Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while working on the railroad, he filed suit against BNSF under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., alleging that he was injured because of BNSF's negligence. A jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him over $3 million in damages. BNSF appealed. The court rejected BNSF's argument that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., and its regulations preclude plaintiff's FELA claim. Rather, the court concluded that the FRSA and its regulations do not preclude federal claims under FELA and rejected BNSF's other contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fair v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which regulates taxis and other cars for hire in New York City, engaged in a lengthy process to create the “Taxi of Tomorrow.” The process culminated in rules that established a particular make and model of vehicle as the City’s official taxicab. Petitioners sought to invalidate the rules and obtain a related declaration, arguing that the TLC lacked authority to enact the rules and violated the separation of powers doctrine in doing so. Supreme Court concluded that the rules were invalid because the TLC exceeded its authority under the City Charter and violated the separation of powers by intruding in the City Council’s domain. The Appellate Division reversed and declared that the rules were valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the TLC did not exceed its authority or violate the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the rules. View "Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n" on Justia Law

Beck filed suit against its franchisor, GM, for claims arising under the Motor Vehicle Dealer Act, N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law 460-473, and state contract law. The court certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) Is a performance standard that requires ʺaverageʺ performance based on statewide sales data in order for an automobile dealer to retain its dealership ʺunreasonable, arbitrary, or unfairʺ under New York Vehicle & Traffic Law section 463(2)(gg) because it does not account for local variations beyond adjusting for the local popularity of general vehicle types? and (2) Does a change to a franchiseeʹs Area of Primary Responsibility or AGSSA constitute a prohibited ʺmodificationʺ to the franchise under section 463(2)(ff), even though the standard terms of the Dealer Agreement reserve the franchisorʹs right to alter the Area of Primary Responsibility or AGSSA in its sole discretion?  Further, the court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffʹs vehicle allocation claim, denying plaintiffʹs request for attorneyʹs fees, or dismissing defendantʹs counterclaim for rescission. View "Beck Chevrolet v. General Motors" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Road Toll Law imposed a road toll “upon the sale of each gallon of motor fuel sold by distributors thereof.” On multiple occasions between June 2008 and March 2011, Marco Petroleum Industries, Inc., contracted with Irving Oil Terminals, Inc. (Irving) for the purchase of diesel fuel. These purchases totaled 603,138 gallons. Each purchase included the transfer of fuel by Irving, at its facility located in Revere, Massachusetts, into trucks operated by P.S. Marston, LLC (Marston). Marston and Marco shared a business address in North Hampton. Marston transported the fuel from Revere to Marco’s facility in North Hampton; Marston invoiced Marco for the deliveries; and Marco paid those bills. The bill of lading issued by Irving for each sale was identical except for the date of sale, amount of fuel purchased, and the invoice amount. Also in connection with each purchase, Marco paid the Massachusetts fuel tax to Irving, and Irving then forwarded the funds to Massachusetts. In 2012, the Department of Safety (DOS) audited Marco’s “Motor Fuel Distributor” account and concluded that Marco imported motor fuel into New Hampshire without a license and therefore failed to report and pay the required New Hampshire road toll on the 603,138 gallons of fuel purchased from Irving. The DOS calculated that Marco owed the State $155,070.71. Marco challenged the DOS audit, arguing that the DOS and the trial court erred by finding that Marco was required to pay the road toll because: (1) it was not a “distributor” of motor fuels under RSA 259:21 (2014); (2) it did not “sell” motor fuel under RSA 260:32 (2014) (amended 2014); and (3) it would be unfair to require Marco to pay the New Hampshire road toll because it had already paid the Massachusetts fuel tax. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marco Petroleum Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, New Hamp. Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

