Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Morgantown passed an ordinance seeking to regulate the weight and size of certain vehicles using a portion of West Virginia State Route 7 that passes through Morgantown. Plaintiffs filed a complaint arguing that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a municipality is not statutorily authorized to prohibit the operation of trucks or to impose limitations on the size or weight thereof on a connecting part of the state road system, and therefore, Morgantown was not authorized to regulate the size or weight of trucks traveling on the portion of W. Va. Route 7 that lies within the city. View "City of Morgantown v. Nuzum Trucking Co." on Justia Law

Darling’s Auto Mall is a franchisee of General Motors LLC (GM) and and authorized dealer. Darling’s filed two small claims actions in district court alleging that it had been underpaid by GM for certain warranty repairs in violation of the Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers Act (Dealers Act). The district court ruled in favor of Darling’s on both small claims. GM appealed and requested a jury trial de novo. The superior court granted GM’s request. After a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment in favor of GM. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court’s decision to grant a jury trial de novo was not an appealable determination; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Darling’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court properly rejected Darling’s proposed jury instructions. View "Darling's Auto Mall v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

BN applied for an exemption permitting expeditious abandonment of a railroad line. The STB granted but then revoked an exemption prior to completion of the abandonment and instead authorized BN to enter into an “interim trail use/rail banking agreement” in accordance with the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), as implemented by the STB in 49 C.F.R. 1152.29. In 2014, plaintiffs, ranchers who own properties underlying and surrounding the railway right-of-way easement, filed two separate actions against the State and the Department, seeking a declaration quieting title to the right-of-way because the easement terminated by operation of law when BN ceased railroad operations. The district court consolidated the two cases and concluded that plaintiffs' claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB, and granted Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are not within the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction, but that the Amended Complaints - alleging that defendants “stand in the shoes” of the BN, and therefore defendants cannot impose non-railroad restrictions on plaintiffs’ rights as servient landowners,- failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court modified part of the district court judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Trevarton v. South Dakota" on Justia Law

Nissan North America, Inc., a motor vehicle manufacturer, and Stephen McDaniels, a prospective Nissan dealer (collectively, Defendants), sought to relocate a Nissan dealership to a location 7.6 miles from a dealership operated by Wayzata Nissan, LLC. Wayzata filed an action against Defendants and then moved for a temporary restraining order, challenging the relocation under the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act, Minn. Stat. 80E.01-.17. The district court denied the motion, determining that the exception in section 80E.14(1) for the “relocation of an existing dealer” applied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on the merits, holding (1) even though the relocation at issue has already occurred this appeal is not moot; (2) the notice and good-cause requirements of section 80E.14(1) apply on the date that a manufacturer develops the intention to authorize a relocation, not on the date of the physical relocation of a dealership; and (3) the existing-dealer exception does not apply when the relocation of a dealership is accompanied by a change in the person or entity operating the dealership, and therefore, the existing-dealer exception does not apply in this case. View "Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

An individual and a company filed a putative class action suit alleging that United Parcel Service (UPS) overcharges customers for liability coverage against loss or damage for packages with a declared value of $300 or more. The complaint alleged breach of contract; sought declaratory relief (28 U.S.C. 2201); claimed violation of 49 U.S.C. 13708(b) (regulating billing and collecting practices for motor carriers); and, in the alternative, alleged unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, agreeing with UPS that the language of the shipping contract at issue unambiguously precluded the plaintiffs’ interpretation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to 49 U.S.C. 13708(b), but reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims. Reasonable minds could differ on the correct interpretation of UPS’s Service Guide provision; the provision is at least ambiguous, so its meaning is a question of fact that is not properly answered by the court at this early stage in the proceedings. An unjust enrichment claim—that a benefit was unjustly conferred on UPS when customers paid an extra charge on packages despite UPS’s representations that it provided a portion of this service for free—is not precluded by his breach of contract claim. View "Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co." on Justia Law

