clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress's term "standard" had been identified as one "susceptible" to a mandate/incentive distinction. The court also concluded that the ordinance could have its intended effect and substitute CNG cabs for traditional cabs at the airport but it did not show that the City's cab drivers faced such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects as to force them to switch vehicles. Accordingly, the ordinance was not preempted by section 209(a) of the Act and the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ass'n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

The Institute challenged the final rule promulgated by the FRA to implement section 104 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432 section 104(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4848, 4857. Section 104 required a qualifying rail carrier to submit an implementation plan to install a "positive train control" (PTC) system no later than December 31, 2015 on certain tracks used for passenger service or for transporting "poison- or toxic- by-inhalation" hazardous material (PIH or TIH). The court concluded that the Institute's challenge was not ripe because it had not established that its members now faced a present or imminent injury from the 2012 Final Rule's omission of a two-part risk assessment test. Accordingly, the court dismissed the Institute's petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. FRA, et al." on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent.View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Detroit International Bridge Company was immune from the City of Detroit’s zoning ordinances because it was a federal instrumentality for the limited purpose of facilitating commerce over the Ambassador Bridge, which connects Detroit to Ontario, Canada. The federal government was not a party to the suit. Commodities Export, which owned property near the Bridge, later filed suit against Detroit and the United States, claiming that the Bridge Company had unilaterally condemned roads around its property, cutting off the land and causing a regulatory taking. It claimed that Detroit was liable for failing to enforce its own ordinances and demanded that the United States take a position on the Bridge Company’s federal-instrumentality status and control the Company’s actions. The United States cross-claimed against Bridge Company, alleging that it had misappropriated the title of “federal instrumentality.” The district court granted summary judgment for the United States and dismissed the action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over the government’s cross-claim and owe no deference to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal common law. Bridge Company is not a federal instrumentality. View "Commodities Exp. Co. v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co." on Justia Law