Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed separate actions against various Minnesota cities, counties, and law enforcement entities alleging violations of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2724(a). In separate orders, the district court denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss, including claims by many defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The City of Minneapolis appeals the denial of qualified immunity in the Karasov action, and numerous Minnesota counties appeal the denial of qualified immunity in the Kampschroers action. After the parties briefed these appeals, the court issued its decision in McDonough v. Anoka County, which squarely addressed the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded that McDonough is controlling precedent. The court also concluded that its decision that the statutory term “obtain” is unambiguous controls defendants' additional argument that the rule of lenity entitles them to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kampschroer v. Ramsey County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Minnesota driver's license holders, filed suit against local entities, Law Enforcement Does, Commissioners, and DPS Does, alleging that defendants violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, by accessing or disclosing personal information from the DPS database without a permissible purpose. The district courts dismissed the actions for failure to state a claim. The present appeals raise issues similar to those presented in the court's opinion in McDonough v. Anoka County and are governed by the court's holding in that case. McDonough discussed the history, purpose, and applicability of the DPPA. The court addressed the individual complaints in this group of cases and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ray v. Anoka County" on Justia Law

Before the incident that precipitated this lawsuit, Jeff Cottles had worked as a track switchman for Norfolk Southern Railway Company for seven years. The process of "throwing" a switch involves pulling the handle up, moving it in an arc from right to left, stopping in the upright position, and then continuing to move the handle down and to the left. Cottles testified that the track 4 switch was harder to throw than the other switches in the Daikin plant. One early morning during his shift, Cottles attempted to throw the track 4 switch again. This time when he pushed the handle down the switch suddenly froze about one foot from the ground, and, according to Cottles, he felt pain in his back and neck. Within a week of the incident, Cottles's pain from his injuries had become so severe that he was unable to continue his job. He was diagnosed with bulging disks in his neck and a pinched nerve in his back. Cottles has not been able to return to work since rotator cuff surgery. It was undisputed that Daikin, not Norfolk Southern, owned the tracks and switches inside its plant. Regardless of who was notified, Daikin itself was required to address the issue and then to notify Norfolk Southern that the problem had been fixed. After Norfolk Southern received word from Daikin that maintenance had been performed, a Norfolk Southern track inspector would inspect the switch to confirm that the repairs had been completed. Cottles filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action against Norfolk Southern alleging that Norfolk Southern "failed to provide [Cottles] with a reasonably safe place to work" and that, as a result, Cottles sustained permanent damage to his neck and his back. In addition to his claims of negligence, Cottles asserted that Norfolk Southern was strictly liable under the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA") and/or "applicable FRA standards." Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, contending that Cottles' own testimony that he had thrown the track 4 switch three to six times earlier during his shift "without incident" and the fact that his own visual inspection before each throw had not revealed any defects in the switch demonstrated that Norfolk Southern had no notice that the track 4 switch was defective. At the hearing on Norfolk Southern's motion for a summary judgment, Cottles's counsel conceded that Cottles' strict liability claim under the FSAA should have been dismissed. The trial court later entered summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern on the FELA claims too. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Cottles presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Norfolk Southern negligently failed to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern, and remanded the action to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

After BNSF suspended an employee, BMWED filed a complaint against BNSF alleging that BNSF's disciplinary actions interfered with and subverted the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-188, grievance and arbitration processes, and sought a declaration that BNSF’s actions violated the RLA. BNSF subsequently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin BMWED from proceeding with a threatened strike. The district court ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that the dispute was minor and subject to mandatory arbitration, and enjoining the threatened strike. BMWED filed an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the subsequent entry of the final judgment in the case mooted the question of the procedural propriety of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the ConRail test (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives. Ass’n ) and properly concluded that the parties' dispute is a minor one. The court rejected BMWED's attempts to sidestep the ConRail framework by claiming that the distinction between minor and major disputes does not apply to the case. Rather, the court concluded that this is a dispute that fits squarely within the major/minor framework from the RLA and ConRail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. BNSF" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employed as truck drivers, filed suit against Tutle and Schlumberger, alleging that defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-211(a). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs are exempt under the federal Motor Carrier Act, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1), where the evidence establishes that the character of plaintiffs' job duties was such that they were called upon “either regularly or from time to time” to drive in interstate commerce. There was a reasonable expectation of interstate travel, the Motor Carrier Act exemption applies to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs thus are not entitled to overtime compensation. View "Alexander v. Tutle and Tutle Trucking" on Justia Law

