Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

After his bicycle collided with a radar trailer that the Town's police department had placed on the road, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town, alleging, inter alia, a breach of statutory duty pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149 and a claim of nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiff's nuisance claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n, which provides that section 13a-149 is the exclusive remedy against a municipality for injuries caused by a defect in a road or bridge. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint removing all claims except his section 13a-149 claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish a highway defect claim under section 13a-149. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment striking the nuisance claim against the Town on the basis of its determination that section 13a-149 was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the Town, when it also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Town on the basis of its determination that Plaintiff had failed to establish an essential element of a highway defect claim under section 31a-149. View "Himmelstein v. Windsor" on Justia Law

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

Linda Brown sued a common carrier and its driver (SunTran) after sustaining serious injuries from being thrown from her wheelchair when the bus she was riding braked sharply. SunTran requested the judge to instruct the jury that common carriers have a duty to passengers to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The judge rejected that instruction and instead instructed that a failure to exercise the highest degree of care under the circumstances was negligence. The jury awarded compensatory damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a common carrier has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care practicable under the circumstances or only the duty to exercise reasonable care. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the general negligence standard, reasonable care under all the circumstances, applies. Remanded for a new trial.View "Nunez v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt. of Tuscon, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury awarded more than $20 million for the death of three persons in a 2002 collision between a car and a tractor-trailer. Original defendants included the truck driver, his employer, the owner of the load being carried, the owner of the tractor (Adler), and the owner of the semi-trailer. The driver and his employer obtained a substitution of judge, but a second motion to substitute the judge was denied on the ground that it had been requested by the same entity (employer) operating under a different name. A motion for substitution brought by the Adler was denied on the ground that the determination concerning the employer was a substantial ruling. Section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives all defendants the right to one substitution of judge, provided no substantial ruling has yet been made in the case. The appellate court ordered a new trial. The parties agreed to dismiss Adler, releasing it from liability. The Supreme Court vacated the new trial order, but remanded on other issues. Once Adler, whose request to substitute had been denied, was no longer in the case, no other defendant had standing to challenge that denial. View "Powell v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

Krista Rosencrans was severely injured when a train collided with a motor vehicle in which she was a passenger. Rosencrans and her mother (collectively, Appellants) brought a negligence action against Union Pacific and the operator of the motor vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, determining, among other things, that the claims that the train crew failed to maintain a proper lookout and failed to slow or stop the train to avoid a specific hazard were excessive speed claims and thus preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in finding that Appellants' state law negligence claim based on failure to slow the train was preempted where Appellants' claim based on Union Pacific's alleged failure to exercise ordinary care once it appeared that a collision would probably occur was not necessarily speed based and thus preempted. Remanded.View "Dresser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law