Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

ABM petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Union's effort to represent the workers who handle airline baggage was governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and not the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a), by applying a new test to determine whether the RLA applies, without explaining its reasons for doing so. Because an agency's unexplained departure from precedent was arbitrary and capricious, the court vacated the Board's order. In this case, the court held that the Board was not free to simply adopt the NMB's new approach without offering a reasoned explanation for that shift. The court explained that an agency cannot avoid its duty to explain a departure from its own precedent simply by pointing to another agency's unexplained departure from precedent. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the order, remanding for further proceedings. View "ABM Onsite Services - West, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was seriously injured on the job, BNSF disciplined him for violations of BNSF rules that led to his injury. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for BNSF, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that his supervisors intentionally retaliated against him for filing his injury report. In this case, without more specific evidence of an improper retaliatory motive, the court found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. View "Heim v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was disciplined by his employer, BNSF, for not promptly reporting a workplace injury, he filed suit claiming that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The jury awarded plaintiff damages for emotion distress. The court concluded, however, that its decision in Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co. required plaintiff to establish intentional retaliation and that the jury instructions did not compel such a finding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blackorby v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was supervising a BNSF crew, removing and reinstalling timber crossing planks. The crew had difficulty removing one plank, and with plaintiff’s approval, used a front‐end loader, which caused the plank to fly loose as plaintiff was walking on the track and to strike his leg. Days later he went to his doctor and learned that he had fractured his tibia. After first stating that he had been injured at home, on advice of his union, plaintiff told his supervisor, Veitz, about the injury. BNSF paid his medical bills and, pursuant to its policy, staged a reenactment and concluded that plaintiff had been careless. Later, a crew member told Veitz that he thought plaintiff was injured 10 days before the incident, while removing railroad ties from railroad property. Pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement, BNSF investigated. For his carelessness in the front-loader incident (which cost it medical expenses), BNSF imposed a 30-day suspension, but discharged plaintiff for the theft. Veitz testified that he had not given plaintiff permission to take ties, which are soaked in creosote. BNSF does not give or sell creosote products to employees or the public because of potential hazards The National Railroad Adjustment Board and OSHA denied plaintiff’s appeals. A jury awarded plaintiff damages under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which forbids a railroad to discriminate against an employee for reporting a work-related injury, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no evidence that the firing was related to the injury report. The company has a firm policy of firing employees discovered to have stolen company property. View "Koziara v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) maintains a database of inspection history and safety records relating to commercial motor vehicle operators. Appellants, a group of commercial motor vehicle operators, brought suit against the FMSCA and the Department of Transportation, arguing that the potential disclosure to employers of “non-serious” driver-related safety records contained in the database violates the Privacy Act. The district court granted the FMCSA’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that 49 U.S.C. 31150 was ambiguous as to the agency’s authority to include non-serious driver-related safety violations in the database and, further, that the agency’s interpretation of section 31150 was a reasonable and permissible construction of the statute and was entitled to Chevron deference. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) section 31150 is ambiguous as to the question of non-serious driver-related safety violations; and (2) the agency’s interpretation of the statute is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. View "Flock v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Before the incident that precipitated this lawsuit, Jeff Cottles had worked as a track switchman for Norfolk Southern Railway Company for seven years. The process of "throwing" a switch involves pulling the handle up, moving it in an arc from right to left, stopping in the upright position, and then continuing to move the handle down and to the left. Cottles testified that the track 4 switch was harder to throw than the other switches in the Daikin plant. One early morning during his shift, Cottles attempted to throw the track 4 switch again. This time when he pushed the handle down the switch suddenly froze about one foot from the ground, and, according to Cottles, he felt pain in his back and neck. Within a week of the incident, Cottles's pain from his injuries had become so severe that he was unable to continue his job. He was diagnosed with bulging disks in his neck and a pinched nerve in his back. Cottles has not been able to return to work since rotator cuff surgery. It was undisputed that Daikin, not Norfolk Southern, owned the tracks and switches inside its plant. Regardless of who was notified, Daikin itself was required to address the issue and then to notify Norfolk Southern that the problem had been fixed. After Norfolk Southern received word from Daikin that maintenance had been performed, a Norfolk Southern track inspector would inspect the switch to confirm that the repairs had been completed. Cottles filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action against Norfolk Southern alleging that Norfolk Southern "failed to provide [Cottles] with a reasonably safe place to work" and that, as a result, Cottles sustained permanent damage to his neck and his back. In addition to his claims of negligence, Cottles asserted that Norfolk Southern was strictly liable under the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA") and/or "applicable FRA standards." Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, contending that Cottles' own testimony that he had thrown the track 4 switch three to six times earlier during his shift "without incident" and the fact that his own visual inspection before each throw had not revealed any defects in the switch demonstrated that Norfolk Southern had no notice that the track 4 switch was defective. At the hearing on Norfolk Southern's motion for a summary judgment, Cottles's counsel conceded that Cottles' strict liability claim under the FSAA should have been dismissed. The trial court later entered summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern on the FELA claims too. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Cottles presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Norfolk Southern negligently failed to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern, and remanded the action to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

