Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

KCI’s Transit Division provides bus and shuttle services on 32 set routes, four of which cross state lines. From 2009 through 2012, its revenue generated by interstate routes fluctuated between 1.0% and 9.7%. KCI trains drivers on multiple interstate and intrastate routes. KCI may assign a driver to any route on which he has been trained, including interstate routes, and may discipline a driver who refuses to drive an assigned route. As a “common carrier by motor vehicle” authorized to engage in interstate commerce, KCI is subject to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations and possesses a U.S. Department of Transportation registration number. KCI provides each driver with a “Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations Pocketbook” detailing the driver’s responsibilities under DOT regulations. Plaintiffs were drivers who, during the relevant period, worked more than 40 hours in a week without receiving overtime pay; 1.3% of their trips required them to cross state lines. Resch filed a purported collective action to recover unpaid overtime. The district court conditionally certified a class. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of KCI, holding that Plaintiffs are ineligible for overtime under the Motor Carrier Act exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1), and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. View "Resch v. Krapf's Coaches Inc" on Justia Law

Cuahutemoc Gonzalez contracted with several companies, including a company owned by Robert Garcia, to transport silage from a farm. Garcia brought to the farm a tandem truck and a new driver, Raymond Ramierz. During the tandem truck’s first trip, Ramirez collided with a car in which a mother and daughter were traveling. The collision killed all three. Samuel Jackson, the daughter’s father and mother’s former husband, filed suit against Gonzalez, seeking to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of Garcia and Ramirez based on Gonzalez’s alleged status as a motor carrier under both the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (Federal Regulations) and their Texas counterparts (Texas Regulations). Ramirez’s family (the Ramirezes) intervened and asserted negligence claims against Gonzalez under common-law theories of retained control over an independent contract and joint enterprise. The trial court granted Gonzalez’s no-evidence motions for summary judgment as to both the Ramirezes’ and Jackson’s claims. The court of appeals reversed as to the no-evidence summary judgment on Jackson’s claim under the Texas Regulations and on the Ramirezes’ negligence claims based on retained control. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Gonzalez cannot be held liable as a motor carrier under either the Federal Regulations or the Texas Regulations; and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to show that the same party retained sufficient control over the transportation in which the truck was engaged to owe Ramirez a common-law duty. View "Gonzalez v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Union Pacific Railway, and Stickle, alleging that failure to properly build and maintain railway bridges over the Cedar River caused or exacerbated the 2008 flood and that the decision to attempt to stabilize the bridges by weighing them down with railcars filled with ballast caused or exacerbated the flooding of their properties, either because bridges collapsed and effectively dammed the river and blocked drainage, or because railcars on bridges that did not collapse blocked the free flow of the river and diverted water into low-lying areas. Union Pacific filed Notice of Removal that asserted federal question jurisdiction and stated that attorneys for the co-defendants had no objection to removal, accompanied by a local rule certification that: “co-defendants have given their consent to the removal.” Stickle did not file notice of consent to removal until more than 30 days after Union Pacific was served. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved to remand, arguing that their claims were not completely preempted and that not all defendants had timely consented. The district court denied remand. The Eighth Circuit vacated, finding the consent adequate, but that the state claims were not completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 701. View "Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co." on Justia Law

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, that Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7521(a))requires regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from vehicles, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued coordinated rules governing the greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy of cars and trucks. In 2012 the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s car emission standards. Opponents, including purchasers of new vehicles and POP, a business that makes after-market modifications to diesel engines enabling them to run on vegetable oil, then challenged the car rules on procedural grounds; challenged EPA’s truck standards on procedural grounds; and challenged both agencies’ regulations concerning trucks as arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit declined to reach the merits. The purchasers of new vehicles, arguing that EPA neglected to comply with a nondiscretionary statutory duty to provide its emission standards to the Science Advisory Board prior to issuing them, lacked standing, having failed to identify a discrete injury that a favorable decision by the court would remedy. POP’s interest in promoting alternative fuel does not fall within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. 7521, the provision of the Clean Air Act governing emissions standards for motor vehicles. View "Delta Constr. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Illinois requires that motor carriers of property, conducting intrastate operations, obtain a license from the Illinois Commerce Commission, which requires appropriate insurance or surety coverage. A carrier complies by submitting proof of insurance or bond coverage and is then issued a public carrier certificate, stating that the holder “certifies to the Commission that it will perform transportation activities only with the lawful amount of liability insurance in accordance with 92 Ill. Admin. Code 1425.” Drivers must have a copy of the license with them at all times. It is a Class C misdemeanor offense for an operator not to produce proof of registration upon request. Three carriers were cited by the ICC police for conducting regulated activity without a license. During a follow-up investigation, the carriers refused to comply, reasoning that documents sought by the ICC would reveal their rates, routes, and services, so the requirement was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c). The ICC rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the ICC, concluding that the document requests had no significant economic impact on rates, routes or services and, alternatively, that efforts to enforce the licensing requirement are exempted from preemption. View "Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a towing company, filed a complaint and requested a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order, and both a preliminary and permanent injunction against the State and other governmental entities, alleging that two towing statutes enacted by the General Assembly in 2012 - Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-10A-04(a)(3) and (a)(7) - are arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable, as well as unconstitutional. The trial judge granted Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The State appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals certified to the Supreme Court three questions of law. The Court of Appeals answered the first question in the negative, thereby eliminating the need to address the remaining questions, holding that there was not a justiciable controversy where Plaintiff had not been prosecuted under the statutes, nor did Plaintiff allege or prove that there was a credible threat of prosecution for the acts proscribed by the statutes. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "State v. G & C Gulf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application to the Department of Transportation (Department) for authority to operate two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service. The Department denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving the statutory requirement that his livery service would improve present or future “public convenience and necessity.” The trial court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal from the Department’s denial of his permit application, holding that the Department improperly interpreted the “public convenience and necessity” provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-103(a). Remanded for a new hearing. View "Martorelli v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

BLET, a labor union under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, represents locomotive engineers and trainmen, including conductors and brakemen, who work for the railroad, a regional common carrier with 840 miles of track in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Maryland. In 2003, the railroad served notice, seeking to eliminate the “crew consist” of the Trainmen Agreement, so that it would not have to assign a union conductor to each train. BLET refused this proposed change. After several years of failed efforts at negotiation, the railroad began substituting management employees for contract conductors. BLET went on strike. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring BLET from taking economic action against the railroad, finding that the parties were engaged in a minor dispute. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal of the railroad’s complaint, finding that the dispute is major, not minor. Under the status quo requirement of the Act, the railroad was not free to implement at will the very change it sought to accomplish when it served the Section 6 notice on BLET. It did so anyway and prematurely resorted to self-help before the conclusion of the major dispute process. View "Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law