Study of the I-69 extension between Evansville and Indianapolis began in 1944. The 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Act designated a new route from Indianapolis to Memphis,, via Evansville as a “high priority corridor” for development. As the project progressed, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) divided the project into two “tiers” for environmental analysis. After the plans were finalized, construction work on the six sections of Tier 2 began; 90 percent of the work on the extension is complete. The FHWA and Indiana Department of Transportation issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Tier 2, Section 4, in 2010. A Final Environmental Impact Statement and a Record of Decision issued in 2011. The agencies selected the final route and construction plan for Section 4 after reviewing 48 options and produced a record reflecting consideration of impact on historic sites, geological formations, and air-quality, among other factors. Pursuant to its obligations under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service engaged in consultation and issued a Biological Opinion regarding the possible impact of tree-clearing on the endangered Indiana bat. Opponents filed suit. After a lengthy period of inactivity by Plaintiffs, including several missed case management deadlines, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the approvals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professional artist, brought suit against the United Parcel Service (UPS) and other defendants, alleging that two of her paintings were unscrupulously removed from their packaging during the interstate shipment process and sold to a third party without her consent or knowledge. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims against UPS, concluding that they were preempted by the federal Carmack Amendment. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that Plaintiff’s state law causes of action were not preempted because neither the Carmack Amendment nor public policy supports UPS’s attempt to evade liability arising from its intentional misconduct. View "Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Under the Urbanized Area Formula Program, 49 U.S.C. 5307, the Federal Transportation Administration (FTA) administers grant funding to urban transit programs for “operating costs of equipment and facilities for use in public transportation.” Recipients must submit “financial, operating, and asset condition information” to the National Transit Database. The agency apportions grants based, in part, on the number of Vehicle Revenue Miles (VRM) that accrue while a vehicle is “in revenue service,” available to the general public. In 2005, the Illinois House of Representatives called for a performance audit of the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). The audit concluded that the CTA, from possibly as early as 1986, had been overstating its VRM and had received higher than justified UAFP disbursements. Notified of the report, the FTA required that CTA revise its data from 2011 forward. In 2012, a nonprofit watchdog organization contacted the Department of Justice requesting an investigation into the CTA’s reporting practices. The group then filed suit under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the allegations of wrongdoing had been publicly disclosed at the time the action was filed. View "Cause of Action v. CTA" on Justia Law

In 2012, O.K. Farms, Inc. hired J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc. to deliver chickens to Roger Gentry, a poultry grower with a farm near Wister, Oklahoma. Hunt, in turn, hired truck driver Troy Ford to deliver the chickens. In 2012, friends and relatives of Gentry were present to help him receive the delivery, among them, Jimmy Hill. As Ford drove into the chicken house on a Moffett (a vehicle similar to a forklift), he hit Jimmy’s leg and injured his ankle. Jimmy’s ankle became infected, and he died. Michael Hill, Jimmy’s son and the special administrator of his estate, brought a wrongful death action in Oklahoma state court against Hunt, alleging it was vicariously liable for Ford’s negligent driving. Hunt then filed a notice of removal based on diversity of citizenship, and the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Hill subsequently amended his complaint, adding O.K. Farms as a defendant. A few days before trial, Hunt’s counsel discovered Ford was unwilling to appear at trial, despite having been subpoenaed. On the second day of trial, Hunt moved the court to compel Ford to appear, or alternatively, to admit his video deposition testimony. The district court denied Hunt’s motion. The jury returned a $3.332 million verdict against Hunt. Hunt moved for a new trial or, alternatively, remittitur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and (e), arguing: (1) the court’s decision not to compel Ford’s appearance and its exclusion of his deposition testimony prejudiced Hunt; and (2) the jury award was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. The district court denied Hunt’s motion. Hunt appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Hill v. J.B. Hunt Transport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals who contracted with FedEx to provide pick-up and delivery services, filed a complaint claiming that FedEx should have treated and paid them as employees rather than as independent contractors because FedEx could not satisfy all three requirements under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute (Massachusetts Statute). Plaintiffs sought damages for loss of wages, improper wage deductions, and loss of benefits. The district court ultimately granted FedEx summary judgment on all counts, concluding (1) application of one of the requirements of the Massachusetts Statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), and this preempted requirement is not severable from the two remaining requirements; and (2) the remaining two requirements are preempted. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the express preemption provision of the FAAAA preempts the application of one of the Massachusetts Statute’s requirements to FedEx, but the preempted requirement is severable from the two remaining requirements; and (2) the district court erred by concluding, sua sponte, that application of the remaining two requirements was also preempted by the FAAAA. View "Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law