Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a vehicular collision that occurred in a construction zone on Interstate 10 in LaPlace, Louisiana. The plaintiff, Frank Cushenberry, was driving a commercial vehicle when he collided with a truck owned by Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC. The truck was partially in the right lane of the highway while backing up to move traffic cones. The collision resulted in significant injuries to Mr. Cushenberry, including a traumatic brain injury.The case was initially heard in a lower court, where the jury found Barber Brothers 100% at fault for the accident and awarded substantial damages to Mr. Cushenberry, his wife, and their two minor children. Barber Brothers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault.The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the trial court did err in its jury instructions, but that this error was not reversible. The court also found that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault for the accident. The court determined that Barber Brothers was 80% at fault and Mr. Cushenberry was 20% at fault.The court also found that the jury abused its discretion in awarding general damages of $10,750,000.00 to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $2,500,000.00 to his spouse, Robin Cushenberry, and $1,500,000.00 to each of their minor children. The court reduced these awards to $5,000,000.00 in general damages to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $400,000.00 to Mrs. Cushenberry and $100,000.00 to each child.As amended, the trial court judgment was affirmed. View "BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, LLC VS. CAPITOL CITY PRODUCE COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a products liability action against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) for an alleged negligent design of a seat-belt system in a 2011 Honda Odyssey. The plaintiff, Sarah Milburn, was severely injured in a car accident while riding in an Uber vehicle, a 2011 Honda Odyssey. Milburn was seated in the third-row middle seat, which had a ceiling-mounted detachable Type 2 anchor system for the seat belt. Milburn fastened her seat belt incorrectly, leaving her lap unbelted. The accident resulted in Milburn becoming a quadriplegic.The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Milburn based on the jury's verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings that the presumption of nonliability applied and that the presumption was rebutted.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment. The court held that the presumption of nonliability applied as a matter of law because the 2011 Odyssey’s design complied with mandatory federal safety standards that were applicable to the Odyssey at the time of manufacture and governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm. The court further held that the presumption was not rebutted, as no evidence supports the jury’s finding that the federal safety standards failed to adequately protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury. Therefore, the court rendered a take-nothing judgment for Honda. View "AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. v. MILBURN" on Justia Law

Jacob Marion, a minor, was struck and injured by a train operated by Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company while he was walking down the railroad tracks listening to music. The train's conductor and engineer saw Marion walking with his back to the train from a distance of about three-quarters of a mile. They sounded the train's horn when they were approximately 18 seconds away from Marion, but he did not respond. The emergency brake was applied only one second before the train struck Marion. Marion's guardian brought a negligence action against the railroad company and its employees. The defendants argued that the collision was not caused by their negligence but by Marion's failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition, noting that they had attempted to alert Marion of the train's approach and that Marion was old enough to understand the dangers of trains. The plaintiff appealed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a train engineer has a duty to stop or slow down when a person in the train’s path fails to respond to a warning signal. The defendants then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that when a train operator sees a person on the tracks, there is a presumption that the person will move to a place of safety. However, when it becomes apparent that the person will not or cannot get out of the way, that presumption is overcome, and the train operator has a duty to take steps to avoid a collision. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants were negligent, and therefore, summary disposition was not warranted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Marion V Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Diamond Transportation Logistics (Diamond) and The Kroger Company (Kroger). In 2010, the two companies entered into a transportation agreement, which was renewed in 2016, for Diamond to transport Kroger's goods. The agreement included an indemnity provision, which allowed Kroger to withhold payments from Diamond for claims against Diamond under certain conditions. In December 2015, a subcontractor of Diamond was involved in a fatal accident while transporting Kroger's goods. The family of the deceased sued both Diamond and Kroger for wrongful death, alleging negligence in Kroger's selection, hiring, and retention of Diamond as a shipper. Kroger demanded Diamond to cover its legal expenses based on the indemnity provision in their agreement. However, Diamond failed to reimburse Kroger, leading Kroger to withhold nearly $1.8 million in shipping payments from Diamond.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where Kroger filed a counterclaim for breach of the transportation agreement's indemnity provision. The district court ruled in favor of Kroger, awarding it $612,429.45 plus interest. Diamond appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The main issue was whether the indemnity provision's exception for "liability...caused by the sole negligence or willful misconduct of Kroger" relieved Diamond of its obligation. The court held that the exception did not apply in this case because Kroger's liability for the family's negligent selection, hiring, and retention claim was not caused by its "sole negligence." The court reasoned that Diamond's negligence also played a part in Kroger's liability, and therefore, Diamond was required to cover Kroger's costs in settling the family's claim. View "Diamond Transp. Logistics, Inc. v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

