Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

Federal regulators limit the number of hours during which commercial truck drivers may operate their vehicles in a given day and over the course of a week, 49 C.F.R. 395.8(b) (2010). The traditional paper system for recording time is subject to manipulation and falsification. When the FMCSA considered requiring truckers to use electronic on-board records (EOBRs) instead of logbooks for documenting their records of duty status, it acknowledged that Congress contemplated rules mandating electronic monitoring, but also required the agency to ensure that any such device is not used to "harass vehicle operators." The 2010 final rule applied to motor carriers "that have demonstrated serious The Seventh Circuit held that the rule is invalid because the agency failed to consider an issue that it was statutorily required to address. View "Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the proposed construction by the Port of Portland of a new runway at Hillsboro Airport (HIO). On appeal, petitioners argued that the decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unreasonable for several reasons, chief among them the FAA's failure to consider the environmental impacts of any increased demand for HIO resulting from the addition of a runway. Petitioners also argued that the FAA did not afford them a public hearing within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 47106. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the Port's and the FAA's arguments that petitioners waived their claims because they failed to raise them during the public comment period. The court held, after finding that certain precedents did not apply here, that remand was necessary for the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project, if any, pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b). The court also held that an EIS was not warranted based on petitioners' contention that the context and intensity of the project independently required an EIS. The court further held that petitioners' arguments regarding whether the FAA afforded them a public hearing was unpersuasive where the hearing afforded petitioners was a "public hearing" within the meaning of section 47106 and FAA Order 5050.4B. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions to the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project pursuant to section 1508.8(b). View "Barnes, et al. v. US Dept. of Transportation, et al." on Justia Law

This negligence suit under Georgia law stemmed from an injury plaintiff suffered as he unloaded freight from a railcar in July 2005. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to defendants because there were triable issues as to whether defendants were negligent in failing to regularly inspect or maintain the bulkhead door. The court held that the district court was correct in granting defendants summary judgment where plaintiff presented no evidence from which a jury could infer that defendants' omissions, even if negligent, were a proximate cause of his injury, an essential element of his negligence claim under Georgia law. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker, et al. v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate. View "Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Transp." on Justia Law

These appeals involved two essentially identical actions filed in two different states by different groups of plaintiffs, each seeking to represent a class. The actions sought damages on the ground that plaintiffs' personal information was obtained by defendants in violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725. Joining other courts which have dealt with similar claims, the court held that defendants' actions were not unlawful under the DPPA and affirmed the dismissal of the actions by the district courts. View "Howard, et al. v. Oregonian Publishing Co., et al.; Rodriquez et al. v. AMPCO Parking Sys., et al." on Justia Law

Appellants sued appellee under 49 U.S.C. 14103(a) for the reimbursement of fees associated with the loading and unloading of its trucks at appellee's facilities. Appellants subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly read section 14103(a) to preclude relief for unreimbursed "lumping" absent a plaintiff-trucker's affirmative showing that he or she was not reimbursed by either the shipper or the receiver. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order of summary judgment where appellants failed to identify any of its trucks whom a shipper had not already reimbursed. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assoc., et al. v. Supervalu, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a joint petition for review of an order of the Surface Transportation Board (Board), which found, among other things, that a railroad company's practice of charging petitioners interest on certain unpaid charges at a rate of 1-2% per month was not an unreasonable practice under 49 U.S.C. 10702(2). The Board filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that 28 U.S.C. 1336(b) vested a federal district court with jurisdiction to review the Board's determination of the interest-rate issue to the extent one of the petitioners (Railroad Salvage) raised it. The court agreed and dismissed the petition to the extent that it asked the court to review the Board's resolution of the interest-rate issue with respect to Railroad Salvage. The court held that, although its jurisdiction to review the Board's determination of the interest-rate issue as to the other petitioner (Wiedeman) was not in dispute, its resolution of the issue could moot the referring district court's resolution of the issue with respect to Railroad Salvage. To ensure that the district court was allowed a meaningful review of the issue, the court held the petition in abeyance to the extent Wiedeman sought review of the Board's determination of the interest-rate issue. View "Railroad Salvage & Restoration, et al. v. Surface Transportation Board, et al." on Justia Law

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025.

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order. View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues. View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., et al." on Justia Law