Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Maracich v. Spears
Using FOIA requests directed to the South Carolina DMV, attorneys obtained names and addresses, then sent letters to more than 34,000 individuals, seeking clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships for violation of a state law. The letters were headed “ADVERTISING MATERIAL,” explained the lawsuit, and asked recipients to return an enclosed card to participate in the case. Recipients sued the attorneys, alleging violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(4), by obtaining, disclosing, and using personal information from motor vehicle records for bulk solicitation without express consent. The district court dismissed, based on a DPPA exception permitting disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding," including "investigation in anticipation of litigation." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. An attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the (b)(4) litigation exception. DPPA’s purpose of protecting privacy in motor vehicle records would be substantially undermined by application of the (b)(4) exception to the general ban on disclosure of personal information and ban on release of highly restricted personal information in cases there is any connection between protected information and a potential legal dispute. The Court noted examples of permissible litigation uses: service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and execution or enforcement of judgments and orders. All involve an attorney’s conduct as an officer of the court, not a commercial actor, seeking a business transaction. A contrary reading of (b)(4) could affect interpretation of the (b)(6) exception, which allows an insurer and certain others to obtain DMV information for use in connection with underwriting, and the (b)(10) exception, which permits disclosure and use of personal information in connection with operation of private tollroads. View "Maracich v. Spears" on Justia Law
Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
The Port of Los Angeles is run by a Board of Harbor Commissioners under a municipal ordinance (the tariff) and leases terminal facilities to operators that load and unload ships. Federally-licensed short-haul drayage trucks move cargo in and out of the Port. In response to concerns over proposed port expansion, the Board implemented a Clean Truck Program that involved a standard “concession agreement,” governing the relationship between the Port and drayage companies. It required a placard on each truck including a phone number and submission a plan listing off-street parking locations. Other requirements relate to financial capacity, truck maintenance, and drivers. The Board amended the tariff to make it a misdemeanor for a terminal operator to grant access to an unregistered drayage truck. An association of drayage companies sued, claiming that the requirements are expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 4501(c)(1), and that even if the requirements are valid, the Port may not enforce them by withdrawing a right to operate at the Port. The district court ruled in favor of the Port. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding only the driver-employment provision preempted. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part. The FAAAA expressly preempts the placard and parking requirements, which relate to a motor carrier’s price, route, or service with respect to transporting property and “hav[e] the force and effect of law.” The Port exercised classic regulatory authority in forcing terminal operators and, therefore, trucking companies, to alter their conduct by implementing a criminal prohibition punishable by imprisonment. The Port’s proprietary intentions do not control. The Court declined to determine, in a “pre-enforcement posture” whether precedent limits the way the Port can en¬force the financial-capacity and truck-maintenance requirements. View "Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
Hip Heightened Indep. & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ
The Port Authority’s subsidiary, PATH, operates the Grove Street Station in Jersey City. The Station was built in 1910. In 2000 PATH planned to expand the Station to accommodate larger trains and persons with disabilities, a project that would have involved construction of a new entrance and two elevators. After September 11, 2001, and the resulting closure of two stations, ridership increased at the Station. Concerned about congestion and safety, PATH scrapped its renovation plans and undertook a “fast track” project. Construction began in 2002 and concluded in 2005. Plaintiffs alleged that the renovations triggered an obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213, to make the Station accessible to handicapped persons. They also alleged violations under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination and certain state construction code provisions. The district court dismissed, state-law claims on the basis that allowing such claims to proceed would violate the interstate compact between New York and New Jersey that created the Authority, but ordered the Authority to make the east entrance accessible. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the state law claims, but remanded the ADA issue for trial on the issue of feasibility. View "Hip Heightened Indep. & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ" on Justia Law
California Tow Truck Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco
