Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

After Continental and United Air Lines merged, they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity rosters for pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association represents all of the pilots. In 2012 the new United and the Union reached an agreement that sets pilot pay based on: rank (captain vs. first officer), type of aircraft flown, and longevity, defined as all time since the date a pilot was hired, including time spent on furlough. Pre-merger, pilots on furlough accrued seniority but not longevity. Plaintiffs challenged ancillary Agreement 25, under which pilots in active service longer than four years and seven months would receive no credit for furlough time; pilots who had four years and six months of service could claim only one month of furlough; and so on. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision slots 475 former United pilots into the table behind former Continental pilots who were hired before May 6, 2008, in violation of the main agreement, and accused the Union of inadequate representation (DFR claim). Defendants replied that the main agreement governs the future, after Agreement 25 determines the pilots’ starting positions. The district judge dismissed United as a party because disputes about the meaning of an airline industry collective bargaining agreement are within the exclusive authority of an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act, leaving plaintiffs unable to establish both that United violated the contract and that the union did not represent workers fairly. They then argued that the Union negotiated a bad contract. The district court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, with pilots on different sides of the issue, a compromise that favored some over others was inevitable. View "Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging that BNSF violated the anti-retaliation mandate in the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109(a), when BNSF terminated him. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's FRSA claim failed because he failed to present a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination where plaintiff's protected activity was completely unrelated to the fouling-the-tracks incident that led to his discharge. BNSF submitted clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged plaintiff whether or not he had made unrelated reports that were activity protected by the FRSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded in mid-air and crashed eight miles south of Long Island, New York. After an investigation that was the largest and most expensive in the history of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the NTSB accepted the CIA’s assessment of eyewitness accounts and concluded that a mechanical explosion caused the crash. Theorizing that the CIA was covering up the true cause of the crash, Plaintiff requested certain documents from the investigation. The district granted summary judgment for the CIA, concluding that the Freedom of Information Act permitted the agency to withhold the requested documents. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the CIA’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the CIA properly withheld the materials under the Act. View "Stalcup v. Cent. Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

The “B Prong” of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B(a)(2), requires that workers perform a service outside the usual course of the employer’s business to be classified as independent contractors. The Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA) filed an action for a declaration that the B Prong is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Act (FAAAA), and for an injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing section 148B(a)(2) against the MDA’s members. The FAAAA preempts state laws that “relate to” the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier “with respect to the transportation of property.” The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt section 148B(a)(2). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted the preemption test under the FAAAA and incorrectly applied the test to section 148B(a)(2). Remanded. View "Mass. Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley" on Justia Law

North Coast Railroad Authority (NCRA), a public agency established by Government Code section 93000, entered into a contract with the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (NWPRC), allowing NWPRC to conduct freight rail service on tracks controlled by NCRA. Two environmental groups filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21050, 21168.5, to challenge NCRA’s certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of NWPRC’s freight operations. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding CEQA review was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA; 49 U.S.C. 10101) and rejecting a claim that NCRA and NWPRC were estopped from arguing otherwise. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the ICCTA preempts only the “regulation” of rail transportation, whereas NCRA agreed to conduct a CEQA review of the rail operations and related repair/maintenance activities as part of a contract allowing it to receive state funds. NCRA and NWPRC are not estopped from claiming no EIR was required, due to positions taken in previous proceedings and the EIR was not insufficient for improperly “segmenting” the project, given that additional rail operations were contemplated on other sections of the line. View "Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast RR. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the decedent, brought a defective highway action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-144 against the Department of Transportation alleging that a truck lost control as it traveled down Avon Mountain along Route 44, resulting in the death of the decedent. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to state a claim under section 13a-144, claiming that the allegations did not fall within the limited exception to the general rule barring design defect claims under the defective highway statute. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to allege an actionable highway defect under section 13a-144. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly determined that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim under section 13a-144, as the plan of design providing for the steep downhill grade, together with the absence of tangible safety measures, as implemented, did not create an otherwise actionable highway defect as defined by case law. View "Stotler v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a defective highway action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-144 against the Department of Transportation alleging that he sustained severe injuries when a truck descending Avon Mountain along Route 44 experienced brake failure and collided with multiple vehicles, including Plaintiff’s. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 13a-144, and therefore, the action was barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, Defendant asserted that the allegations did not fall within the limited exception to the general rule barring design defect claims under the defective highway statute. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of action under section 13a-144. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity because it did not fall within the ambit of the defective highway statute. View "Cummings v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

This dispute concerns the Bonner Bridge, which provides highway access between mainland North Carolina and the Outer Bank's Hatteras Island. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f, and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. Defendants settled on a plan that essentially mirrors what currently exists: replacing the Bonner Bridge and maintaining NC 12 on Hatteras Island. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' NEPA challenge where defendants have not engaged in unlawful segmentation with respect to the five studied parallel bridge alternatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' Section 4(f) challenge because a Section 4(f) analysis is irrelevant if the joint planning exception applies. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. NC Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Sompo and Nipponkoa, subrogees of the cargo owners/shippers, filed suit against Defendants Norfolk Southern and KCSR to recover for the damages sustained to cargo by a train derailment. At issue in these appeals was the meaning and enforceability of provisions found in the bills of lading that purport to designate the ocean carrier as the sole entity responsible to the cargo owners for damage to the cargo. Further, Docket No. 13-3501 challenged Nipponkoa's ability to maintain its claim for contractual indemnification, a claim assigned to it by the upstream ocean carrier, against defendants. The court affirmed the judgment in Docket No. 13-3416 and concluded that summary judgment for defendants was proper where defendants are entitled to enforce the liability-limiting provision in the upstream carrier's bill of lading against plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment in Docket No. 13-3501 because defendants' arguments for reversal of Nipponkoa's judgment against them are all either waived or without merit. View "Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The People filed a complaint against Defendants, Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (Pac Anchor) and Alfredo Barajas, for violating the unfair competition law (UCL), alleging that Defendants misclassified drivers as independent contractors and committed other violations of California’s labor and unemployment insurance laws. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in Defendants’ favor, determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the People’s action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the People’s UCL action was not related to Pac Anchor’s price, route, or service as a motor carrier, the FAAAA did not preempt this action against Defendants. After noting that the FAAAA does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and services, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FAAAA did not preempt the People’s UCL action against Defendants in this case, as the UCL action was independent of Defendants’ price, routes, or services with respect to the transportation of property. View "People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc." on Justia Law