Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Solondz, a commercial airline pilot, was diagnosed with anxiety and prescribed mirtazapine after experiencing side effects from another medication. Mirtazapine effectively managed his anxiety without significant side effects. Solondz sought medical clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to resume flying, but the FAA categorically disallows pilots from flying while taking mirtazapine, despite allowing conditional approvals for other antidepressants.The FAA denied Solondz's request for a Special Issuance medical certificate multiple times, citing his use of mirtazapine, anxiety, sleep apnea, optic neuritis, and a history of atrial fibrillation. Solondz provided evidence that his conditions were well-managed and that mirtazapine did not cause significant side effects. The FAA's final denial letter reiterated these reasons and added a concern about a potential malignant melanoma diagnosis, which Solondz disputed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for categorically disallowing pilots taking mirtazapine from obtaining medical certification. The court noted that the FAA's process for conditionally approving other antidepressants involves a six-month waiting period and individualized medical assessments, which could also apply to mirtazapine.The court vacated the FAA's final denial letter and remanded the case for further explanation. The court emphasized that the FAA must articulate a clear rationale for its policy and avoid offering explanations that contradict the evidence. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Solondz v. FAA" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 2020, which authorized the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in newly designed tank cars without requiring a permit. LNG is a hazardous material that poses significant risks if released, including explosions, fires, and the formation of ultra-cold gas clouds. The rule did not limit the number of LNG tank cars per train or set a mandatory speed limit, raising safety concerns among various stakeholders.The rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental nonprofits, several states, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. They argued that PHMSA did not adequately consider the safety risks and that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The petitioners contended that the decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that transporting LNG by rail poses a low-probability but high-consequence risk of derailment, which could result in catastrophic environmental impacts. The court emphasized that PHMSA failed to adequately consider the probability and potential consequences of such accidents and did not impose sufficient safety measures, such as a mandatory speed limit or a cap on the number of LNG tank cars per train.The court held that PHMSA's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and vacated the LNG Rule, remanding the case to PHMSA for further proceedings. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly assessing environmental risks and adhering to NEPA's requirements in rulemaking processes. View "Sierra Club v. DOT" on Justia Law

ABM petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Union's effort to represent the workers who handle airline baggage was governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and not the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a), by applying a new test to determine whether the RLA applies, without explaining its reasons for doing so. Because an agency's unexplained departure from precedent was arbitrary and capricious, the court vacated the Board's order. In this case, the court held that the Board was not free to simply adopt the NMB's new approach without offering a reasoned explanation for that shift. The court explained that an agency cannot avoid its duty to explain a departure from its own precedent simply by pointing to another agency's unexplained departure from precedent. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the order, remanding for further proceedings. View "ABM Onsite Services - West, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Scenic filed suit challenging a guidance memorandum issued by the FHWA in 2007, which interpreted the prohibition on “flashing, intermittent or moving” lights to permit state approval of those digital billboards that met certain timing and brightness requirements. The Highway Beautification Act (HBA), 23 U.S.C. 131, requires the FHWA and each state to develop and implement individual federal-state agreements (FSAs), detailing, among other things, “size, lighting and spacing” standards for the billboards now found towering over many of our country’s interstate highways. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Scenic's notice-and-comment claim because Scenic failed to demonstrate that it has standing to bring that challenge. The court concluded that Scenic has standing to bring a claim under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that the Guidance constitutes final agency action. On the merits, the court concluded that, because the FHWA’s interpretation of the FSA lighting provision was reasonable, the interpretation cannot be “contrary to customary use.” Accordingly, Scenic's claim under section 706 fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for dismissal of Scenic's notice-and-comment claim. View "Scenic America, Inc. v. US DOT" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the Board's denial of his request to reopen the Board's 1999 benefits determination. The court concluded that the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. 231g, grants the court jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying requests to reopen initial benefits determinations. The court concluded, however, that the Board’s decision to deny petitioner's request to reopen was reasonable where it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that there were no errors in the allocation of petitioner's earnings that, if corrected, would have given him insured status at the time of the decision. Further, petitioner provided little to no explanation of how his initial decision contained a clerical error or an error that appears on the face of the evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Stovic v. RRRB" on Justia Law

Silverado Stages, a California charter bus service, petitioned for review of the FMCSA's determination denying Silverado's petition for administrative review after the FMCSA publicly reported that Silverado violated a number of federal and state safety regulations. The court concluded that Silverado's contention that the FMCSA's dismissal of Silverado's petition was arbitrary and capricious lacks merit because the FMCSA was not required to provide Silverado with any more process than it received. The court also concluded that Silverado's contention that the violations issued against it are invalid because they were not promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures and because they constitute impermissible sanctions are foreclosed by the court's decision in Weaver v. FMCSA. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Silverado Stages, Inc. v. FMCSA" on Justia Law