Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law

In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained. View "Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department Transportation and its director (collectively, ODOT) to begin appropriation proceedings for the taking of real property owned by Relator, holding that appropriation proceedings were necessary.ODOT's roadway construction project resulted in Relator's property being inaccessible from any road. Relator filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 163. ODOT argued in response that Relator could obtain a permit from the city of Cleveland to connect the property to a road and that Relator must apply for and be denied such a permit before he was entitled to mandamus. The Supreme Court granted Relator's request for a writ of mandamus and ordered ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ compelling ODOT to commence appropriation proceedings. View "State ex rel. Balunek v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring the Town of Buchanan's transportation utility fee (TUF) to be a property tax subject to the Town's levy limit, holding that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.After the circuit court concluded that the money raised for the district fund was subject to the Town's property tax limit Appellants appealed, arguing that the TUF was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town did not follow the lawful procedures that a municipality must follow for funding public improvements because the imposition of property taxes over the Town's levy limits required the consent of the Town's voters and because nothing in the statutes permitted the Town to bypass those levy limits for the purpose of imposing a TUF on property owners in the municipality. View "Wis. Property Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan" on Justia Law

Part of Visitacion’s land in San Francisco’s Visitacion Valley was formerly owned by Southern Pacific, which was, at the time of conveyance (1990), conducting railroad-related business on part of the property. The land subject to an easement is bounded by the right-of-way for mainline railroad tracks. At some point, railroad activities on the dominant tenement ceased. In 2015, the railroad sold the dominant tenement and an adjacent parcel (JHP property) and expressly conveyed to JHP its rights under the easement, although the deed contained no warranty regarding the continued existence of such rights. Visitacion, planning a large, mixed-use residential development and hoping to use the land that was encumbered by the easement, brought a quiet title action, alleging that the easement has been extinguished under the doctrine of abandonment. JHP denied abandonment and sought to establish its “full and complete legal and equitable ownership.”The court of appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to JHP. Given the ambiguity of the easement deed and the uncertain state of the evidence bearing on its origination and use, the trial court erred in construing the deed in the context of these cross-motions for summary judgment. Visitacion’s evidence, if accepted, could establish abandonment. View "Visitacion Investment LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties LLC" on Justia Law

In this case considering whether an easement (2018 easement) taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) exceeded the scope of an easement taken in 1991 by the Department of Public Works (DPW), MassDOT's predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land in South Boston (burdened land), the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for MassDOT.DPW's 1991 order of taking created an easement over the burdened land for purposes of constructing a haul road. In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority began planning the construction of a test track on a portion of Plaintiff's land burdened by the 1991 easement. MassDOT recorded the 2018 confirmatory order of taking and then, contending that the taking merely confirmed that rights it held under the 1991 taking, refused to pay Plaintiff any compensation. Plaintiff responded with this litigation, and the superior court judge entered summary judgment in favor of MassDOT. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) while the intent of the parties should not be considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply; and (2) because the 1991 easement was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement, summary judgment for MassDOT must be reversed. View "Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK Property Development, LLC's property to State Trunk Highway (STH) 50, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting DEKK motion for summary judgment, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.DEKK filed an action under Wis. Stat. 32.05(5) challenging DOT's right to remove DEKK's rights of access to STH 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DEKK, reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the driveway, entitling it to compensation from the closure. The court of appeals reversed and held for DOT on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEKK was not permitted to recover damages for the driveway closure under section 32.05(5) because the access rights allegedly lost by DEKK were distinct from the taking described in DOT's jurisdictional offer. View "DEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") operates local commuter trains in Philadelphia and its suburbs. Amtrak and SEPTA dispute ownership of the Commuter Easement that grants access to Amtrak’s Philadelphia-area rail lines and stations. The original owner of the Easement was the now-defunct Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”).SEPTA claimed that a series of federal rail statutes gave it the option to acquire the Easement from Conrail and that it exercised that right in 1982. Amtrak claims that when SEPTA tried to acquire the Easement, Amtrak exercised a contractual right of first refusal and purchased the Easement, and therefore SEPTA has no right to access Amtrak’s lines and stations.The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding that an easement was not effectively conveyed to SEPTA, finding that SEPTA had a public right to acquire the easment and Amtrak had no authority to block Conrail from conveying it to SEPTA. View "National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The Indiana Southwestern Railway Company sought to abandon railway easements, in which the owners had reversionary interests. The Surface Transportation Board (49 U.S.C. 10903) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use and Abandonment (NITU). Negotiations with potential railbanking sponsors failed. Eventually, the NITU expired, Railway abandoned its easements without entering into a trail use agreement, and the landowners’ fee simple interests became unencumbered by any easements.The landowners sought compensation for an alleged taking arising under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), claiming that the government had permanently taken their property in April 2001, when the NITU became effective. The Claims Court found that the government had taken the property but that the taking lasted only from the date the NITU went into effect until it expired. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The landowner’s property was temporarily taken under the Trails Act. The NITU delayed the reversion of the owners’ interests. The Railway would have otherwise relinquished its rights to its right-of-way during the NITU period. The court remanded for a determination as to the compensation and interest to which the owners are entitled. View "Memmer v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the trial court that two private entities behind a high-speed rail between Houston and Dallas did not qualify as either railroad companies or interurban electric railway companies entitled to eminent-domain authority, holding that the entities had eminent-domain power as interurban electric railway companies.The owner of real property located along the proposed railway route sought a declaratory judgment that the two private entities lacked eminent-domain authority. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowner. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the entities had eminent-domain power as both railroad companies and interurban electric railway companies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the private entities had eminent-domain authority under Chapter 131 of the Texas Transportation Code. View "Miles v. Texas Central Railroad & Infrastructure, Inc." on Justia Law