Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The railroad fired a locomotive engineer, Narron. The union filed a grievance, which eventually came before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which ordered the railroad to reinstate Narron with back pay but authorized the railroad to offset the back pay by any earnings that he had obtained between his firing and his reinstatement. The union filed a petition in the district court challenging that part of the award. The district judge remanded for determination of whether Narron had had any such earnings and ordered the earnings-offset provision vacated. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, holding that the district court exceeded its authority. A district court may set aside a Board order only “for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of [the Railway Labor Act]” or “to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division’s jurisdiction,” or “for fraud or corruption by a member of the division,” 45 U.S.C. 153. View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainment v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a seaman, contracted lymphoma and sued his former employer, a tugboat operator, seeking maintenance and cure. The doctrine of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. Undisputed evidence established that the seaman had lymphoma during his maritime service, but the disease did not present any symptoms at all until after his service. The district court granted summary judgment for the tugboat operator. The Second Circuit reversed. Because the seaman’s illness indisputably occurred during his service, he is entitled to maintenance and cure regardless of when he began to show symptoms. View "Messier v. Bouchard Transp." on Justia Law

Emswiler sued his employer, CSX, a railroad, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen after his seniority on the roster of train engineers was adjusted. Emswiler alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement, breach of duty of fair representation, and disability discrimination under Ohio law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined it could not reach the merits of claims for breach of CBA and disability discrimination due to his failure to pursue arbitral mechanisms mandated by the Railway Labor Act, which governs disputes between management and labor in the railroad industry, 45 U.S.C. 151, 153. The RLA divides disputes into two categories: Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas minor disputes deal with the interpretation of existing CBAs. This is a minor dispute. Emswiler’s claim for breach of duty of fair representation lacked merit. View "Emswiler v. CSX Transp. Inc." on Justia Law

In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the airline extracted concessions that resulted in an approximate 40 percent wage cut for pilots in return for an $888 million claim in bankruptcy to be disbursed as stock shares. The union first suggested that a pilot's share should reflect time that the pilot worked during the 85-month concessionary period, but ultimately adopted a cutoff date for determining which pilots would receive full shares. The cutoff assumed that any pilot employed on the effective date of the Restructuring Agreement would remain employed through its termination four years later. Any pilot who left before the date would receive a share based the number of months that the pilot worked during the concessionary period. All participants in the Early Retirement Program retired after the cutoff date. Plaintiffs, retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and left before the cutoff, received shares at least $100,000 less than expected. The union rejected appeals. The district court granted summary judgment to the union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the union breached its duty of fair representation, Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 15, and discriminated based on age, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(c)(1), and Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2204(a). View "Bondurant v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an air traffic controller 1974-1981, was fired by President Reagan and subject to a ban on rehiring until 1993, when he applied for rehiring. He had moved and did not update his contact information. He was not rehired and, in 2002, brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634against the Secretary, who oversees operations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Plaintiff failed to respond to both the district court's motions deadline and the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, plaintiff filed Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming that his attorney did not receive electronic notices of case filings due to a change of his email address. The court denid the motion, citing an affirmative duty to monitor the docket and maintain a current e-mail address, as well as the prejudice the Secretary would suffer were the motion to be granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also rejecting the case on the merits. View "Yeschick v. Mineta" on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Delivery Association claimed that a state law is preempted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1569, which expressly preempts state attempts to regulate "a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," The challenged state law, part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sect. 148B(a)(2), which requires that an individual performing a service for another be classified as an employee unless "the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer." The MDA also claimed that the state statute imposes an undue burden which violates the Commerce Clause. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate because, while the Association is not itself a party to relevant state litigation, three of its members are defendants in state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General (defendant in this case) but by private parties. The First Circuit remanded for the court to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that any decision will not interfere with pending state cases. View "MA Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley" on Justia Law

This case involved the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 152, which provided that "the majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class." For 75 years, the Board had counted non-voters as voting against union representation, thereby requiring a majority of eligible voters to affirmatively vote for representation before a union could be certified. In 2010, the Board issued a new rule that elections would be decided by a majority of votes cast, and those not voting would be understood as acquiescing to the outcome of the election. Appellants challenged the new rule, claiming that it violated the statute and was arbitrary and capricious. The district court rejected these arguments and granted summary judgment to the Board. Upon review, the court agreed with the district court and affirmed the judgment. View "Air Transport Assoc. of America v. Nat'l Mediation Bd." on Justia Law

The McCaskill–Bond Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 42112, provides that "combination of multiple air carriers into a single air carrier" requires the combined business to merge seniority lists of employees. Republic acquired Midwest. Seniority lists for mechanics, baggage handlers, and administrative personnel have been integrated, but Republic furloughed flight attendants, requiring them to apply for "new" jobs; if they are rehired, the Teamsters Union, which represents flight attendants at Republic's older carriers, places them at the bottom of its seniority roster. The Union maintained its position, even after the National Mediation Board concluded that the flight attendants who worked for Midwest became part of a single bargaining unit at an integrated air transportation business. The district court held that Republic's abandonment of Midwest's federal air transportation certificate, and the return of its planes, meant that Republic had acquired some assets but not an "air carrier" and entered judgment in favor of the Teamsters. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that Midwest was completely integrated into Republic. View "Comm. of Concerned Midwest Flight Attendants v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Airline Di." on Justia Law

This negligence suit under Georgia law stemmed from an injury plaintiff suffered as he unloaded freight from a railcar in July 2005. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to defendants because there were triable issues as to whether defendants were negligent in failing to regularly inspect or maintain the bulkhead door. The court held that the district court was correct in granting defendants summary judgment where plaintiff presented no evidence from which a jury could infer that defendants' omissions, even if negligent, were a proximate cause of his injury, an essential element of his negligence claim under Georgia law. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker, et al. v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate. View "Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Transp." on Justia Law