Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging that BNSF violated the anti-retaliation mandate in the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109(a), when BNSF terminated him. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's FRSA claim failed because he failed to present a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination where plaintiff's protected activity was completely unrelated to the fouling-the-tracks incident that led to his discharge. BNSF submitted clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged plaintiff whether or not he had made unrelated reports that were activity protected by the FRSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The “B Prong” of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B(a)(2), requires that workers perform a service outside the usual course of the employer’s business to be classified as independent contractors. The Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA) filed an action for a declaration that the B Prong is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Act (FAAAA), and for an injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing section 148B(a)(2) against the MDA’s members. The FAAAA preempts state laws that “relate to” the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier “with respect to the transportation of property.” The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt section 148B(a)(2). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted the preemption test under the FAAAA and incorrectly applied the test to section 148B(a)(2). Remanded. View "Mass. Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley" on Justia Law

The People filed a complaint against Defendants, Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (Pac Anchor) and Alfredo Barajas, for violating the unfair competition law (UCL), alleging that Defendants misclassified drivers as independent contractors and committed other violations of California’s labor and unemployment insurance laws. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in Defendants’ favor, determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the People’s action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the People’s UCL action was not related to Pac Anchor’s price, route, or service as a motor carrier, the FAAAA did not preempt this action against Defendants. After noting that the FAAAA does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and services, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FAAAA did not preempt the People’s UCL action against Defendants in this case, as the UCL action was independent of Defendants’ price, routes, or services with respect to the transportation of property. View "People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging claims under MCA 39-2-703, which governs the liability of a railway for negligent mismanagement. BNSF removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of BNSF. The district court found that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-88. Applying the Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's state claim concerning a collision was not preempted. The right of railway employees to sue on the basis of negligence or mismanagement resulting in termination may be unusual in other jurisdictions, but such a right is undoubtedly recognized in Montana. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim concerning the conduct leading to the collision was independent of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and did not require interpretation by the CBA. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was not preempted by the RLA. The court also concluded that BNSF's disciplinary proceedings were not the legal cause of plaintiff's suspension and termination. Consequently, plaintiff's punitive damages claim was reinstated. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wolfe v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Brotherhood represents Norfolk employees who work to ensure that railways remain clear, safe, and navigable. The collective bargaining agreements entitle Brotherhood members to an investigation before Norfolk takes disciplinary action. Norfolk fired four Brotherhood members for making false statements about injuries they suffered while on duty. The investigation followed the procedures typical of a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. As part of the investigation before the firing, Norfolk submitted reports from a consulting engineer, but the engineer did not testify. The Brotherhood sought an injunction to ban the use of accident reconstruction reports in employee disciplinary investigations unless Norfolk adheres to additional pre-hearing procedures. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute arose from application of the collective bargaining agreement in employee disciplinary actions. Norfolk met its burden of proving that its use of the disputed reports at investigations was justified by a contractual right, albeit an implied one. The suit is a “quintessential” minor dispute under the Act and there is “no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.” View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment giving collateral-estoppel effect, in his Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, suit, to a finding of fact made by a Public Law Board in the course of plaintiff's pursuit of his rights under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with BNSF. The court concluded that, because it was the railroad that conducted the investigation and hearing and terminated plaintiff, and because the Board only reviewed a close record, the procedures were not adequate for collateral estoppel to apply. The court rejected BNSF's election-of-remedies argument where plaintiff sought protection under the CBA for his contractual claims and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, was not itself the source of law under which plaintiff sought protection. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Reed, a trackman with NSR, experienced a bout of severe abdominal pain while working. He claimed that the company was reluctant to provide medical treatment and pressured him into signing a statement that he had not been “injured on or at work.” Reed was on medical leave for seven months. After he returned, a company claims agent urged him to state whether the incident was work‐related. Reed stated that, notwithstanding his earlier attestation, he felt that his work did play a role in his injury. NSR fired Reed for making inconsistent statements and for violating an internal rule requiring same‐day reporting of on‐site injuries. Reed and his union believed that his termination violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, Reed appealed his dismissal. While arbitration proceedings before the Board were pending, Reed filed a complaint with OSHA, alleging violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which prohibits discriminating against employees who “notify, or attempt to notify, the railroad carrier … of a work‐related personal injury,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). After an appropriate period, Reed filed in district court. The Board awarded him reinstatement without back pay. The district court denied NSR’s motion for summary judgment under the FRSA election-of-remedies provision, reasoning that the arbitration proceedings were not an “election” of remedies because arbitration was mandatory, and that a collective bargaining agreement was not “another provision of law.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Reed v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, working for Defendant since 1967, was a brakeman on a crew taking a freight train from Defendant’s Cleveland yard to Medina County, Ohio, in 2006. At a Valley City stop, Plaintiff operated a ground switch to move the alignment of the track. Plaintiff stood behind the switch and operated it for 30 minutes to an hour. Witnesses testified and pictures indicated that the ground where Plaintiff worked was muddy and was not covered with ballast. Plaintiff had to urinate while operating the switch and planned to urinate outside, rather than in the toilet compartment of the locomotive, because he found that compartment to be “dirty” and “unusable.” Once Plaintiff completed his tasks, he began to walk from the switch to a field behind the tracks. Within steps of the switch, Plaintiff slipped and twisted his knee. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn right meniscus and underwent surgery to repair the cartilage. The district court rejected jury verdicts in favor of Plaintiff on his claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient proof of causation between the jury-determined violations under FELA and LIA and Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a truck driver for Red Racks, which was operated by DAV, filed suit under section 306 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA-LU) Technical Corrections Act (TCA), Pub. L. 110-244, Title III, section 306, 122 Stat. 1572, 1620, claiming that he was a "covered" employee eligible for overtime. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly determined that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), covered employee under the TCA was one driving a vehicle with a gross motor vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. The district court also correctly determined that plaintiff was not a covered employee, where the trucks he drove actually weighed less than 10,000 pounds, and properly granted summary judgment to DAV and denied partial summary judgment to plaintiff. View "McCall v. Disabled American Veterans, et al." on Justia Law