Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

C.H. Robinson was the Customs-bonded carrier for three 2001 entries of wearing apparel from China, which entered the U.S. as Transportation & Exportation (T&E) entries, but were never exported and are “missing.” A Mexican company was the importer of record and consignee of the merchandise; the T&E entry documents indicated that the merchandise was to be delivered to Laredo, Texas, for exportation to Mexico. The merchandise left Los Angeles, but it is not clear what happened after that. Customs never inspected or took possession of the subject merchandise at the Port of Laredo. During an audit, Customs contacted Mexican Customs authorities and learned that stamped importation forms were false. Customs issued notices of liquidated damages claims against C.H. Robinson’s custodial bond, charging misdelivery. Based upon mitigation guidelines, Customs reduced the amount of liquidated damages from $75,000. C.H. Robinson paid $57,212 in 2004 and sought a refund. Customs also made a demand, under 19 U.S.C. 1553, for payment of $106,407.86, plus interest, for duties, taxes, and fees on the entries. C.H. Robinson did not protest the demand or pay the duties, and its challenge to Commerce’s assessment of liquidated damages remained stayed. The Court of International Trade held C.H. Robinson liable for duties, taxes, and fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. C.H. Robinson Co." on Justia Law

The Village petitioned for review of the Board's denial of its request to reopen a 2008 proceeding in which the Board approved a railroad's acquisition of a Chicago-area railway company. The Village sought to reopen the proceeding based on a new study on traffic projection, based in part on post-acquisition traffic conditions. The court denied the petition for review because it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Village's claims of material error and because the Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the Village's new evidence did not warrant reopening of the Board's original decision. View "Village of Barrington, IL v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

CSX challenged the Board's issuance of a decision modifying its procedures for rate reasonableness cases. The court rejected CSX's argument that the Board violated its statutory mandate when it made simplified procedures available for all cases. The court concluded that the Board adequately explained its adoption of a new revenue-allocation methodology as well as its rationale for adopting a new interest rate for reparations. However, the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in raising the relief cap for its most simplified rate reasonableness procedure. It appears that the Board double-counted costs in producing its estimate without explanation. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Board to address this issue. View "CSX Transp., Inc., et al. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of PowerPoint presentations that the FMCSA posted on its website on May 16, 2012. Petitioners claimed that the presentations represented an "astonishing" change in agency policy, which the agency failed to subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the presentations did nothing more than explain the agency's Safety Measurement System, which was announced and implemented in 2010. The court dismissed the petition as untimely because, under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, challenges to agency rules, regulations, or final orders must be brought within 60 days of their issuance. View "Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transp., et al. v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

About 100 years ago, the then-owners of land abutting a 2.88-mile stretch of rail corridor near the City of South Hutchinson, Kansas granted deeds covering that land to the predecessor of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF). The corridor was used by BNSF until 2004. It was then converted to a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The current owners asserted that the conversion constituted a taking and sought compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Federal Claims entered summary judgment in favor of the government, finding that none of the plaintiffs possessed a fee-simple property interest in the land underlying the rail corridor that could be the subject of a taking because the land had been conveyed to the BNSF’s predecessor in fee simple and not by easements. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, finding that some of the land was conveyed to the BNSF’s predecessor in fee simple, but that the railroad was only granted an easement over other land. With respect to others, the issue was clouded by chain-of-title questions. View "Biery v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the Board addressed a rate dispute between a shipper and two railroads. The railroads contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the shipper and the shipper contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the railroads. The railroads and the shippers petitioned for review. The court concluded that the Board reasonably interpreted that the prior rates were not reasonable based on a Stand-Alone-Cost test that employs a hypothetical Stand Alone Railroad that is optimally efficient; the Board's calculation of the railroads' variable costs was reasonable and reasonably explained; and Arizona Electric lacked standing where the court could not detect a current injury to Arizona Electric from the Board's decision regarding the switch to proportional rates. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

The Union petitioned for review of the FRA's decision that the agency lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Union Pacific Railroad Company had authority under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to designate terminals for a new service the railroad had instituted in California. The court concluded that, because this was a dispute regarding interpretation of the CBA, it was governed by the procedures of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151a, for disputes requiring interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. The FRA correctly determined that this was fundamentally an issue of contract interpretation beyond its adjudicatory powers. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "United Transp. Union v. Foxx" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, alleging claims under MCA 39-2-703, which governs the liability of a railway for negligent mismanagement. BNSF removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of BNSF. The district court found that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-88. Applying the Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's state claim concerning a collision was not preempted. The right of railway employees to sue on the basis of negligence or mismanagement resulting in termination may be unusual in other jurisdictions, but such a right is undoubtedly recognized in Montana. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim concerning the conduct leading to the collision was independent of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and did not require interpretation by the CBA. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was not preempted by the RLA. The court also concluded that BNSF's disciplinary proceedings were not the legal cause of plaintiff's suspension and termination. Consequently, plaintiff's punitive damages claim was reinstated. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wolfe v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Corning hired Hyundai, an ocean shipper, to transport thin glass sheets for use in televisions and computer monitors from the U.S. to Asia. Although it is not clear when the damage occurred, damage was noted when Hyundai unloaded the containers from flatcars operated by its subcontractors (Norfolk Southern Railway and BNSF, another rail carrier). Corning had no role in selecting and no relationship with the subcontractors. There were opinions that the damage was caused by movement of the railcars, not by packing, but the actual cause was not established. Corning’s insurer paid Corning $664,679.88 and filed suit. The district court held that the case would proceed solely under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11706, apparently reasoning that the damage undisputedly occurred while the cargo was in the possession of a rail carrier. The court found that a Subcontracting Clause did not immunize the rail carriers from suit, but obligated Corning to indemnify Hyundai for any resultant claims by a subcontractor against Hyundai arising out of the same facts. The court held that a $500-per-package limit of liability did not apply to the rail carriers or Hyundai. After a jury trial, the court found Hyundai and the railroads liable, but denied prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hyundai, reversed and vacated judgments against the railroads, and remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest.View "CNA Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., Ltd." on Justia Law