Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging claims under MCA 39-2-703, which governs the liability of a railway for negligent mismanagement. BNSF removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of BNSF. The district court found that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-88. Applying the Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's state claim concerning a collision was not preempted. The right of railway employees to sue on the basis of negligence or mismanagement resulting in termination may be unusual in other jurisdictions, but such a right is undoubtedly recognized in Montana. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim concerning the conduct leading to the collision was independent of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and did not require interpretation by the CBA. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was not preempted by the RLA. The court also concluded that BNSF's disciplinary proceedings were not the legal cause of plaintiff's suspension and termination. Consequently, plaintiff's punitive damages claim was reinstated. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wolfe v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Brotherhood represents Norfolk employees who work to ensure that railways remain clear, safe, and navigable. The collective bargaining agreements entitle Brotherhood members to an investigation before Norfolk takes disciplinary action. Norfolk fired four Brotherhood members for making false statements about injuries they suffered while on duty. The investigation followed the procedures typical of a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. As part of the investigation before the firing, Norfolk submitted reports from a consulting engineer, but the engineer did not testify. The Brotherhood sought an injunction to ban the use of accident reconstruction reports in employee disciplinary investigations unless Norfolk adheres to additional pre-hearing procedures. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute arose from application of the collective bargaining agreement in employee disciplinary actions. Norfolk met its burden of proving that its use of the disputed reports at investigations was justified by a contractual right, albeit an implied one. The suit is a “quintessential” minor dispute under the Act and there is “no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.” View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment giving collateral-estoppel effect, in his Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, suit, to a finding of fact made by a Public Law Board in the course of plaintiff's pursuit of his rights under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with BNSF. The court concluded that, because it was the railroad that conducted the investigation and hearing and terminated plaintiff, and because the Board only reviewed a close record, the procedures were not adequate for collateral estoppel to apply. The court rejected BNSF's election-of-remedies argument where plaintiff sought protection under the CBA for his contractual claims and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, was not itself the source of law under which plaintiff sought protection. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Reed, a trackman with NSR, experienced a bout of severe abdominal pain while working. He claimed that the company was reluctant to provide medical treatment and pressured him into signing a statement that he had not been “injured on or at work.” Reed was on medical leave for seven months. After he returned, a company claims agent urged him to state whether the incident was work‐related. Reed stated that, notwithstanding his earlier attestation, he felt that his work did play a role in his injury. NSR fired Reed for making inconsistent statements and for violating an internal rule requiring same‐day reporting of on‐site injuries. Reed and his union believed that his termination violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, Reed appealed his dismissal. While arbitration proceedings before the Board were pending, Reed filed a complaint with OSHA, alleging violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which prohibits discriminating against employees who “notify, or attempt to notify, the railroad carrier … of a work‐related personal injury,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). After an appropriate period, Reed filed in district court. The Board awarded him reinstatement without back pay. The district court denied NSR’s motion for summary judgment under the FRSA election-of-remedies provision, reasoning that the arbitration proceedings were not an “election” of remedies because arbitration was mandatory, and that a collective bargaining agreement was not “another provision of law.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Reed v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, working for Defendant since 1967, was a brakeman on a crew taking a freight train from Defendant’s Cleveland yard to Medina County, Ohio, in 2006. At a Valley City stop, Plaintiff operated a ground switch to move the alignment of the track. Plaintiff stood behind the switch and operated it for 30 minutes to an hour. Witnesses testified and pictures indicated that the ground where Plaintiff worked was muddy and was not covered with ballast. Plaintiff had to urinate while operating the switch and planned to urinate outside, rather than in the toilet compartment of the locomotive, because he found that compartment to be “dirty” and “unusable.” Once Plaintiff completed his tasks, he began to walk from the switch to a field behind the tracks. Within steps of the switch, Plaintiff slipped and twisted his knee. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn right meniscus and underwent surgery to repair the cartilage. The district court rejected jury verdicts in favor of Plaintiff on his claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient proof of causation between the jury-determined violations under FELA and LIA and Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a truck driver for Red Racks, which was operated by DAV, filed suit under section 306 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA-LU) Technical Corrections Act (TCA), Pub. L. 110-244, Title III, section 306, 122 Stat. 1572, 1620, claiming that he was a "covered" employee eligible for overtime. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly determined that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), covered employee under the TCA was one driving a vehicle with a gross motor vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. The district court also correctly determined that plaintiff was not a covered employee, where the trucks he drove actually weighed less than 10,000 pounds, and properly granted summary judgment to DAV and denied partial summary judgment to plaintiff. View "McCall v. Disabled American Veterans, et al." on Justia Law

Almy lives in Indiana. He began working for Kickert School Bus Line in 2000, at a terminal located in Illinois. He picked up children at private schools in Illinois and took them to homes in Indiana, drove charter trips for Illinois schools, and would occasionally pick up children at Illinois schools and drive them to Indiana. Almy believed that Kickert was under-paying him because, under the collective bargaining agreement, he did not receive a higher hourly rate of pay for overtime, even though he worked more than 40 hours per week; he was not paid for the 20 minutes it took him to prepare his bus each morning or for time required for fueling, cleaning, and paperwork; and was not paid during charter trips for time it took to drive the empty bus to the school and then back to the bus terminal. Kickert began providing overtime pay in 2008. Almy sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for back pay. The district court entered summary judgment for his former employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an exemption from overtime provisions for interstate drivers whose maximum hours are regulated by the Department of Transportation, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). View "Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc" on Justia Law

Illini Concrete formally ceased doing business in October 2009 and sold certain of its assets, including delivery trucks, to Kienstra. The Teamsters Local Union, which represents concrete mixer drivers and others employed by Illini and then by Kienstra, alleged that Kienstra laid off 14employees, declined to make good on Illini’s unfunded liability to its employees’ union pension fund, subcontracted work to competitors to avoid hiring back union employees,and refused to hear grievances regarding the asset sale and its effect on the employees. The Union claimed that the asset sale was a ruse to allow Illini to evade obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and sought a declaration that Kienstra is Illini’s alter ego, bound by the CBA. The district court denied motions to compel arbitration. Kienstra and Illini Concrete filed an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which states that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Norfolk employees who run trains include train service workers and engine service workers. Engineers are engine service workers who operate locomotives. Train service workers perform switching and groundwork; they include conductors and trainmen. BLET is the authorized representative under the Railway Labor Act for Norfolk’s locomotive engineers, while UTU represents conductors and trainmen. Despite this division, an employee may pay dues to UTU or BLET and have either union handle grievances, 45 U.S.C. 152. Train service employees advance to engine service positions through Norfolk’s Engineer Training program. UTU’s CBA governs the employee’s work until he completes the program. After that, the employee is covered by BLET’s CBA. UTU filed a grievance on behalf of members in Norfolk’s Virginia Division. The men challenged the engineer seniority roster, arguing they should be ranked in the order they became trainmen, not in the order they became engineers. The national agreement between BLET and Norfolk, the national agreements between UTU and Norfolk, and regional arrangements among BLET, UTU, and Norfolk were presented to the Public Law Board arbitration panel, which decided in the employees’ favor. BLET sought to vacate; the district court granted summary judgment to UTU and Norfolk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs v. United Transp. Union" on Justia Law