KCI’s Transit Division provides bus and shuttle services on 32 set routes, four of which cross state lines. From 2009 through 2012, its revenue generated by interstate routes fluctuated between 1.0% and 9.7%. KCI trains drivers on multiple interstate and intrastate routes. KCI may assign a driver to any route on which he has been trained, including interstate routes, and may discipline a driver who refuses to drive an assigned route. As a “common carrier by motor vehicle” authorized to engage in interstate commerce, KCI is subject to Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations and possesses a U.S. Department of Transportation registration number. KCI provides each driver with a “Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations Pocketbook” detailing the driver’s responsibilities under DOT regulations. Plaintiffs were drivers who, during the relevant period, worked more than 40 hours in a week without receiving overtime pay; 1.3% of their trips required them to cross state lines. Resch filed a purported collective action to recover unpaid overtime. The district court conditionally certified a class. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of KCI, holding that Plaintiffs are ineligible for overtime under the Motor Carrier Act exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1), and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. View "Resch v. Krapf's Coaches Inc" on Justia Law

Cuahutemoc Gonzalez contracted with several companies, including a company owned by Robert Garcia, to transport silage from a farm. Garcia brought to the farm a tandem truck and a new driver, Raymond Ramierz. During the tandem truck’s first trip, Ramirez collided with a car in which a mother and daughter were traveling. The collision killed all three. Samuel Jackson, the daughter’s father and mother’s former husband, filed suit against Gonzalez, seeking to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of Garcia and Ramirez based on Gonzalez’s alleged status as a motor carrier under both the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (Federal Regulations) and their Texas counterparts (Texas Regulations). Ramirez’s family (the Ramirezes) intervened and asserted negligence claims against Gonzalez under common-law theories of retained control over an independent contract and joint enterprise. The trial court granted Gonzalez’s no-evidence motions for summary judgment as to both the Ramirezes’ and Jackson’s claims. The court of appeals reversed as to the no-evidence summary judgment on Jackson’s claim under the Texas Regulations and on the Ramirezes’ negligence claims based on retained control. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Gonzalez cannot be held liable as a motor carrier under either the Federal Regulations or the Texas Regulations; and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to show that the same party retained sufficient control over the transportation in which the truck was engaged to owe Ramirez a common-law duty. View "Gonzalez v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Union Pacific Railway, and Stickle, alleging that failure to properly build and maintain railway bridges over the Cedar River caused or exacerbated the 2008 flood and that the decision to attempt to stabilize the bridges by weighing them down with railcars filled with ballast caused or exacerbated the flooding of their properties, either because bridges collapsed and effectively dammed the river and blocked drainage, or because railcars on bridges that did not collapse blocked the free flow of the river and diverted water into low-lying areas. Union Pacific filed Notice of Removal that asserted federal question jurisdiction and stated that attorneys for the co-defendants had no objection to removal, accompanied by a local rule certification that: “co-defendants have given their consent to the removal.” Stickle did not file notice of consent to removal until more than 30 days after Union Pacific was served. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved to remand, arguing that their claims were not completely preempted and that not all defendants had timely consented. The district court denied remand. The Eighth Circuit vacated, finding the consent adequate, but that the state claims were not completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 701. View "Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co." on Justia Law

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, that Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7521(a))requires regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from vehicles, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued coordinated rules governing the greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy of cars and trucks. In 2012 the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s car emission standards. Opponents, including purchasers of new vehicles and POP, a business that makes after-market modifications to diesel engines enabling them to run on vegetable oil, then challenged the car rules on procedural grounds; challenged EPA’s truck standards on procedural grounds; and challenged both agencies’ regulations concerning trucks as arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit declined to reach the merits. The purchasers of new vehicles, arguing that EPA neglected to comply with a nondiscretionary statutory duty to provide its emission standards to the Science Advisory Board prior to issuing them, lacked standing, having failed to identify a discrete injury that a favorable decision by the court would remedy. POP’s interest in promoting alternative fuel does not fall within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. 7521, the provision of the Clean Air Act governing emissions standards for motor vehicles. View "Delta Constr. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law