Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB
Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law
Nat’l Truck Equip. Assoc v. Nat’l Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin.
NHTSA is a federal agency within the Department of Transportation that writes and enforces safety standards for motor vehicles. NTEA is a trade organization representing manufacturers who customize bodies for special-purpose commercial vehicles. In 2005, NHTSA initiated a rulemaking proceeding at Congress’s behest to upgrade the safety standard establishing strength requirements for passenger compartment roofs in certain vehicles. NHTSA proposed, among other things, extending the scope of the safety standard to include a previously unregulated class of vehicles, many of which are produced by NTEA’s members. NTEA objected, but in 2009, NHTSA promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 216a. The Sixth Circuit denied review. “To ask for more process in a situation like this would render NHTSA’s standard-setting mission a practical impossibility.” The standard complies with “minimum substantive criteria” specified by Congress: that any new safety standard “shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms.” View "Nat'l Truck Equip. Assoc v. Nat'l Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin." on Justia Law
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Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law
Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp.
Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law
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Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law
Brandt v. United States
In 1908, the United States granted the railroad right-of-way to Pacific Railroad Company for railroad purposes. In 1976, the government conveyed 83.32 acres of land partially burdened by the right-of-way to Brandt’s parents, in fee simple, subject to the right-of-way. In 1987, WYCO acquired the railroad right-of-way and operated the rail line. In 1996, WYCO filed a Notice of Intent to Abandon Rail Service with the Surface Transportation Board. The STB approved abandonment in 2003, and, in 2004, WYCO notified the STB that it had completed abandonment. In 2006, the government sought declaratory judgment that title to the abandoned right-of-way had vested in the government under the National Trails System Improvements Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. 1248(c). Brandt sought quiet title and argued that, to the extent the government acquired some interest in land formerly occupied by the easement, that interest would constitute a taking for which just compensation is owed. The Claims Court dismissed the takings claim for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Brandt did not have claims “pending” for purposes of section 1500 when he filed his takings complaint. View "Brandt v. United States" on Justia Law
Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, created Amtrak, 84 Stat. 1327, and allowed railroads to be excused from providing intercity passenger service by entering into a contract with Amtrak. In1971, after filing for bankruptcy, APU’s predecessor contracted to pay Amtrak $52 million and provide Amtrak use of its tracks, facilities and services; Amtrak was to relieve it of responsibility for intercity rail passenger service and issue it about 5.2 million stock shares. A 1978 Settlement Agreement released existing claims between APU’s predecessor and Amtrak. In 1997, Congress enacted the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, 111 Stat. 2570, requiring that Amtrak, before redeem all common stock for the fair market value. More than 10 years later, Amtrak has not redeemed APU’s stock. In 2000 APU rejected Amtrak’s offer of $0.03 per share. In 2008 APU filed suit. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that Amtrak qualified as an agency for purposes of constitutional violations, that federal agencies cannot be sued for damages for constitutional violations, and that the statute did not create a private right of action for redemption. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to a claim that Amtrak’s valuation of APU’s shares denied APU due process, but otherwise affirmed. View "Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp." on Justia Law
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Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law
Multistar Industries, Inc. v. USDOT, et al
Multistar, a for-hire motor carrier engaged in the business of transporting hazardous materials, petitioned for review of FMCSA's order to cease operations, and, in a separate petition for review, challenged the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for administrative review. The court dismissed the petitions insofar as they challenged the "unsatisfactory" rating and the order to cease operations because the court could not reach the merits of Multistar's substantive claims where there was no final agency decision. The court held that Multistar received all of the process it was due with regard to the contested violations, and the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for review was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Multistar Industries, Inc. v. USDOT, et al" on Justia Law
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Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law
Webb v. Black Hawk
Petitioners Jamie Webb, Jeffrey Hermanson, and Michaleen Jeronimus, challenged the legality of the City of Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles on certain city streets. Petitioners, a group of bicyclists, were cited and fined for riding their bikes on the only street providing access through town from the state highway to Central City. Petitioners argued that Black Hawk, as a home-rule municipality, lacked the authority to prohibit bicycles on local streets absent a suitable alternative bicycle route as provided by state statute. Both the trial and district courts ruled in favor of Black Hawk, finding the city had the authority to ban bicycles through both its home-rule and police powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles was a matter of mixed state and local concern and conflicts with and is preempted by state law.