CTTA filed this action seeking to invalidate two ordinances where the City and County of San Francisco required tow truck drivers to obtain permits to operate in San Francisco and towing firms to obtain permits to conduct business within San Francisco. CTTA primarily argued that the entire "permit scheme" (as it called both ordinances) was preempted by federal law. The district court upheld the permit scheme for "non-consensual" towing, but enjoined enforcement against those doing exclusively "consensual" towing and against tow truck drivers simply "passing through" San Francisco. Both parties cross-appealed. The CTTA's challenge to the entire permit scheme necessarily encompassed all of the permit scheme's components - each of which could be preempted. The district court analyzed the permit scheme in a way the parties presented the scheme, as a whole, but without specifically addressing its individual provisions. In doing so, however, the district court ran afoul of American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles, which required "examining the specific provisions" of the permit scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "California Tow Truck Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law
Senne v. Vill. of Palatine
Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it. View "Senne v. Vill. of Palatine" on Justia Law
Latif v. Holder
Plaintiffs were United States citizens or legal permanent residents who had good reason to believe they were on the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) no-fly list (List). They initially submitted grievances through the redress program run by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but the government refused to confirm or deny their inclusion on the List. Rather than continuing to pursue their administrative grievances with the TSA, Plaintiffs filed this action against the directors of the TSC and FBI and the attorney general, challenging the TSA's grievance procedures. The district court dismissed the case, holding that TSA was a necessary party to the litigation but that TSA could not feasibly be joined in the district court due to 49 U.S.C. 46110, which grants federal courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review TSA's final orders. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 46110 does not strip the district court of federal question jurisdiction over substantive challenges to the inclusion of one's name on the List; and (2) the district court's determination that TSA was a necessary party was not an abuse of discretion, but the court erred in holding that joinder of TSA was infeasible in light of section 46110. View "Latif v. Holder" on Justia Law
LeGrande v. United States
While working as a flight attendant, LeGrande was injured when the aircraft encountered severe turbulence. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, alleging that air traffic controllers employed by the FAA negligently had failed to warn the flight’s captain that turbulence had been forecast along the flight path. The district court concluded that FAA employees did not breach any duty owed LeGrande and granted summary judgment for the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. LeGrande argued, for the first time, that her injuries resulted from the negligence of a National Weather Service meteorologist. The court concluded that the FAA breached no duty owed to LeGrande and that LeGrande failed to give the NWS the notice that the FTCA requires. View "LeGrande v. United States" on Justia Law
Manufacturers Railway Co. v. STB, et al.
Manufacturers obtained authorization from the Board to discontinue service over its entire system but the Board did not apply its entire-system exception. Instead, the Board required Manufacturers to pay dismissal allowances to its dismissed employees. The court concluded that the Board did not reasonably explain and justify the departure from its longstanding entire-system exception. Therefore, the court found that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manufacturers Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law
Yeschick v. Mineta
Plaintiff, an air traffic controller 1974-1981, was fired by President Reagan and subject to a ban on rehiring until 1993, when he applied for rehiring. He had moved and did not update his contact information. He was not rehired and, in 2002, brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634against the Secretary, who oversees operations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Plaintiff failed to respond to both the district court's motions deadline and the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, plaintiff filed Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming that his attorney did not receive electronic notices of case filings due to a change of his email address. The court denid the motion, citing an affirmative duty to monitor the docket and maintain a current e-mail address, as well as the prejudice the Secretary would suffer were the motion to be granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also rejecting the case on the merits.
View "Yeschick v. Mineta" on Justia Law
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assoc., Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.
In 2011 the court vacated a rule issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration about the use of electronic monitoring devices in commercial trucks. Petitioners, commercial truck drivers, sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. 2412. The other party, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, was not included in the petition, but was the only party responsible for paying the fees. The EAJA defines a party eligible for an award as “an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000” or an “organization, the net worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000.” The Seventh Circuit denied fees. The absence of OOIDA from the petition indicates that it is not eligible for fees. Even if the petitioners did not have an explicit fee arrangement among themselves, their fee arrangements with the same law firm, which had represented OOIDA for over 20 years, resulted in an implicit arrangement whereby the organization paid all fees and costs and the individual drivers were not responsible for any payment. The purpose of the EAJA would not be served by awarding fees to the individuals. Financial considerations would not have deterred them from pursuing this action.
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View "Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assoc., Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law