Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prohibits states from imposing taxes that “discriminat[e] against a rail carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4)A, including: Assessing rail transportation property at a value with a higher ratio to the true market value of the property than the ratio applied to other commercial and industrial property; levying or collecting an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same jurisdiction; or imposing “another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation.” Railroads sued, claiming that Tennessee sales and use tax assessments were discriminatory. The district court agreed, holding that imposition of those taxes on railroad purchases and use of diesel fuel was discriminatory. In response, in 2014, Tennessee enacted a Transportation Fuel Equity Act that repeals the sales and use tax on railroad diesel fuel, but subjects railroads to the same per-gallon tax imposed on motor carriers under the Highway User Fuel Tax. Previously railroads, like other carriers using diesel fuel for off-highway purposes, were exempt from a “diesel tax.” The Railroads contend the Act is discriminatory because it now subjects only railroads to taxation of diesel fuel used off-highway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the Railroads’ motion for a preliminary injunction on its targeted or singling-out approach and the functional approach, but remanded for consideration of the Railroads’ argument under the competitive approach. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were three shipping operators who pay a fee to Puerto Rico to conduct business out of the Port of San Juan. The Commonwealth supplied each company with cargo-scanning technology, required them to scan all of their inbound cargo at the port, and then, to pay for the scanning, charged each an additional fee on top of the existing fees that it already charged operators to utilize the port. A magistrate judge concluded that the additional fee was constitutional as applied to the three shipping operators equipped with the scanning technology and did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the three shipping operators failed to prove that the additional fee, as applied to them, violates the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Camara de Mercadeo v. Vazquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against MCRA, alleging that the stop sign violation for which MRCA cited him occurred on a “highway” as defined by Vehicle Code section 360, that Vehicle Code section 21 makes the provision of the Vehicle Code uniformly applicable to all “highways” located in California, that Vehicle Code section 21455.5 governs automated traffic enforcement systems, and that MRCA failed to comply with the requirements of Vehicle Code section 21455.5 in establishing its automated video camera traffic enforcement system. At issue on appeal is whether MCRA is unlawfully imposing administrative penalties - in substantive effect fines for moving traffic violations - on motor vehicle owners. The court concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that it is “immaterial” whether or not the roadway in MRCA-controlled parkland where plaintiff was administratively cited is a “highway” as defined in Vehicle Code section 360. Highway or not in plaintiff's case, the court found that the MRCA Ordinance does not conflict with Vehicle Code section 21’s general prohibition against local vehicle ordinances in favor of uniform state vehicle laws. Because the court held that MRCA’s automated video camera traffic enforcement system is not subject to the Vehicle Code’s provisions governing automated traffic enforcement systems, the trial court correctly sustained MRCA’s demurrer. View "Everett v. Mountains Recreation & Conservancy Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, airplane passengers, filed suit against Boeing in state court after a Boeing 777 hit a seawall at the end of a runway at the San Francisco International Airport and injured 49 passengers, killing three passengers. Suits were also brought in federal courts and were consolidated by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) under 28 U.S.C. 1407(a). Boeing removed the state suits to federal court, asserting admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333 and asserting federal officials' right to have claims against them resolved by federal courts under 28 U.S.C. 1442. The MDL decided that the state suits should be transferred to California to participate in the consolidated pretrial proceedings, but the district court remanded them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that Boeing was not entitled to remove under section 1442(a)(1) because Boeing was not acting as a federal officer in light of Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. However, the court concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction exists under section 1333(1) because section 1333(1) includes accidents caused by problems that occur in transocean commerce. In this case, the plane was a trans-ocean flight, a substitute for an ocean-going vessel. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions. View "Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation (tasked with regulating the transportation of hazardous materials) finalized extensive amendments to the regulations for the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, 7 49 C.F.R. 171-174 & 179). The regulations included substantial background information regarding the safety issues concerning the transportation of hazardous materials and prior train derailments leading to tragic harms. Chemical and fertilizer entities sought to enjoin the railway (CP) from imposing a requirement that any TIH materials transported on CP's railways be transported in normalized steel rail cars. