Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring the Town of Buchanan's transportation utility fee (TUF) to be a property tax subject to the Town's levy limit, holding that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.After the circuit court concluded that the money raised for the district fund was subject to the Town's property tax limit Appellants appealed, arguing that the TUF was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town did not follow the lawful procedures that a municipality must follow for funding public improvements because the imposition of property taxes over the Town's levy limits required the consent of the Town's voters and because nothing in the statutes permitted the Town to bypass those levy limits for the purpose of imposing a TUF on property owners in the municipality. View "Wis. Property Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan" on Justia Law

Part of Visitacion’s land in San Francisco’s Visitacion Valley was formerly owned by Southern Pacific, which was, at the time of conveyance (1990), conducting railroad-related business on part of the property. The land subject to an easement is bounded by the right-of-way for mainline railroad tracks. At some point, railroad activities on the dominant tenement ceased. In 2015, the railroad sold the dominant tenement and an adjacent parcel (JHP property) and expressly conveyed to JHP its rights under the easement, although the deed contained no warranty regarding the continued existence of such rights. Visitacion, planning a large, mixed-use residential development and hoping to use the land that was encumbered by the easement, brought a quiet title action, alleging that the easement has been extinguished under the doctrine of abandonment. JHP denied abandonment and sought to establish its “full and complete legal and equitable ownership.”The court of appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to JHP. Given the ambiguity of the easement deed and the uncertain state of the evidence bearing on its origination and use, the trial court erred in construing the deed in the context of these cross-motions for summary judgment. Visitacion’s evidence, if accepted, could establish abandonment. View "Visitacion Investment LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss a complaint citing him with violating 49 C.F.R. 393.11, incorporated by Mont. Code Ann. 61-10-154, which required a red light to be affixed to protruding loads, holding that the district court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority.After Appellant was convicted in justice court he appealed de novo to the district court, arguing that section 61-10-154, which authorizes the Montana Department of Transportation to adopt rules and regulations, and Mont. Code Ann. 61-9-512, which criminalizes violations of regulations adopted pursuant to section 61-10-154, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature did not delegate the lawmaking function, as argued by Appellant. View "State v. Akhmedli" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Defendant had not been lawfully arrested without a warrant and thus reversing the decisions of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to revoke Defendant's driver's license, holding that the circuit court did not err.A law enforcement officer arrested Defendant in his home without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed elsewhere. Rhe officer articulated no urgent need to arrest Defendant and admitted that he could have obtained a warrant from an impartial magistrate. The DMV applied evidence suggesting that Defendant might have driven while intoxicated from the scene of the misdemeanor to his home in three separate decisions revoking Defendant's driver's license. The circuit court reversed the revocation decisions, concluding that they were clearly wrong in light of the now-repealed W. Va. Code 17C-5A-2(f)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the DMV's suspension orders were founded upon an unlawful arrest. View "Frazier v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the administrative revocation of Petitioner's driver's license for driving under the influence of controlled substances or drugs, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support Defendant's license revocation.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the record did not support the OAH's finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner had consumed alcohol, drugs, and/or controlled substances because the Department of Motor Vehicles offered no evidence that Defendant used or ingested controlled substances or drugs. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for entry of an order rescinding Defendant's revocation and reinstating his driver's license. View "Casto v. Frazier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming an order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reinstating Respondent's personal driver's license and commercial driver's license after Defendant challenged the finding of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that Respondent drove under the influence of alcohol, holding that there was no error.In 2017, the DMV revoked Respondent's personal driver's license and disqualified him from holding a commercial driver's license. Following an administrative hearing in 2019, the OAH rescinded the DMV's revocation and disqualification orders. The OAH reinstated both of Respondent's licenses, finding that the DMV had not proven that Respondent drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DMV did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent drove a motor vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol. View "Frazier v. Gaither" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that warrantless inspections authorized by New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) requiring the installation of electronic logging devices (ELD) in commercial motor vehicles fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.The FMCSA promgulated the rules at issue in 2015, and the rules were permanently incorporated into New York law in 2019. Petitioner commenced this combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging New York's adoption of the rule. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the searches authorized by the rule were valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the lower courts properly determined that the ELD rule is constitutional; but (2) Supreme Court should have declared the rights of the parties rather than dismissing the complaint. View "Owner Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit challenging the City of Windsor Heights's attempts to collect automated traffic citation fines not reduced to a judgment in a municipal infraction proceeding, holding that the district court erred in part.At issue was an income offset program authorized pursuant to Iowa Code 8A.504 allowing the department of administrative services to "establish a debt collection setoff procedure for collection of debts owed to the public agency." Plaintiffs brought this action against the City and the City's collection agent challenging the program to enforce civil penalties issued pursuant to the automated traffic enforcement system. The district court dismissed all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court erred in dismissing some claims against the City as time-barred. View "Stogdill v. City of Windsor Heights" on Justia Law

In this case considering whether an easement (2018 easement) taken by eminent domain by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) exceeded the scope of an easement taken in 1991 by the Department of Public Works (DPW), MassDOT's predecessor in interest, with respect to Plaintiff's land in South Boston (burdened land), the Supreme Judicial Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for MassDOT.DPW's 1991 order of taking created an easement over the burdened land for purposes of constructing a haul road. In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority began planning the construction of a test track on a portion of Plaintiff's land burdened by the 1991 easement. MassDOT recorded the 2018 confirmatory order of taking and then, contending that the taking merely confirmed that rights it held under the 1991 taking, refused to pay Plaintiff any compensation. Plaintiff responded with this litigation, and the superior court judge entered summary judgment in favor of MassDOT. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) while the intent of the parties should not be considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply; and (2) because the 1991 easement was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement, summary judgment for MassDOT must be reversed. View "Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law