After BNSF suspended an employee, BMWED filed a complaint against BNSF alleging that BNSF's disciplinary actions interfered with and subverted the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-188, grievance and arbitration processes, and sought a declaration that BNSF’s actions violated the RLA. BNSF subsequently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin BMWED from proceeding with a threatened strike. The district court ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that the dispute was minor and subject to mandatory arbitration, and enjoining the threatened strike. BMWED filed an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the subsequent entry of the final judgment in the case mooted the question of the procedural propriety of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the ConRail test (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives. Ass’n ) and properly concluded that the parties' dispute is a minor one. The court rejected BMWED's attempts to sidestep the ConRail framework by claiming that the distinction between minor and major disputes does not apply to the case. Rather, the court concluded that this is a dispute that fits squarely within the major/minor framework from the RLA and ConRail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. BNSF" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employed as truck drivers, filed suit against Tutle and Schlumberger, alleging that defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-211(a). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs are exempt under the federal Motor Carrier Act, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1), where the evidence establishes that the character of plaintiffs' job duties was such that they were called upon “either regularly or from time to time” to drive in interstate commerce. There was a reasonable expectation of interstate travel, the Motor Carrier Act exemption applies to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs thus are not entitled to overtime compensation. View "Alexander v. Tutle and Tutle Trucking" on Justia Law

Alphonse Maddin worked as a truck driver by Petitioner TransAm Trucking (“TransAm”). In January 2009, Maddin was transporting cargo through Illinois when the brakes on his trailer froze because of subzero temperatures. After reporting the problem to TransAm and waiting several hours for a repair truck to arrive, Maddin unhitched his truck from the trailer and drove away, leaving the trailer unattended. He was terminated for abandoning the trailer. Both an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and Respondent, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), concluded Maddin was terminated in violation of the whistleblower provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”). He was ordered reinstated with backpay. TransAm filed a Petition for Review of the ARB’s Final Decision and Order to the Tenth Circuit which concluded that there was no reversible error in the ARB's decision, and affirmed. View "Transam Trucking v. Administrative Review Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Central Transport violated the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), when it employed him as a "switcher" at its St. Louis terminal. The district court granted summary judgment to Central Transport. The FLSA exempts “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). Based on the Supreme Court’s controlling precedents, the court concluded that, if an employee spends a substantial part of his time participating in or directing the actual loading of a motor vehicle common carrier’s trailers operating in interstate or foreign commerce, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to regulate that employee’s hours of service and the MCA Exemption applies, regardless of the employee’s precise role in the loading process. Because the summary judgment record conclusively establishes that a substantial part of plaintiff's time during the relevant period was spent loading Central Transport trailers for interstate transportation, the MCA Exemption applies in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Central Transport Int'l" on Justia Law