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court held the Surface Transportation Board should address whether CP's requirement is reasonable in the first instance, denied the request for injunctive relief, and dismissed without prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding no likelihood of irreparable harm. The court rejected an argument that CP's requirement would amount to a national crisis for an adequate water supply or fertilizer for crops. Any minimum reduction in the ability to transport TIH materials by rail does not outweigh the real concerns which prompted CP to implement the requirement. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while working on the railroad, he filed suit against BNSF under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., alleging that he was injured because of BNSF's negligence. A jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him over $3 million in damages. BNSF appealed. The court rejected BNSF's argument that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., and its regulations preclude plaintiff's FELA claim. Rather, the court concluded that the FRSA and its regulations do not preclude federal claims under FELA and rejected BNSF's other contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fair v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which regulates taxis and other cars for hire in New York City, engaged in a lengthy process to create the “Taxi of Tomorrow.” The process culminated in rules that established a particular make and model of vehicle as the City’s official taxicab. Petitioners sought to invalidate the rules and obtain a related declaration, arguing that the TLC lacked authority to enact the rules and violated the separation of powers doctrine in doing so. Supreme Court concluded that the rules were invalid because the TLC exceeded its authority under the City Charter and violated the separation of powers by intruding in the City Council’s domain. The Appellate Division reversed and declared that the rules were valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the TLC did not exceed its authority or violate the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the rules. View "Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n" on Justia Law

Beck filed suit against its franchisor, GM, for claims arising under the Motor Vehicle Dealer Act, N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law 460-473, and state contract law. The court certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) Is a performance standard that requires ʺaverageʺ performance based on statewide sales data in order for an automobile dealer to retain its dealership ʺunreasonable, arbitrary, or unfairʺ under New York Vehicle & Traffic Law section 463(2)(gg) because it does not account for local variations beyond adjusting for the local popularity of general vehicle types? and (2) Does a change to a franchiseeʹs Area of Primary Responsibility or AGSSA constitute a prohibited ʺmodificationʺ to the franchise under section 463(2)(ff), even though the standard terms of the Dealer Agreement reserve the franchisorʹs right to alter the Area of Primary Responsibility or AGSSA in its sole discretion?  Further, the court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffʹs vehicle allocation claim, denying plaintiffʹs request for attorneyʹs fees, or dismissing defendantʹs counterclaim for rescission. View "Beck Chevrolet v. General Motors" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Road Toll Law imposed a road toll “upon the sale of each gallon of motor fuel sold by distributors thereof.” On multiple occasions between June 2008 and March 2011, Marco Petroleum Industries, Inc., contracted with Irving Oil Terminals, Inc. (Irving) for the purchase of diesel fuel. These purchases totaled 603,138 gallons. Each purchase included the transfer of fuel by Irving, at its facility located in Revere, Massachusetts, into trucks operated by P.S. Marston, LLC (Marston). Marston and Marco shared a business address in North Hampton. Marston transported the fuel from Revere to Marco’s facility in North Hampton; Marston invoiced Marco for the deliveries; and Marco paid those bills. The bill of lading issued by Irving for each sale was identical except for the date of sale, amount of fuel purchased, and the invoice amount. Also in connection with each purchase, Marco paid the Massachusetts fuel tax to Irving, and Irving then forwarded the funds to Massachusetts. In 2012, the Department of Safety (DOS) audited Marco’s “Motor Fuel Distributor” account and concluded that Marco imported motor fuel into New Hampshire without a license and therefore failed to report and pay the required New Hampshire road toll on the 603,138 gallons of fuel purchased from Irving. The DOS calculated that Marco owed the State $155,070.71. Marco challenged the DOS audit, arguing that the DOS and the trial court erred by finding that Marco was required to pay the road toll because: (1) it was not a “distributor” of motor fuels under RSA 259:21 (2014); (2) it did not “sell” motor fuel under RSA 260:32 (2014) (amended 2014); and (3) it would be unfair to require Marco to pay the New Hampshire road toll because it had already paid the Massachusetts fuel tax. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marco Petroleum Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, New Hamp. Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law