A pilot, who was injured in an airplane crash in 1985, sought medical benefits for a 2016 spinal surgery and subsequent treatment, as well as for diabetes treatment related to his spinal treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim, concluding that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot’s spinal problems. The Board also excluded the testimony of the pilot’s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision and that the Board had not abused its discretion in its procedural rulings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot's spinal problems. The court also found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the pilot's biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The court further held that the Board did not have an obligation to secure the testimony of a particular witness, and that the pilot's failure to secure a witness's testimony did not create an obligation for the Board to do so. View "Jespersen v. Tri-City Air and Alaska Insurance Guaranty Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims. View "Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation" on Justia Law

This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired. View "SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO" on Justia Law

In this case, Glen Pace, a Mississippi resident, appealed the dismissal of his claims against multiple corporate defendants over personal injuries he suffered in a Texas airplane crash. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the claims against the out-of-state defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and held that the two Mississippi defendants were improperly joined, which allowed removal to federal court.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court agreed that Pace failed to state a claim against either in-state defendant, and thus, they were improperly joined. As for the out-of-state defendants, the court found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The court reasoned that the aircraft crash, any equipment failure, and the injuries all occurred in Texas, and Pace's subsequent medical treatment and damages in Mississippi did not constitute an actual injury felt in the state for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. The court held that Pace's injuries from the crash occurred in Texas and his subsequent medical treatment in Mississippi were "consequences stemming from the actual tort injury," which do not confer personal jurisdiction.The court also denied Pace's request for jurisdictional discovery, stating that Pace failed to present specific facts or reasonable particularity regarding jurisdictional facts. The court stressed that its decision should not be interpreted as implying a view on the merits of Pace’s claims. View "Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is faced with deciding if a passenger on a train station platform, who involuntarily falls into a non-public area (a trough housing electrical and lighting equipment) and sustains severe injuries, becomes a trespasser due to his fall. The injured party, Okiemute C. Whiteru, was intoxicated and fell into the trough after attempting to sit on the station platform ledge. The fall resulted in a fractured vertebra, which led to his eventual death by asphyxiation. Whiteru's parents and estate filed claims of negligence and wrongful death against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), arguing that WMATA failed in its duty as a common carrier to render aid to Whiteru.In a previous decision, the court held that Whiteru's contributory negligence did not preclude liability for WMATA's failure to aid. However, on remand, WMATA argued that Whiteru's status changed from passenger to trespasser when he fell into the non-public area, thus reducing WMATA's duty of care. The district court granted WMATA's motion for summary judgment, accepting the argument that Whiteru became a trespasser upon his fall.The Appeals Court, however, found uncertainty in how to determine Whiteru's status under District of Columbia law as either a passenger or a trespasser, which in turn would determine WMATA's duty of care. The court found no controlling precedent from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on this matter and thus certified the question to that court. The certified question asks if, under District of Columbia law, a passenger of a common carrier who involuntarily falls into a non-public area, sustaining immobilizing injuries, may recover for the exacerbation of the injuries due to the common carrier's failure to aid him, if the common carrier knew or had reason to know of the injuries. View "Whiteru v. WMATA" on Justia Law

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law