Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Multistar, a for-hire motor carrier engaged in the business of transporting hazardous materials, petitioned for review of FMCSA's order to cease operations, and, in a separate petition for review, challenged the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for administrative review. The court dismissed the petitions insofar as they challenged the "unsatisfactory" rating and the order to cease operations because the court could not reach the merits of Multistar's substantive claims where there was no final agency decision. The court held that Multistar received all of the process it was due with regard to the contested violations, and the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for review was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Multistar Industries, Inc. v. USDOT, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jamie Webb, Jeffrey Hermanson, and Michaleen Jeronimus, challenged the legality of the City of Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles on certain city streets. Petitioners, a group of bicyclists, were cited and fined for riding their bikes on the only street providing access through town from the state highway to Central City. Petitioners argued that Black Hawk, as a home-rule municipality, lacked the authority to prohibit bicycles on local streets absent a suitable alternative bicycle route as provided by state statute. Both the trial and district courts ruled in favor of Black Hawk, finding the city had the authority to ban bicycles through both its home-rule and police powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles was a matter of mixed state and local concern and conflicts with and is preempted by state law. View "Webb v. Black Hawk" on Justia Law

Before 1997, the authority operated the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Boston extension of the turnpike, and the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels, crossing under Boston Harbor to connect downtown o the East Boston section. In 1997, while the massive "Big Dig" project was underway, the Legislature placed within authority stewardship the integrated system of roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other facilities known as the MHS, which included the Boston extension and the tunnels it had operated before, as well as the central artery, the central artery north area, and the Ted Williams Tunnel. G.L. c. 81A, 3. The authority was authorized to charge tolls "for transit over or through the [MHS] or any part thereof," and to adjust tolls so that, when supplemented by other revenues, they pay all the expenses of the MHS. The authority required drivers traveling through the Sumner and Williams Tunnels, and the Weston and Allston-Brighton interchanges of the Boston extension, to pay a toll, but did not charge a toll to drivers traveling through the Callahan Tunnel, the central artery, or the CANA. Plaintiffs claimed that tolls were unconstitutional to the extent they were spent on the nontolled portions of the MHS. The trial court dismissed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed.View "Murphy v. MA Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Appellant, an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). Appellant appealed, challenging his indeterminate civil commitment by asserting three substantive claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to indeterminately civilly commit an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe; (2) the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not preclude the State from presenting in the civil commitment proceeding evidence of conduct alleged in earlier criminal cases that ended in acquittals; and (3) Appellant waived his to right appellate review of his claim that the State violated the Minnesota Constitution when it committed him without a trial by jury. View "Beaulieu v. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, struck by an Amtrak train across railroad tracks owned and maintained by Illinois Central, claimed that Illinois Central failed to signalize the crossing properly. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding an expert's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The court also held that Illinois Central demonstrated that the crossing at issue was not "unusually dangerous" as a matter of Mississippi law. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Illinois Central. View "Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Hackett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), and aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3). He moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle so that evidence gathered after the improper stop constituted fruit of an unlawful search. The stated basis for the stop was improper lane usage. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that momentary crossings of a highway lane line did not give the officer reasonable grounds to make the stop. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To establish probable cause that a violation of the lane usage statute has occurred, the officer must point to facts which support a reasonable belief that defendant has deviated from his established lane of travel and that it was “practicable” for him to have remained constant in his proper lane. A traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. Here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason; an investigatory stop was proper. View "People v. Hackett" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an accident involving an automobile and a tractor-trailer. Appellants, the driver of the automobile and his wife, filed suit against Appellees, the driver of the truck, the individual who leased the truck, and the owner of the truck, alleging negligence and requesting punitive damages for alleged violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). Before trial, the circuit court entered an order excluding evidence of Appellees' failure to conduct a post-accident drug-and-alcohol testing. Appellees also asked to bifurcate the proceedings to exclude from the compensatory-damages phase of the trial evidence that was relevant only to punitive damages, but the circuit court did not address the motion. At the conclusion of Appellants' case, the circuit court granted Appellees' motion for directed verdict with regard to punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that Appellees failed to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements of the FMCSR; and (2) Appellants' second argument that the circuit court erred in granting Appellees' motion for directed verdict on punitive damages, which was premised on bifurcation, was not appropriate, as an opinion the Court could offer would only be advisory.View "Brumley v. Keech" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiffs Jacon and Laura Jongeward, and Gordon and Jeannie Jongeward asserted a timber trespass claim against defendant BNSF Railway Company when a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed the Jongewards' trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Jongeward v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiff Broughton Lumber Company asserted a timber trespass claim against defendants BNSF Railway Company and Harsco Corporation in the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division, after a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed Broughton's trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

Oliver Arlington was employed by Miller's Trucking as a log truck driver and loader operator pursuant to an oral employment agreement. For his work, Miller's paid Arlington twenty-five percent of the "load rate" as calculated by Miller's. Arlington, however, asserted that according to the parties' oral agreement, he should have been paid a salary in the form of annual wages. Arlington filed a wage claim, seeking the pay he alleged he was owed in regular and overtime wages. The Department of Labor and Industry's bureau dismissed Arlington's claim for lack of merit and lack of sufficient evidence. On appeal, a bureau hearing officer dismissed Arlington's claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to require Miller's to produce material requested by Arlington and in refusing to admit tendered evidence, prejudicing the substantial rights of Arlington, and the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's judgment; and (2) the hearing officer and district court incorrectly determined that Arlington engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of the operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce and thus was exempt from overtime requirements. Remanded.View "Arlington v. Miller's Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law