Justia Transportation Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Detroit International Bridge Company was immune from the City of Detroit’s zoning ordinances because it was a federal instrumentality for the limited purpose of facilitating commerce over the Ambassador Bridge, which connects Detroit to Ontario, Canada. The federal government was not a party to the suit. Commodities Export, which owned property near the Bridge, later filed suit against Detroit and the United States, claiming that the Bridge Company had unilaterally condemned roads around its property, cutting off the land and causing a regulatory taking. It claimed that Detroit was liable for failing to enforce its own ordinances and demanded that the United States take a position on the Bridge Company’s federal-instrumentality status and control the Company’s actions. The United States cross-claimed against Bridge Company, alleging that it had misappropriated the title of “federal instrumentality.” The district court granted summary judgment for the United States and dismissed the action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over the government’s cross-claim and owe no deference to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal common law. Bridge Company is not a federal instrumentality. View "Commodities Exp. Co. v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co." on Justia Law

In 1903 the railroad acquired a right-of-way for a 100-foot wide, 76-mile long, strip across Arizona land near the Mexican border. After operating for about 100 years, the railroad initiated proceedings to abandon the railway with the Department of Transportation’s Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail or Abandonment (NITU) in 2006 authorizing conversion to a public trail under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The landowners sued, alleging that issuance of the NITU constituted a compensable taking. The claims court dismissed, reasoning that the government had not physically invaded the property. The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the takings claim accrued when the 2006 NITU issued. During discovery on remand, the government produced a NITU affecting the property that had issued in 1998. There was no indication that the NITU was published; the landowners submitted declarations that they were not aware of the 1998 NITU. The claims court held that the limitations period began in 1998 and that the claims were time-barred. The Federal Circuit reversed. In these circumstances, the government’s interest in bright-line legal rules must yield to the landowners’ right to receive actual or constructive notice that their claims have accrued. View "Ladd v. United States" on Justia Law

Faith Malpeli brought an inverse condemnation action against the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT), seeking compensation for the alleged taking of her property as a result of the reconstruction of Montana Highway 191 near Big Sky during a highway safety improvement project. A jury found that MDT had not taken a property right belonging to Malpeli, and therefore did not reach the question of compensation. Malpeli appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by: (1) denying Malpeli's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial; (2) excluding Malpeli's appraiser from testifying; and (3) allowing MDT to disclose to the jury an offer of compromise it had made to Malpeli before this action was filed. MDT cross-appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by denying its motion for partial summary judgment before trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court determined that the motion for summary judgment should have been granted, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of MDT.View "Malpeli v. Montana" on Justia Law

Before 1997, the authority operated the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Boston extension of the turnpike, and the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels, crossing under Boston Harbor to connect downtown o the East Boston section. In 1997, while the massive "Big Dig" project was underway, the Legislature placed within authority stewardship the integrated system of roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other facilities known as the MHS, which included the Boston extension and the tunnels it had operated before, as well as the central artery, the central artery north area, and the Ted Williams Tunnel. G.L. c. 81A, 3. The authority was authorized to charge tolls "for transit over or through the [MHS] or any part thereof," and to adjust tolls so that, when supplemented by other revenues, they pay all the expenses of the MHS. The authority required drivers traveling through the Sumner and Williams Tunnels, and the Weston and Allston-Brighton interchanges of the Boston extension, to pay a toll, but did not charge a toll to drivers traveling through the Callahan Tunnel, the central artery, or the CANA. Plaintiffs claimed that tolls were unconstitutional to the extent they were spent on the nontolled portions of the MHS. The trial court dismissed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed.View "Murphy v. MA Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Appellant, an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). Appellant appealed, challenging his indeterminate civil commitment by asserting three substantive claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to indeterminately civilly commit an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe; (2) the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not preclude the State from presenting in the civil commitment proceeding evidence of conduct alleged in earlier criminal cases that ended in acquittals; and (3) Appellant waived his to right appellate review of his claim that the State violated the Minnesota Constitution when it committed him without a trial by jury. View "Beaulieu v. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Hackett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A), and aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3). He moved to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle so that evidence gathered after the improper stop constituted fruit of an unlawful search. The stated basis for the stop was improper lane usage. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, finding that momentary crossings of a highway lane line did not give the officer reasonable grounds to make the stop. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To establish probable cause that a violation of the lane usage statute has occurred, the officer must point to facts which support a reasonable belief that defendant has deviated from his established lane of travel and that it was “practicable” for him to have remained constant in his proper lane. A traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. Here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious reason; an investigatory stop was proper. View "People v. Hackett" on Justia Law

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) entered into an agreement, pursuant to the Rail Enhancement Fund created by Va. Code Ann. 33.1-221.1:1.1, to grant funds to Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) for the development of an intermodal terminal in Montgomery County. Appellant, Montgomery County, instituted on action against DRPT, DRPT's director, and the Commonwealth Transportation Board, claiming that section 33.1-221.1:1.1 and the agreement were unconstitutional pursuant to the state Constitution's internal improvements clause and credit clause, and sought to enjoin their administration. Norfolk Southern subsequently intervened as a defendant. The circuit court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 33.1-221.1:1.1, as applied in this case, did not violate either the internal improvements clause or the credit clause of the Constitution of Virginia.View "Montgomery County v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp." on Justia Law

Appellants, St. Louis County and St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC), filed suit against Prestige Travel and numerous other online travel companies that facilitate the booking of hotel and motel rooms via the internet. The appellants argued that Prestige and the other companies were required to pay hotel and tourism taxes imposed by the revised ordinances of St. Louis County and state law. Prestige moved to dismiss the petition, and the circuit court overruled the motion. Shortly thereafter, H.B. 1442, which specifically exempted online travel companies such as Prestige from the tax, was passed. Prestige filed a motion to reconsider its motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed the case. Appellants appealed, arguing the law violated the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) appellants waived their constitutional challenge to the law by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity; (2) the law does not violate the original purpose requirement of the state constitution; and (3) the argument that the title of the law is so general that the bill should be invalidated in its entirety is not supported by the current state of law. View "St. Louis County v. Prestige Travel, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners, 23 transportation vendors, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to prevent the Department of Education ("DOE") from implementing allegedly illegal bid solicitations related to a school transportation contract. At issue was whether certain specifications in the bid solicitations of the DOE comported with the public bidding laws. The court held that the "Employee Protection Provisions" ("EPPs") contained in the solicitation were subject to heightened scrutiny and held that the DOE had not proven that the EPPs were designed to save the public money, encourage robust competition, or prevent favoritism. The court, however, applied the rational basis review to the remaining disputed bid specifications and held that the DOE's actions regarding pricing of school transportation and discounted payment arrangements were rational business judgments that lie within the DOE's discretion.View "In the Matter of L&M Bus Corp. " on Justia Law