Lenard E. Noice worked as a conductor for Petitioner BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). He fell from a BNSF train that was moving at speed and perished. Respondent, Lenard Noice II, acting as personal representative for Noice (the Estate), filed a wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA), asserting, among other claims, that BNSF negligently permitted the train from which Noice fell to operate at an excessive speed. The undisputed facts established that the train from which Noice fell never exceeded the speed limit for the class of track upon which it was operating. BNSF moved for summary judgment arguing that the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The district court accepted this argument and dismissed the Estate’s FELA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that FRSA did not preclude a FELA excessive-speed claim. Because FRSA contained no provision expressly precluding the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim and because permitting the Estate’s FELA claim to proceed furthered the purposes of both statutes, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, Linda Phillips, an employee of Hoker Trucking, driving a semi‐truck in Indiana, struck a vehicle driven by Robbins, who died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident. The truck driven by Phillips was pulling a trailer Hoker borrowed from Lakeville. Lakeville had a Great West Casualty insurance policy covering the trailer. There was a separate suit concerning the liability of Phillips and Hoker. To preempt a possible claim against Lakeville’s policy, Great West sought a declaratory judgment against Hoker, Phillips, and Robbins’s estate, that it did not have to indemnify Hoker and Phillips for any liability in connection with the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Great West. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Great West’s policy was ambiguous as to whether Hoker and Phillips were excluded from coverage and should be construed against Great West; that even if the exclusions are not ambiguous, they do not exclude Hoker and Phillips from coverage; and regardless of whether the exclusions apply to Hoker and Phillips or not, such exclusions are invalid under Wisconsin law, the state where the trailer is registered. The court found the policy unambiguous. View "Great West Cas. Co. v. Robbins" on Justia Law

The City and Xerox appealed the trial court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of mandate. At issue is whether the City, as the “issuing agency” for notice of parking violations in the City, Veh. Code, 40202, must conduct the “initial review” of challenged citations, section 40215, subd. (a), or whether it may delegate that duty to Xerox, its "processing agency," section 40200.6, subd. (a), with which it contracts "for the processing of notices of parking violations," section 40200.5, subd. (a). The court held that, based on the language of section 40215, subdivision (a) and relevant legislative history, the City is required to conduct the initial review, and cannot contract with Xerox to perform that duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandate, as well as the trial court's award of approximately $722,000 in attorney fees pursuant to the California private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Weiss v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Alphonse Maddin worked as a truck driver by Petitioner TransAm Trucking (“TransAm”). In January 2009, Maddin was transporting cargo through Illinois when the brakes on his trailer froze because of subzero temperatures. After reporting the problem to TransAm and waiting several hours for a repair truck to arrive, Maddin unhitched his truck from the trailer and drove away, leaving the trailer unattended. He was terminated for abandoning the trailer. Both an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and Respondent, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), concluded Maddin was terminated in violation of the whistleblower provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”). He was ordered reinstated with backpay. TransAm filed a Petition for Review of the ARB’s Final Decision and Order to the Tenth Circuit which concluded that there was no reversible error in the ARB's decision, and affirmed. View "Transam Trucking v. Administrative Review Bd." on Justia Law

Nicholas Giannoni was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk along a state highway. The highway ended at a private driveway and lawn and led directly to a stream culvert. When the sidewalk ended, Nicholas inadvertently rode his bicycle across the driveway, over a patch of grass, and into the culvert, injuring himself. Plaintiffs brought this highway defect action on behalf of Nicholas under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31a-144 against the Commissioner of Transportation. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs alleged a cognizable highway defect claim under section 31a-144. View "Giannoni v. Comm’r of Transp." on Justia Law