Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law

Two former residents of Libby, Montana developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos. The exposure was linked to asbestos-containing vermiculite transported by BNSF Railway Company from a nearby mine. Between 1922 and 1990, BNSF was required by federal law to ship this vermiculite to and from its Libby railyard. Evidence showed that asbestos dust escaped from sealed railcars during transit and switching operations, eventually accumulating in and around the railyard. Both plaintiffs resided or spent considerable time near the railyard during the relevant period.This litigation began when the personal representatives of the decedents’ estates brought negligence and strict liability claims against BNSF in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. BNSF moved for summary judgment on the strict liability claims, arguing that it was protected by the common carrier exception, but the district court denied the motion. After a jury trial, the jury found for BNSF on negligence but for the plaintiffs on strict liability, awarding compensatory damages. The district court subsequently denied BNSF’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the strict liability claims, prompting BNSF’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of Montana law de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the common carrier exception too narrowly. The appellate court concluded that BNSF’s transportation of asbestos-containing vermiculite, including the resulting accumulation of asbestos dust, was conducted pursuant to its federally mandated duty as a common carrier. Montana law, including recent precedent from the Montana Supreme Court, supported applying the common carrier exception to shield BNSF from strict liability in these circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for BNSF. View "Wells v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

A plaintiff was injured in a collision at an intersection controlled by a malfunctioning traffic signal. Both drivers claimed to have stopped at the flashing red light and to have the right of way. The defendant was driving a truck for his employer, who was also named in the suit under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The plaintiff alleged negligence by the truck driver in failing to maintain control, keep a proper lookout, and yield, and sought damages for injuries and loss of consortium. The employer denied negligence and asserted contributory negligence by the plaintiff.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, granted the employer’s motion to exclude two of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses, finding their testimony would not aid the jury. The court also denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint shortly before trial, which sought to add direct negligence claims against the employer and violations of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). Additionally, the court refused a jury instruction on those regulations. At trial, the jury found the defendant negligent but determined the plaintiff was contributorily negligent to a degree greater than slight, awarding no damages.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend as to direct negligence claims against the employer due to untimeliness and prejudice, but erred in denying amendment as to the truck driver’s alleged FMCSR violations, since those allegations provided statutory grounds for existing negligence claims and were not prejudicial or futile. The Supreme Court also held that excluding the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, as it would have assisted the jury, and that refusal to instruct the jury on FMCSRs was erroneous. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Hamer V. Duffy" on Justia Law

A passenger was seriously injured after the driver of a remotely rented vehicle, accessed via a membership-based car-sharing service, crashed while under the influence of alcohol. The driver, a university student and approved member of the rental service, reserved the vehicle through a mobile app late at night after consuming alcohol at a party. The process for renting and accessing the car involved no face-to-face interaction with company staff, and the company had no prior knowledge of the driver’s intoxication or any history of impaired driving. Following the crash, the driver was convicted of felony DUI causing injury.The injured passenger sued the car-sharing company and its affiliated vehicle owner in the Superior Court of Yolo County, alleging negligent entrustment for providing the car to an unfit driver, negligent maintenance for failing to include technology to detect driver impairment, and vicarious liability based on vehicle ownership. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled for the defendants, holding that the company owed no duty to inquire about a renter’s impairment at the time of a remote rental, had no duty to install alcohol-detection devices, and was shielded from vicarious liability by federal law (the Graves Amendment).On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that remote rental car companies are exempt from statutory requirements to inspect for signs of impairment at the time of rental, per Civil Code section 1939.37, and that courts should not impose additional investigatory duties absent legislative action. The court also held that the Graves Amendment preempts state law claims of vicarious liability based solely on vehicle ownership. Judgment for the defendants was therefore affirmed. View "Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds.After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law

