Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

CBP imposed almost $38 million in penalties against UP under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1584(a)(2), after finding illegal drugs secreted on trains brought to the U.S. border by Ferromex or KCSM, both Mexican railroads. The district court found that CBP lacked statutory authority to penalize UP and found in UP's favor. The government appealed. The court rejected CBP's constitutionally suspect contention that the Act authorizes the heavy fines at issue in this case; the statute does not authorize penalties against UP for drugs found on railcars UP neither owned nor controlled; and the statute did not authorize CBP to require UP, as a common carrier, to do more than reasonably possible to prevent Mexican drug cartels from hiding drugs on trains UP did not control in a country in which UP had no operations. The court concluded, however, that the district court's imprecise injunction must be corrected. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacating only the injunction. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Washington statutes that require a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" (PCN) in order to operate a ferry on Lake Chelan in central Washington sate. The court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass a right to operate a public ferry on intrastate navigable waterways and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The court also held that the district court properly abstained from deciding on plaintiffs' challenges to the PCN requirement as applied to the provision of boat transportation services on the lake. The district court properly abstained under the Pullman doctrine, but the district court should have retained jurisdiction instead of dismissing the claim. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded this claim with instructions to the district court to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge. View "Courtney, et al. v. Goltz, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board's decision rejecting his application for a certificate authorizing the acquisition and operation of a small length of industrial railroad track because his application refused any obligation to transport "toxic inhalation hazard" products. While the court concluded that petitioner did not forfeit his argument on appeal, the court found petitioner's arguments unpersuasive on the merits. Because the Board had permissibly determined the scope of a freight railroad's common carrier obligation under 49 U.S.C. 11101(a), and the Board's rejection of petitioner's application was reasonable, the court denied the petition for review. View "Riffin v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

Dandino petitioned under 49 U.S.C. 521(b)(9) for review of an order of the FMCSA affirming a civil penalty to Dandino for transporting goods after the agency had revoked its operating authority and before that authority was reinstated. The court held that, for purposes of section 521(b)(9), when a final agency order was mailed to a party, and there was no proof of actual receipt, there was a rebuttable presumption that the order was received within three days of mailing. Applying this holding to these circumstances, the court concluded that Dandino's petition was timely. However, on the merits, the court concluded that Dandino's concession that it operated "without the required operating authority" was dispositive of its petition on the merits. The court rejected Dandino's remaining claim and dismissed the petition for review. View "Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Brown appealed the dismissal of his action challenging his ban from using public transportation provided by the Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority ("MTTA"). Brown claimed violations of his federal and state constitutional rights. Brown sued the MTTA over a series of events in 2007 in which he was alleged to have been disruptive, intoxicated behaved badly. Initially Brown brought suit in state court. That case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He then refiled the case with the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the MTTA as well as defendants J.D. Eppler, Ray Willard, Jane Doe, and Janet Doe (collectively "employee defendants"). In so doing, the court concluded Brown did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in access to MTTA services. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal on Brown's procedural due process claim; the district court judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. Eppler, et al" on Justia Law

This case concerned challenges to the 2011 Hours of Service (HOS) rule issued by the FMCSA. In Case No. 12-1092, ATA asserted that the new safety-oriented provisions in the final HOS rule were overly restrictive and costly. In Case No., 12-1113, Public Citizen claimed that the rule was insufficiently protective of public safety. The court concluded that what remains of the 2003 Final Rule after two remands and three rulemakings were highly technical points best left to the agency. Therefore, the court generally affirmed the rule and vacated only the agency's application of the 30-minute break to short-haul drivers where the agency failed to explain its decision under the requirements of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. View "American Trucking Ass'ns v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

In connection with the Utah Transit Authority's construction of a high-speed commuter rail line, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) classified a certain railroad crossing as public. The Public Service Commission upheld the classification. Union Pacific Railroad sought review of the Commission's decision upholding UDOT's public classification. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in determining that UDOT correctly classified the crossing as public, as Union Pacific failed to present enough evidence to support its arguments that the crossing was formally vacated or abandoned or that the crossing was a new road that never became public. View "Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, 49 U.S.C. 24101, empowers Amtrak and the FRA to jointly develop performance measures to enhance enforcement of the statutory priority Amtrak's passenger rail service has over trains. AAR challenged the statutory scheme as unconstitutional. The court concluded that section 207 impermissibly delegated regulatory authority to Amtrak. The court need not reach AAR's separate argument that Amtrak's involvement in developing the metrics and standards deprived its members of due process. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Assoc. of American Railroads v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., et al." on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

ATO challenged the City's enactment of an ordinance offering taxicabs certified to run on compressed natural gas (CNG) a "head-of-the-line" privilege at a municipally-owned airport. At issue was whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). The court concluded that the ordinance, enacted using traditional police powers, was not superseded by any clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress's term "standard" had been identified as one "susceptible" to a mandate/incentive distinction. The court also concluded that the ordinance could have its intended effect and substitute CNG cabs for traditional cabs at the airport but it did not show that the City's cab drivers faced such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects as to force them to switch vehicles. Accordingly, the ordinance was not preempted by section 209(a) of the Act and the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ass'n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law