Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, that Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7521(a))requires regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from vehicles, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued coordinated rules governing the greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy of cars and trucks. In 2012 the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s car emission standards. Opponents, including purchasers of new vehicles and POP, a business that makes after-market modifications to diesel engines enabling them to run on vegetable oil, then challenged the car rules on procedural grounds; challenged EPA’s truck standards on procedural grounds; and challenged both agencies’ regulations concerning trucks as arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit declined to reach the merits. The purchasers of new vehicles, arguing that EPA neglected to comply with a nondiscretionary statutory duty to provide its emission standards to the Science Advisory Board prior to issuing them, lacked standing, having failed to identify a discrete injury that a favorable decision by the court would remedy. POP’s interest in promoting alternative fuel does not fall within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. 7521, the provision of the Clean Air Act governing emissions standards for motor vehicles. View "Delta Constr. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Illinois requires that motor carriers of property, conducting intrastate operations, obtain a license from the Illinois Commerce Commission, which requires appropriate insurance or surety coverage. A carrier complies by submitting proof of insurance or bond coverage and is then issued a public carrier certificate, stating that the holder “certifies to the Commission that it will perform transportation activities only with the lawful amount of liability insurance in accordance with 92 Ill. Admin. Code 1425.” Drivers must have a copy of the license with them at all times. It is a Class C misdemeanor offense for an operator not to produce proof of registration upon request. Three carriers were cited by the ICC police for conducting regulated activity without a license. During a follow-up investigation, the carriers refused to comply, reasoning that documents sought by the ICC would reveal their rates, routes, and services, so the requirement was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c). The ICC rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the ICC, concluding that the document requests had no significant economic impact on rates, routes or services and, alternatively, that efforts to enforce the licensing requirement are exempted from preemption. View "Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a towing company, filed a complaint and requested a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order, and both a preliminary and permanent injunction against the State and other governmental entities, alleging that two towing statutes enacted by the General Assembly in 2012 - Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-10A-04(a)(3) and (a)(7) - are arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable, as well as unconstitutional. The trial judge granted Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The State appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals certified to the Supreme Court three questions of law. The Court of Appeals answered the first question in the negative, thereby eliminating the need to address the remaining questions, holding that there was not a justiciable controversy where Plaintiff had not been prosecuted under the statutes, nor did Plaintiff allege or prove that there was a credible threat of prosecution for the acts proscribed by the statutes. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "State v. G & C Gulf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application to the Department of Transportation (Department) for authority to operate two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service. The Department denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving the statutory requirement that his livery service would improve present or future “public convenience and necessity.” The trial court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal from the Department’s denial of his permit application, holding that the Department improperly interpreted the “public convenience and necessity” provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-103(a). Remanded for a new hearing. View "Martorelli v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

BLET, a labor union under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, represents locomotive engineers and trainmen, including conductors and brakemen, who work for the railroad, a regional common carrier with 840 miles of track in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Maryland. In 2003, the railroad served notice, seeking to eliminate the “crew consist” of the Trainmen Agreement, so that it would not have to assign a union conductor to each train. BLET refused this proposed change. After several years of failed efforts at negotiation, the railroad began substituting management employees for contract conductors. BLET went on strike. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring BLET from taking economic action against the railroad, finding that the parties were engaged in a minor dispute. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal of the railroad’s complaint, finding that the dispute is major, not minor. Under the status quo requirement of the Act, the railroad was not free to implement at will the very change it sought to accomplish when it served the Section 6 notice on BLET. It did so anyway and prematurely resorted to self-help before the conclusion of the major dispute process. View "Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1953, New York and New Jersey entered into the Waterfront Commission Act, establishing the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to govern operations at the Port of New York‐New Jersey. At that time, individual pieces of cargo were loaded onto trucks, driven to the pier, and then unloaded for loading, piece‐by‐piece, onto the vessel. Similarly, arriving cargo was handled piece-by-piece. Containerization transformed shipping: a shipper loads cargo into a large container, which is loaded onto a truck and transported to the pier, where it is lifted aboard a ship. Continental operates warehouses, including one at 112 Port Jersey Boulevard, Jersey City. Continental picks up containers from the Global Marine Terminal, transports them to the Warehouse, unloads them, and removes their contents. Continental stores the freight and provides other services, such as sampling, weighing. and wrapping. In 2011, the Commission advised Continental that it was required to obtain a stevedore license, concluding that the property line and building of the 112 Warehouse were within 1,000 yards of a pier. Continental sought a declaratory judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that Continental engages in stevedoring activities at the warehouse and that the warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ under the Act and within the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Cont'l Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor" on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific freight train carrying steel injection molds to Plano Molding in Illinois derailed in Oklahoma; the molds broke through the floor of their shipping container, causing that train car and many behind it to derail. The molds had been manufactured in China and shipped to the U.S. before being transferred to the train. Three companies that were involved in the shipment and that sustained losses sued Plano, claiming that a company Plano hired packed the molds improperly, causing the floor of the container to break and ultimately causing the derailment, so that Plano was liable for breach of a warranty found in the “World Bill of Lading,” which provided shipping terms. Plano argued that the molds were properly packed and that they fell through the floor of the container because the container was defective. The district court found in favor of Plano, finding that the derailment was caused by deficiencies in the container. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plano had no obligation to explain why the accident occurred. Once the court found that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that Plano had breached the warranty, the actual cause of the accident became legally irrelevant. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, while operating a truck, Yelder, an employee of Yelder-N-Son Trucking, collided with a Tri-National truck, causing extensive property damage. Tri-National filed a claim with its insurer, Harco, which paid $91,100 and retained a subrogation interest. Yelder was insured by Canal with an MCS-90 endorsement, mandated by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. In 2010, Canal sought a declaratory judgment against the Yelder defendants and Harco. An Alabama court entered default judgment against the Yelder defendants only, stating Canal had no duty to defend or indemnify them under the Canal policy. The court made no declaration about whether the MCS-90 endorsement requires a tortfeasor’s insurer to compensate an injured party when the injured party has already been compensated by its own insurer. Tri-National then sued the Yelders in Missouri and obtained a $91,100 default judgment. Tri-National sought equitable garnishment against Canal, apparently on behalf of Harco. Canal removed the action to the federal district court, which granted Tri-National’s motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the MCS-90 does require such compensation. The circumstance of Tri-National carrying its own insurance did not absolve Canal of its obligations under the endorsement View "Tri-National, Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co." on Justia Law