On a rainy night in March 2020, the plaintiff was catastrophically injured while sleeping in a truck driven by his co-worker, both of whom were transporting plasticware from New Jersey to California. The truck, owned and operated by Alliance, a federally licensed motor carrier, crashed on a highway near Oklahoma City. The transportation had been arranged by XPO Logistics, LLC, a federally licensed property broker, which was hired by Sabert Corporation to facilitate shipping but did not own trucks or employ drivers. XPO contracted with Alliance to perform the transport, and Alliance assigned the plaintiff and his co-worker to drive the shipment.After the accident, the plaintiff sued XPO in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging negligence based on claims that XPO exercised control over the transport and owed a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe workplace. XPO moved for summary judgment, arguing it was solely a broker and not responsible for the carrier’s employee safety. The trial court granted summary judgment for XPO, finding the evidence undisputed that XPO acted as a broker, not a carrier, and did not control Alliance’s transport operations. The trial court also excluded plaintiff’s expert declaration, which had applied the wrong legal standard.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the judgment. The court held that under California law, a broker who hires an independent contractor carrier generally owes no duty of care to the carrier’s employees for workplace injuries, unless the broker has a nondelegable duty or retains and exercises control over the work. The court found no triable issues of fact supporting either exception, and further clarified that the federal Essex Insurance Company v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc. test for broker liability for cargo damage is irrelevant to personal injury claims under California law. The judgment for XPO was affirmed. View "Hu v. XPO Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway, a California railroad corporation, sought to acquire a 20-acre parcel in Willits, California owned by John Meyer through eminent domain. The property is adjacent to Mendocino Railway’s tracks and was intended for the construction and maintenance of rail facilities supporting ongoing and future freight and passenger operations. The company argued that, as a common carrier public utility under relevant statutes, it had the authority to exercise eminent domain for public use. The evidence at trial included testimony about the history of rail service on the line, Mendocino Railway’s acquisition and operations, including passenger excursions and more limited commuter and freight services, and the necessity of the property for expanding its rail facilities.The Mendocino County Superior Court conducted a bench trial and found that Mendocino Railway failed to qualify as a public utility entitled to exercise eminent domain. The court reasoned that the railway’s primary activity was excursion service, which does not confer public utility status, and was unconvinced by the evidence of passenger and freight services. The court further concluded that, even if Mendocino Railway had public utility status, it did not meet the statutory requirements for eminent domain, finding the primary purpose of the proposed taking to be for private business activities rather than public use. The court also found insufficient evidence regarding the project’s impacts on neighboring residents and questioned the credibility and timing of Mendocino Railway’s site plans.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Mendocino Railway met its burden of proving it was a common carrier public utility under California law, and that it satisfied the statutory requirements for eminent domain: public interest and necessity, proper planning for public good and least private injury, and necessity of the property for the project. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding compensation to Meyer. View "Mendocino Railway v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a tragic incident on January 14, 2022, when Marquise Webb and Richie Aaron, Jr. boarded an Amtrak train in Illinois. Although unrelated, both transferred to Amtrak’s River Runner train in Missouri, where Webb fatally shot Aaron without apparent motive during a scheduled stop. Amtrak prohibits firearms onboard, but does not routinely conduct passenger security screenings. After the shooting, Amtrak crew initially dismissed reports of gunfire as fireworks, and medical aid was rendered to Aaron at the next station, but he was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.Following these events, Breayonna Aaron, representing herself, her deceased husband, and their children, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against Amtrak for negligence, negligent hiring/training/supervision, and wrongful death, seeking substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Amtrak moved for judgment as a matter of law, but the court submitted the case to a jury, which found Amtrak liable and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. After trial, Amtrak renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, sought a new trial or reduction in punitive damages. The district court denied Amtrak’s motions, but reduced the punitive damages award as constitutionally excessive.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Amtrak’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. It held that the plaintiffs failed to provide legally sufficient evidence of a duty or causation under any negligence theory presented, as Missouri law requires foreseeability of criminal acts for a duty to exist, and but-for causation for wrongful death. The appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of Amtrak’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and directed the entry of judgment for Amtrak, finding no basis for liability on the claims asserted. View "Aaron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law

Parker Noland operated a construction debris removal business in Flathead County, Montana, but was ordered by the Montana Public Service Commission to cease operations due to lacking a required Class D motor carrier certificate. Noland formed PBN LLC and applied for the certificate, but withdrew his application after finding the administrative process—including requests for sensitive financial information by competitors—too burdensome. He then limited his business to activities not requiring the certificate. Subsequently, Noland filed suit in the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County, seeking a declaratory judgment that two provisions of the Montana Motor Carrier law, known as the public convenience and necessity (PCN) provisions, were unconstitutional under both the Montana and United States Constitutions.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Montana and Evergreen Disposal, Inc., which had intervened. The court held that Noland lacked standing to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge, reasoning he sought to vindicate only a future injury and had not shown how the statutes would be unconstitutionally applied to him. However, the court found Noland had standing to bring a facial challenge, but ruled against him, concluding the provisions were not facially unconstitutional because some applicants had previously received Class D certificates.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s rulings de novo. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision that Noland lacked standing for an as-applied challenge, holding that he failed to demonstrate a concrete injury or how the statutes were applied to him. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of Noland’s facial challenge, holding that he had standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality on its face, since the procedural requirements themselves could constitute injury regardless of outcome. The case was remanded for further consideration of the facial constitutional challenges. View "Noland v. State" on Justia Law

Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate. View "Panting v. United States" on Justia Law