View "Webb v. Black Hawk" on Justia Law
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Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law
Maracich v. Spears
Using FOIA requests directed to the South Carolina DMV, attorneys obtained names and addresses, then sent letters to more than 34,000 individuals, seeking clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships for violation of a state law. The letters were headed “ADVERTISING MATERIAL,” explained the lawsuit, and asked recipients to return an enclosed card to participate in the case. Recipients sued the attorneys, alleging violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(4), by obtaining, disclosing, and using personal information from motor vehicle records for bulk solicitation without express consent. The district court dismissed, based on a DPPA exception permitting disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding," including "investigation in anticipation of litigation." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. An attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the (b)(4) litigation exception. DPPA’s purpose of protecting privacy in motor vehicle records would be substantially undermined by application of the (b)(4) exception to the general ban on disclosure of personal information and ban on release of highly restricted personal information in cases there is any connection between protected information and a potential legal dispute. The Court noted examples of permissible litigation uses: service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and execution or enforcement of judgments and orders. All involve an attorney’s conduct as an officer of the court, not a commercial actor, seeking a business transaction. A contrary reading of (b)(4) could affect interpretation of the (b)(6) exception, which allows an insurer and certain others to obtain DMV information for use in connection with underwriting, and the (b)(10) exception, which permits disclosure and use of personal information in connection with operation of private tollroads. View "Maracich v. Spears" on Justia Law
Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
The Port of Los Angeles is run by a Board of Harbor Commissioners under a municipal ordinance (the tariff) and leases terminal facilities to operators that load and unload ships. Federally-licensed short-haul drayage trucks move cargo in and out of the Port. In response to concerns over proposed port expansion, the Board implemented a Clean Truck Program that involved a standard “concession agreement,” governing the relationship between the Port and drayage companies. It required a placard on each truck including a phone number and submission a plan listing off-street parking locations. Other requirements relate to financial capacity, truck maintenance, and drivers. The Board amended the tariff to make it a misdemeanor for a terminal operator to grant access to an unregistered drayage truck. An association of drayage companies sued, claiming that the requirements are expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 4501(c)(1), and that even if the requirements are valid, the Port may not enforce them by withdrawing a right to operate at the Port. The district court ruled in favor of the Port. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding only the driver-employment provision preempted. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part. The FAAAA expressly preempts the placard and parking requirements, which relate to a motor carrier’s price, route, or service with respect to transporting property and “hav[e] the force and effect of law.” The Port exercised classic regulatory authority in forcing terminal operators and, therefore, trucking companies, to alter their conduct by implementing a criminal prohibition punishable by imprisonment. The Port’s proprietary intentions do not control. The Court declined to determine, in a “pre-enforcement posture” whether precedent limits the way the Port can en¬force the financial-capacity and truck-maintenance requirements. View "Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
FAA v. Cooper
Claiming that the FAA, DOT, and SSA violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A), by sharing his records with one another, respondent filed suit alleging that the unlawful disclosure to the DOT of his confidential medical information, including his HIV status, had caused him "humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other severe emotional distress." The District Court granted summary judgment against respondent, concluding that respondent could not recover damages because he alleged only mental and emotional harm, not economic loss. Reversing the District Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "actual damages" in the Act was not ambiguous and included damages for mental and emotional distress. Applying traditional rules of construction, the Court held that the Act did not unequivocally authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress. Accordingly, the Act did not waive the Government's sovereign immunity from liability for such harms. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. View "FAA v. Cooper" on Justia Law