Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a truck driver for Red Racks, which was operated by DAV, filed suit under section 306 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA-LU) Technical Corrections Act (TCA), Pub. L. 110-244, Title III, section 306, 122 Stat. 1572, 1620, claiming that he was a "covered" employee eligible for overtime. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly determined that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), covered employee under the TCA was one driving a vehicle with a gross motor vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. The district court also correctly determined that plaintiff was not a covered employee, where the trucks he drove actually weighed less than 10,000 pounds, and properly granted summary judgment to DAV and denied partial summary judgment to plaintiff. View "McCall v. Disabled American Veterans, et al." on Justia Law

Almy lives in Indiana. He began working for Kickert School Bus Line in 2000, at a terminal located in Illinois. He picked up children at private schools in Illinois and took them to homes in Indiana, drove charter trips for Illinois schools, and would occasionally pick up children at Illinois schools and drive them to Indiana. Almy believed that Kickert was under-paying him because, under the collective bargaining agreement, he did not receive a higher hourly rate of pay for overtime, even though he worked more than 40 hours per week; he was not paid for the 20 minutes it took him to prepare his bus each morning or for time required for fueling, cleaning, and paperwork; and was not paid during charter trips for time it took to drive the empty bus to the school and then back to the bus terminal. Kickert began providing overtime pay in 2008. Almy sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for back pay. The district court entered summary judgment for his former employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an exemption from overtime provisions for interstate drivers whose maximum hours are regulated by the Department of Transportation, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). View "Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc" on Justia Law

Illini Concrete formally ceased doing business in October 2009 and sold certain of its assets, including delivery trucks, to Kienstra. The Teamsters Local Union, which represents concrete mixer drivers and others employed by Illini and then by Kienstra, alleged that Kienstra laid off 14employees, declined to make good on Illini’s unfunded liability to its employees’ union pension fund, subcontracted work to competitors to avoid hiring back union employees,and refused to hear grievances regarding the asset sale and its effect on the employees. The Union claimed that the asset sale was a ruse to allow Illini to evade obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and sought a declaration that Kienstra is Illini’s alter ego, bound by the CBA. The district court denied motions to compel arbitration. Kienstra and Illini Concrete filed an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which states that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Norfolk employees who run trains include train service workers and engine service workers. Engineers are engine service workers who operate locomotives. Train service workers perform switching and groundwork; they include conductors and trainmen. BLET is the authorized representative under the Railway Labor Act for Norfolk’s locomotive engineers, while UTU represents conductors and trainmen. Despite this division, an employee may pay dues to UTU or BLET and have either union handle grievances, 45 U.S.C. 152. Train service employees advance to engine service positions through Norfolk’s Engineer Training program. UTU’s CBA governs the employee’s work until he completes the program. After that, the employee is covered by BLET’s CBA. UTU filed a grievance on behalf of members in Norfolk’s Virginia Division. The men challenged the engineer seniority roster, arguing they should be ranked in the order they became trainmen, not in the order they became engineers. The national agreement between BLET and Norfolk, the national agreements between UTU and Norfolk, and regional arrangements among BLET, UTU, and Norfolk were presented to the Public Law Board arbitration panel, which decided in the employees’ favor. BLET sought to vacate; the district court granted summary judgment to UTU and Norfolk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs v. United Transp. Union" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent.View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law

Koch Foods appealed the final decision and order issued by the Administrative Review Board (ARB) of the Department of Labor (DOL), in which the ARB determined that Koch Foods had violated the whistleblower protection provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105(a)(1)(B)(i), by firing its employee, respondent Timothy Bailey. Bailey argued that he was fired for refusing to drive a vehicle he believed was overweight in violation of state and federal law. After reviewing the plain language of the provision and its statutory context, as well as the relevant statutory history, the court held that the phrase "refuses to operate a vehicle because ... the operation violates a regulation, standard, or order," as used in section 31105(a)(1)(B)(i), referred only to circumstances in which operation would result in an actual violation of law. Accordingly, the court vacated the ARB's decision and remanded so that the ARB could evaluate whether the operation of Bailey's assigned vehicle would have resulted in an actual violation of a regulation, standard, or order related to commercial motor vehicle safety, health, or security. View "Koch Foods, LLC v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Labor, et al" on Justia Law

Araujo, who worked for New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, witnessed a fatal accident in 2008, when a construction worker was electrocuted on the job. He reported an emotional injury and was later suspended for violation of a rule relating to the accident. He filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety & Health Administration Office of Whistleblower Protection, which issued findings in favor of Araujo, and ordered NJT to pay $569,587 in damages, to which NJT objected. Araujo then filed suit, alleging that he was disciplined in retaliation for his participation in an activity protected by the Federal Rail Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109, in reporting his injury. The district court found that the discipline was not retaliatory and granted NJT summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that NJT failed to refute Araujo’s assertion that his actions were in line with NJT practice at the time of the accident. View "Araujo v. NJ Transit Rail Operations, Inc." on Justia Law